POVERTY, DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STEPHEN LOFFREDO t

I guess it's all right to say to a man that he should lift himself by

his own bootstraps. But it's a cruel jest to say to a bootless man
that he should lift himself by his own bootstrap.
1
-Martin Luther King, Jr.

INTRODUCTION
In the winter of 1987, M. A., a homeless man in poor health,
challenged the constitutionality of a federal law that barred him
2
from receiving food stamps because he slept in a city-run shelter.

The shelter did not provide Mr. A. with the meals that his medical
condition required and it often ran out of food altogether so that
he frequently went hungry. 3 After repeated hospitalizations, Mr.
A. died of renal failure brought on by malnourishment and dehydration. 4 A federal district court subsequently found nothing irrational about a legislative classification that withheld food assistance
5
from a starving man.
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Helen Hershkoff.
1 Martin Luther King, Jr., The Future of Integration, Address at Kansas State
University, Manhattan, Kansas (Jan. 19,1968) (transcript available atThe King Center,
Library and Archive, Atlanta, GA).
2 See Chavis v. Lyng, No. 87 Civ. 1500 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (unreported decision). Mr.
A. was a member of a class composed of approximately 10,000 men and women who
resided in municipal shelters in New York City.
3 See Affidavit of M. A. 1 8, Chavis (No. 87 Civ. 1500).
4 See Plaintiffs' Brief in Further Support of Motions for Class Certification and
Preliminary Injunction at 1-2, Chavis (No.87 Civ. 1500). A temporary restraining
order had been obtained for Mr. A. at the outset of the lawsuit, but the provision of
food stamps at that juncture could not reverse the damage inflicted by months of
malnourishment. Id.
5 See Case notes on preliminary injunction hearing, Chavis (No. 87 Civ. 1500) (on
file with the author).
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Two decades ago, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional claims of poor people would be assessed under so-called rationality review. 6 The judiciary must broadly defer to political outcomes
in the area of "economics and social welfare," the Court declared,
even when they deny "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. " 7 The reasoning that led to this result is by
now familiar. First, since the Constitution does not expressly
guarantee material subsistence,8 the claims of people like Mr. A.
implicate no fundamental right or interest that commands special
judicial protection. Second, since the Court does not regard
poverty as a suspect classification, even explicit legislative discrimination against poor people does not trigger heightened judicial
scrutiny. Rather, the Court will tolerate even inhumane treatment
of poor people because "[u]nder our structure of government"
courts ought to defer to democratic decisionmaking, especially on
ordinary distributional matters. 10 By justifying its poverty cases in
this manner, the Court places considerable weight on a bare
assumption that poor people have fair access to the political
process. Yet the Court has never paused to consider whether the
political process is in fact "democratic" with respect to the poor.
For the millions like Mr. A., though, having their claims remitted to
"the democratic process" usually means no process at all.
This Article examines the Supreme Court's use of the rationality
standard in areas that affect poor people, and argues that the
political powerlessness of the poor requires some form of enhanced
judicial protection.
The Court's nearly limitless deference to
legislation that disadvantages poor people ignores the central role
that wealth plays in American politics."
Although the poor are

6See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (holding that the
constitutionality of social welfare legislation must be assessed under the same
deferential form of rationality review applicable to commercial regulations).
7Id. at 485.
8 The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not include a right to
minimum subsistence. See id. at 485-87 (holding that a state regulation fixing
maximum public assistance grant levels without regard to family size does not violate
equal protection).
9 See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) ("[T]his Court has never held
that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection
analysis."). See generally William H. Clune III, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth
Discriminations Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 SuP. CT. REv. 289, 327-36
(discussing "whether poverty shall even be recognized as a suspect classification").
10 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 596-97 (1987).
11 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE 310 (1983) ("The most common
form of powerlessness in the United States today derives from the dominance of
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generally recognized as a politically powerless minority, 12 the
Court's poverty discourse nevertheless treats society's most
marginalized members as though they were the fully empowered
equals of the more affluent.1 3 By contrast, commentators from
across the ideological spectrum recognize the realpolitik of money
and its dominance in the political sphere. 14 As Kevin Phillips puts
it, "it's hard to overstate the importance of American politics to
American wealth-and vice versa." 15 Indeed, the inordinate role
that wealth plays in American politics-and the political debilitation
caused by poverty-has been characterized
as the most pressing
6
today.'
democracy
American
to
threat
money in the sphere of politics."); David Adamany, PAC's and theDemocraticFinancing
of Politics, 22 ARiz. L. REV. 569, 571 (1980) (contending that inequalities of wealth
result in "differential participation by presumably equal citizens"); see also LARRY L.
BERG ET AL., CORRUPTION IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 43-46 (1976)
(explaining that those with access to wealth enjoy "weighted votes" in their ability to
exercise
disproportionate political influence).
12
See RALPH DOLGOFF & DONALD FELDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL WELFARE
155 (2d ed. 1984) (defining poverty as a lack of "command over resources" which
include power, access, and influence); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Centuty of Our
Constitution: Rethinking OurDuty to the Poor,39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 (1987) (discussing
"the poor's continuing political powerlessness"); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in
ConstitutionalLaw (with Special Reference to Pornography,Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1992) (discussing the uneven distribution of wealth and power
in American society); supranote 11. Commentators have most recently noted that the
poor are politically powerless to alter environmental policies that have had a
disproportionately adverse impact on low-income communities. See H.R. REP. No.
101-428, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1990) (discussing the poor's lack of political
power over environmental pollution); Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown,
Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalismand the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1
KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69,70 (1991) ("[C]ommunities comprised of low-income and
working class people with no more than a high school education are not as effective
at marshalling [political] opposition as communities of middle or upper income
people."); Dick Russell, EnvironmentalRacism: Minority Communities and TheirBattle
Against Toxics, AMICUS J., Spring 1989, at 22, 25 (discussing the "'functional link
between... poverty and powerlessness'") (quoting Barry Commoner, Director for the

Center for Biology of Natural Systems, Queens College).
13 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-59 (1973)
(suggesting that poor families dissatisfied with their community's educational system
can move to a different location or vote to achieve change).
14 See, e.g., ELiZABETH DREw, POLITICS AND MONEY vii (1983) (explaining that
money makes a "qualitative change in the way the [political] system work[s]"); AMITAI
ETzIONI, CAPITAL CORRUPTION: THE NEW ATTACK ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3
(1988) (focusing on the ways in which economically powerful interest groups undercut

American government); LARRYJ. SABATO, PAC POWER 75 (1983) (stating that political
action committees (PACs) contributed a total of $79.2 million to congressional
candidates in 1982); Comment, One Dollar,One Vote, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 1992,
at 4, 6 (referring to the "superior political clout of the rich"); see also infra note 424.
15 KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLrIcs OF RICH AND POOR xix (1990).
16
See MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY (1992) (contending that the central
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The tension between democracy and wealth is not a recent
development in American society.' 7 It is familiar history that
James Madison and his Federalist colleagues viewed political
democracy as a threat to property, fearing that the impecunious
masses would vote themselves economic equality in a fully democratic republic.' 8 The Anti-Federalists and theirJacksonian successors
democratic problem is the inordinate role that money plays in the public, noncommercial sphere of civil society); WVALZER, supra note 11, at 310 ("Citizens without
money come to share a profound conviction that politics offers them no hope at
all."); Charles R. Beitz, PoliticalFinances in the United States: A Survey of Research, 95
ETHICS 129, 143-46 (1984) (noting the threat that disparate wealth poses to
democratic government); Ray Marshall, UndemocraticAmerica, SOUTHERN CHANGES,
Spring, 1992, at 8, 10 ("Inequality as extreme as ours destroys democratic institutions." (quoting former U.S. Secretary of Labor)); cf. Ronald Dworkin, What Is
Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 12 (1987) (describing "a
serious complaint against American democracy most people accept to some degree:
that some private citizens have disproportionately more political power than others,
because they are richer or control media or for some similar reason").
17 From the founding of the republic, the democratic order has confronted
difficult questions of economic inequality. See ROBERT H.JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE
FORJUDICIAL SUPREMACY xii (1941) ("Two kinds of power seem always in competition
in our democracy: there is political power, which is the power of the voters, and
there is the economic power of property, which is the power of its owners."); see also
ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRrTCs 333 (1989) ("From ancient times to the
present day ... virtually all thoughtful advocates of democratic and republican
government have strongly emphasized how democracy is threatened by inequalities
in economic resources."). See generally STAUGHTON LYND, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RADICALISM 67-68 (1968) (explaining the difficulty in reconciling property
rights with a fully democratic government).
18 During closed deliberations at the Constitutional Convention, Madison bluntly
stated: "In future times a great majority of the people will not only be without
landed, but any other sort of property. These [may] combine under the influence of
their common situation; in which case the rights of property... will not be secure
in their hands." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1789, at 203-04 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79, 84 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (expressing Madison's view that "the most common and
durable source of factions has been the verious [sic] and unequal distribution of
property," and decrying the popular "rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts,
for an equal division of property, [and] ... other improper or wicked project[s]");
ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING 7-8 (1963) (stating that the
assemblage at the Constitutional Convention was "by no means committed to popular
government," and that most of the delegates "interpreted democracy as mob rule and
assumed that equality of representation would permit the spokesmen for the common
man to outvote the beleaguered deputies of the uncommon man"); Pope McCorkle,
The Historianas Intellectual: CharlesBeard and the ConstitutionReconsidered, 28 AM.J.
LEGAL HiST. 314, 318-19 (1984) (defending Beard's thesis that the founders sought
to promote the economic interests of the propertied classes).
Popular agitation in the post-Revolutionary period for legislation that promoted
wealth redistribution, together with more direct challenges to existing economic
arrangements (Shay's Rebellion, for example), supplied reasonable bases for
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also acknowledged the tension between American economic and
political arrangements, but regarded sharp economic inequalities as
19
the evil that threatened popular sovereignty.
The polarity between democratic ideal and economic elitism has
intensified in the second half of the twentieth century as constitutional doctrine has drifted, at least superficially, toward egalitarian
values, 20 while a radical maldistribution of wealth has profoundly
influenced political affairs. 21 The poor have been the principal
victims of this dichotomy. 22 While the convergence of political
Madison's fear that the democratization of America had produced a citizenry unlikely
to accept elite property and privilege. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 15-19 (1990) (noting that democratic and
egalitarian sentiments had become common among large segments of the public
following the Revolution and led to various legislative and popular assaults upon
economic inequalities); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 229-43 (1991) (contending that "[e]quality was.., the most radical and
most powerful ideological force let loose in the Revolution").
19 See e.g., Letters of Centinal, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 139 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981) ("A republican, or free government, can only exist ... where
property is pretty equally divided."); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,35-38 (1985) (describing a Republican ideal in which
rough material equality forms the basis for effective democratic participation by all
citizens).
20 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1962) (establishing the principle
of one-person, one-vote in the state electoral context); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (rejecting provision of "separate but equal" public schools for
white students and African-American students). See generally LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT
RIGHT? 211-71 (1975) (tracing the rise of equality as a constitutional value in the latter
portion of the twentieth century); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 TermForeword: EqualCitizenship Underthe FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-38
(1977) (tracing the development of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
doctrine from a "guarantee of racial equality" to a broader constitutional "principle
of equal citizenship"). But see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIALJUSTICE 162 (1987) (describing the declining importance of the
Fourteenth Amendment in protection ofAfrican- American rights); Arthur S. Miller,
SocialJustice and the Warren Court: A PreliminaryExamination, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 473,
489 (1984) (arguing that the Warren Court's civil rights and civil liberties decisions
affecting poor people worked to preserve the status of "those highest in the social
pecking order"); Mark Tushnet, . .. And Only Wealth Will Buy YouJustice"--Some Notes
on the Supreme Cour 1972 Term, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 177 (contending that the Court
has applied equal protection doctrine differentially to safeguard the interests of the
affluent while tolerating legislation harmful to the poor).
21 See Mark Tushnet, Corporationsand Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 253,
259-60 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (discussing the "advantages of wealth" in the political
sphere).
22
See WALZER, supra note 11, at 310. African-Americans and other racial
minorities are disproportionately victimized by poverty in the United States. See
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., OVERVIEW OF
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1992 GREEN BOOK, BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON
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and economic power marginalizes the poor from democratic
processes, the myth of political equality simultaneously serves as a.
justification for denying them the heightened judicial protection
that constitutional doctrine has elsewhere accorded politically
23
powerless minorities and other suspect classes.
This paradox has not gone unnoticed. Throughout the 1960s
and 1970s, courts and commentators debated whether poverty
should be considered a suspect classification for purposes of equal
protection analysis, and whether a right to subsistence inheres in
the Constitution. 24 At least some commentators believed that the
Court would and should assume a special role in the protection of
the poor against disfavorable majoritarian outcomes. 25 But by the

PROGRAMS WITHIN THEJURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 1273
(Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter 1992 GREEN BOOK]; see also Richard Delgado, Pep
Talks for the Poor: A Reply and Remonstrance on the Evils of Scapegoating, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 525, 541 (1991) (discussing the subordinated position of the poor and
minorities); Charles V. Hamilton & Dona C. Hamilton, SocialPolicies,Civil Rights,and
Poverty, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 287, 306-11
(Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986) ("[R]ace... has always been
fused with class in the political struggle to obtain equitable policies to alleviate
poverty."); Rosemary L. Bray, So How Did I Get Here?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, § 6
(Magazine), at 34, 35 (stating that the "welfare question" is inextricably linked to
race). Moreover, the feminization of poverty continues to progress. See, e.g., RUTH
SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT
AMERICA xvii (1992) (describing the "ever-increasing numbers of women [who] have
been living in poverty"); MaryJ. Bane, Household Composition andPoverty, in FIGHTING
POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T, supra, at 209, 216-20 (examining the
dramatic increase in the percentage of the poor who are members of female-headed
and single-person households); Barbara Ehrenreich & Karin Stallard, The Nouveau
Poor, Ms.,July/Aug. 1982, at 217, 217 (stating that two-thirds of the adults who fall
within the federal definition of poverty are women). See generally MIMI ABRAMOVITZ,
REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES FROM COLONIAL TIMES
TO THE PRESENT 13-40 (1988) (providing a feminist perspective on the welfare state).
23 The incapacity of a liberal "rights" approach, which depends on the premise of
formal equality, to protect the poor and minorities against subjugation has been an
important theme of critical race theory, feminist legal theory, and critical legal
studies. For the critical race approach, see Derrick Bell, RacialRealism, 24 CONN. L.
REV. 363 (1992); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimating Racial Discrimination Through
AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN L. REV.
1049 (1978). For the feminist critique, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT
(1988). For the critical legal studies approach, see William H. Simon, Rights and
Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (1986). See generally Mark
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1984) (criticizing the
liberal
theory of rights as unstable, indeterminate, abstract, and destructive).
24
See, e.g., ARYEH NEIER, ONLYJUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL
CHANGE 127-40 (1982) (discussing efforts by poor peoples' lawyers in the 1960s and
1970s to establish a constitutional right to subsistence and heightened constitutional
protection for the poor).
25 See, e.g., Frank I.- Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On
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early 1970s, the Burger Court, in a swift series of cases affecting
welfare, 26 housing, 2 7 and education, 28 essentially announced a
principle of judicial noninterference with political determinations
regarding the poor.29 Formally, the Court set down a rule that
claims by poor persons would be evaluated under minimum
rationality review. Functionally, however, the Court erected what
appears to be an insurmountable presumption that political
decisions concerning social welfare issues are constitutional.3 0
Indeed, in the nearly twenty years that this rule has been in effect,
the Court has not invalidated a single poverty classification or social
welfare restriction.3 1 To appreciate how extraordinary this record
Protectingthe PoorThrough the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 38-39 (1969)
(setting forth what is now the classic argument in favor of heightened protection of
the poor).
?6 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (imposing minimum
rationality standard on equal protection claims affecting subsistence benefits).
27 See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141-43 (1971) (imposing minimum
rationality standard on equal protection claims affecting housing).
28 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973)
(imposing minimum rationality standard on equal protection claims affecting public
education issues).

2 The Court's poverty discourse thus diverged from that of international human
rights law. The right to minimum subsistence, and, indeed, to an adequate standard
of living, is universally recognized as basic to the inherent dignity of every individual.
Cf Mary A. Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions,59 U. CHI. L. Rgv. 519,
526-32 (1992) (suggesting an appropriate role for affirmative welfare rights in liberal
democracies). Compare International Bill of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d mtg. at 76, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("Everyone has the right
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family ... .") with Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 196 (1989) (stating that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution generally
"confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life ").
3
°Justice Marshall's dissent in Dandridge was prescient on this point. The
majority,Justice Marshall objected, had "emasculat[ed] the Equal Protection Clause
as a constitutional principle applicable to the area of social welfare administration."
Dandridge,397 U.S. at 508 (1970) (Marshall,J., dissenting). Lower courts, constrained
by the rationality standard, have questioned the legitimacy of the Court's approach.
See, e.g., Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 93-94 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032
(1984) (upholding Pennsylvania's three-month limit on welfare benefits to indigents
between the ages of 18 and 45, but stating "[w]ere this a matter of first impression,
we might conclude that subsistence is impliedly protected by the Constitution,
because it is of basic human importance and fundamental to the meaningful exercise
of all other rights").
31 The Court last struck down welfare classifications in 1973. See United States
Dep't ofAgric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508,514 (1973) (invalidating provision of the Food
Stamp Act that denied benefits to any household with an individual who had been
claimed as a dependent by an ineligible individual living outside the household);
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (invalidating
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is, one need only juxtapose it with the Court's treatment of other
social and economic measures, where the Court has routinely
declared legislation unconstitutional even on a rationality standard.3 2
The Court's willingness to endorse, in the name of democracy,
any legislative burden imposed on the poor has handed the elected
branches a carte blanche to deal with a politically dispossessed
minority. The only true solution to this problem-an inclusive and
democratic politics that fully enfranchises all citizens regardless of
economic station-would require fundamental social and political
transformations that seem unlikely in the foreseeable future.3 3 In

provision of the Food Stamp Act that denied benefits to any household comprised of
unrelated individuals); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621
(1973) (invalidating New Jersey regulation under the AFDC program that denied
subsistence benefits to families with children born out of wedlock); see also Williams
v. Wohlgemuth, 366 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Pa. 1973), affd mere., 416 U.S. 901 (1974)
(invalidating a Pennsylvania regulation that denied general assistance to unemancipated minors living with unrelated persons not eligible for assistance).
During this same twenty-year period, state courts have charted an independent
course from the federal system and have invalidated social welfare classifications
under state constitutions that presumably would have been upheld under the federal
test. See generally Robert A. Sedler, The State Constitutions and the Supplemental
Protection of Individual Rights, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 465 (1985) (discussing state
constitutional decisions invalidating state social and economic regulations that
presumably would have been sustained under federal equal protection analysis).
2 The Court's application of the minimum rationality test to the area of taxation
deserves special mention. It is well settled that "in taxation, even more than in other
fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification." Regan v. Taxation
with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,547 (1983) (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S.
83, 88 (1940)). Nevertheless, the Court has regularly declared state tax legislation
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause using the rationality test. See, e.g.,
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1989);
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S 612, 622-24 (1985); Williams v.
Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 23-27 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869,
878-80 (1985); cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (invalidating, on equal
protection grounds, Alaska's use of residence as a criterion for distribution of state
surplus oil wealth). The distinction between the welfare and tax areas is not that
welfare classifications have been more considered and constitutionally "rational" than
tax measures. Rather, it appears that the Court has adopted an especially relaxed
form of rationality review in cases affecting the poor. See infra text accompanying
notes 124-55.
33 See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 17, at 106-31 (arguing that functional political
equality within a democratic framework is "feasibl[e]," but would require the adoption
of "measures well beyond those that even most democratic states have hitherto
brought about"); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND

PERFORMANCE 489 (3rd ed. 1976) (arguing that genuine democratization of political
processes cannot occur in the United States without "reducing the amount of
inequality among Americans in their access to political resources"); cf. Richard D.
Parker, The Past of ConstitutionalTheory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 242-59
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the meantime, the Court's laissez-faire jurisprudence poses a
dangerous dilemma: the political process provides little security for
even the most basic interests of the poor, while the absence of a
judicial check on that process has encouraged political discourse
and decisionmaking to degenerate into a virtual free-fire zone with
respect to the rights and lives of poor people.3 4 The lack of
seriousjudicial review, and the resulting legislative failure to engage
in reasoned deliberation, has produced a politics marked by
scapegoating, stereotyping, and stigmatization 3 5
Although the Court's use of rationality review has exercised a
stranglehold on the rights of poor persons for the last two decades,
the legal and factual underpinnings of this jurisprudence have
recently come under challenge from an unlikely source: the
Rehnquist Court. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,3 6 the
Court squarely acknowledged-for the first time in constitutional
discourse-that inequalities of private economic power tend to
reproduce themselves in the political sphere and displace legitimate
democratic governance. Concentrated wealth exerts so "corrosive
and distorting" an effect on political processes, the Austin Court
held, that states have a "compelling" interest in regulating its
deployment, even at the expense of significant First Amendment
rights. 7
The news here is not that disparities of wealth lead to domination and disempowerment in the political sphere. That much has
been long understood by politicians, social scientists, and ordinary
folk. Rather, the landmark in Austin is that the Court has explicitly
acknowledged economic capture of the political process as a matter
of such constitutional significance as to be termed "compelling" and
to override the fundamental rights asserted. Given the determined
silence of post-Lochner 8 jurisprudence on this phenomenon,
(1981) (arguing that the American political process falls far short of democratic
norms).
34 See infra text accompanying notes 169-235, 269-84.
35 See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79
GEO. L.J. 1499, 1499-1502 (1991) (discussing rhetorical stigmatization of the poor);
Sunstein, supra note 19, at 72-73 (discussing the use of stereotyping in poverty law);
Robin Toner, New Politics of Welfare Focuses on Its Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, at
1, 16 (quoting Marian Wright Edelman, President of the Children's Defense Fund,
that "bashing welfare" has become a "fourth generation code phrase, perhaps more
powerful than busing, quotas or Willie Horton").
36 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
37 Id. at 660.
s Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Austin's acknowledgment of the structural role that money plays in
American politics would seem to open many areas of constitutional
doctrine to serious question.
This Article examines the implications that the Court's newly
articulated analysis of wealth and democracy has for the treatment
of poverty in constitutional law. Reduced to its simplest form, the
Article's argument runs as follows: a pervasive theme in constitutional theory holds thatjudicial deference to political outcomes (the
type of deference that is reflected in rationality review) presupposes
some baseline legitimacy in the political process, which this Article
will call "democratic legitimacy." Whether this democratic premise
is satisfied in any particular context turns on empirical judgments
about how the political process is actually functioning, and on legalnormative judgments about what counts as a democratically
legitimate process that merits deferential review. On the first
question, Austin implicitly recognizes that poor people, although
formally enfranchised, suffer severe marginalization from the
processes of self-government because of their economic incapacity.
On the second, Austin teaches that wealth-based distribution of
political power is a democratically illegitimate phenomenon of
considerable constitutional import. This Article argues that the
Court's unremitting deference to political outcomes in the social
welfare area, without regard to the disequilibrating effect of wealth
on the political process, cannot be squared with Austin's central
insight into the active tension between economic inequalities and
democratic legitimacy.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the
democratic justification that the Court offers for the presumption
of constitutionality afforded to governmental policies affecting the
poor. It discusses the idea that the Court's deference to political
outcomes presupposes some quality of democratic integrity in the
underlying political process, and argues that the Court has sketched
the nature of that quality in a variety of doctrinal contexts,
including, but not limited to, the Carolene Productsfootnote.39 The
conception of democracy that emerges from these doctrinal areas
is broadly egalitarian and implicitly recognizes that political
marginalization due to poverty is an undemocratic phenomenon
39 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), discussed
infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
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that ought to negate or at least undermine the usual presumption
of constitutionality.
Part II analyzes the Court's failure to redeem the promise of this
constitutional framework in cases seeking judicial protection for the
poor. It recounts the Court's abrupt relegation of poor people's
claims to the graveyard of rationality review, and focuses on the
Court's refusal to consider seriously whether the poor are members
of a politically powerless "out-group[]," 40 deserving heightened
judicial solicitude. It then analyzes scholarly efforts to explain the
Court's persistent attachment to rationality review, examining the
major libertarian, process-oriented, and liberal apologies for the
Court's poverty discourse. Although these explanations proceed
from widely divergent premises, they all assume that the Court's
poverty cases are a faithful application of doctrine. This Part
contends that none of the major justifications for the Court's
poverty jurisprudence offers a coherent theory, and it develops
alternative explanations for the Court's treatment of the poor. Part
II concludes by suggesting that the Court's poverty discourse
reflects an ideology of elitism that has seriously skewed the Court's
conception of democracy and has blinded it to wealth-induced
deviations from democratic principle.
Part III contends that the Court's recently articulated analysis of
wealth and democracy in Austin is radically at odds with its
treatment of poverty in constitutional law. This Part argues that
wealth-induced distortions of the democratic process, recognized by
Austin as constitutionally significant, systematically disadvantage and
disenfranchise the poor as a group; that no theory of pluralist
interest-group or virtual representation adequately resolves the
problem; and that the self-replicating nature of the defect makes it
resistant to correction through politics. Part III concludes that
wealth-based distortions of the political process present a compelling case for more searching judicial inquiry in claims of discrimination against the poor, that the normal presumptions of constitutionality and judicial deference should not obtain in such cases, and that
the Court has a constitutional duty to control, if not the concentration of wealth, then at least the concentration of power that wealth
affords.

41

40 Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1942)
(stating that "Itlhe minorities problem springs from the existence of fairly well
defined 'out-groups' disliked by those who control the political and other organs of
power in society").
41 Questions of how searching such review should be and what should count as
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A word about method: the Article proceeds by internal, legal
argument, seeking to analyze the integrity of the rationality standard
within the doctrinal limits that the Court itself has developed.4 2
Absent from the argument is an appeal to exogenous value systems
that may be available to legitimate the existence of certain social
welfare rights not yet recognized by the Court. 43 In addition, the

discrimination against the poor are beyond the scope of this Article. See Michelman,
supra note 25,passim (developing a "minimum welfare" model of equal protection for
the poor that responds not to "discrimination" but to severe deprivation, and that
does not command judicially enforced material equality, but does require state
fulfillment of "just wants"); Malcolm E. Wheeler, In Defense of Economic Equal
Protection, 22 KAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973) (offering a model of equal protection for the
poor in which the Court ensures that "no substantial differences in access" to certain
public goods or services "arise primarily from differences in wealth") (emphasis
omitted). This Article aims only to demonstrate that the current regime of
consigning virtually any constitutional claim by the poor to minimum rationality
review is indefensible. It may well be that the precise contours of a replacement
regime will be difficult to design and implement. Judges and commentators have
argued that only a theory assigning substantive constitutional value to certain core
subsistence needs or interests will allow the Court's poverty discourse to navigate
between a radical transformation of society and the danger of insignificance to the
poor. See e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-22 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting criteria including "the relative importance to individuals in the
class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive");
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 160-62 (1980) (arguing that "[a] theory of
suspicious classification [would] be of only occasional assistance to the poor, since
their problems are not often problems of classification to begin with"); Michelman,
supranote 25, at 22-33 (suggesting that since all payment requirements "discriminate"
against those unable to pay, a rule subjecting such requirements to heightened
scrutiny would have a sweeping impact). This criticism is substantial. But it
overlooks the salutary consequences that a demand for more reasoned analysis might
have on political outcomes. A regime that merely insists on a fairer, more rational
and less stereotypic treatment of the poor within the framework of existing state
interventions would positively foster human dignity and equal respect, and could
mitigate some of the worst deprivations of poverty by requiring public officials to
confront and justify, in more than a proformafashion, the oppressive and irrational
elements of their policies. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1075 n.4 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that minority participation in the political process has
the capacity to alter the quality of public debate, even if it does not always
immediately alter political outcomes); Sunstein, supra note 19, at 57-59, 72-79
(examining heightened scrutiny as a demand for reasoned analysis). But see Michael
A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some CautionaryNotes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE
L.J. 1651, 1652 (1988) (contending that "reasoned dialogue ... may have the
potential for undermining public political participation, especially among poorer
groups").
4?Cf David A.J. Richards, Book Review-Beyond Accommodation: EthicalFeminism,
Deconstruction, and the Law, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 247, 247 (1991-92)
(book review) (explaining the distinction between internal and external criticism).
43 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuitof ConstitutionalWelfare Rights: One View
of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 1004-15 (1973) (constructing a
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Article shares a certain common ground with process-based analyses
of constitutional review in its identification of undemocratic politics
as one, though by no means the exclusive, basis for close judicial
oversight of political outcomes. 44 Unlike process-based constitutional theories, however, the argument developed here does not
designate democratic integrity as the sole nontextual guide for
constitutional adjudication and in no way tethers constitutional
interpretation to a "process-perfection" goal.4 5 Nevertheless, the
method of analysis that the Article pursues might be criticized as
submerging substantive value conflicts that ought to be more
directly confronted. 46 From this critical perspective, a reconstitution of poverty doctrine could occur, as some commentators have
argued, only outside the paradigmatic framework of the Court's own
jurisprudence. 47 Whatever the merits of such criticism, the Article
nevertheless assumes that there is an independent value in analyzing
the internal coherence of constitutional doctrine in the social
welfare area. The demasking of poverty doctrine has the capacity
to call into question the institutional legitimacy of the Court's
jurisprudence in ways that the more thoroughgoing, external
critique cannot. 4 1 Moreover, by offering an affirmative analysis of
the way in which poverty law can be positively reconstructed, the
constitutional theory of affirmative welfare rights fromJohn Rawls's theory ofjust
society).
44 See ELY, supra note 41, at 101-04 (setting forth the leading explanation of a
process-based approach to the counter-majoritarian problem); see also MARK KELMAN,
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 189-92 (1987) (setting forth major criticisms to
process-based approaches to constitutional review).
45 For a discussion and critical appraisal of process-based constitutional theories,
see Symposium on Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REv. 631 (1991).
4?Cf Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 (1980) (arguing that process-perfecting theories

merely "banish divisive controversies over substantive values from the realm of
discourse ... to the unruly world of power").
constitutional
47
See e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,
737-40 (1985) (arguing that it is impossible to identify a group for protection against
prejudice without making substantive value choices); Paul Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The EssentialContradictionsof Normative ConstitutionalScholarship,
90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1092-95 (1981) (same).
48 For illustrations of the strengths and limits of internal critiques, see, e.g., Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term-Foreword: The VanishingConstitution,103
HARv. L. REV. 43 (1989) (offering a critical account of the Rehnquist Court's
constitutional jurisprudence from within the majoritarian paradigm that the Court
professes); MariJ. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent AntidiscriminationLaw, and a
Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 (1991) (developing
a "dualis[tic]" account of accent discrimination "from and against the traditions of
legal analysis" ).

1290 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:1277
hope is that this Article can engage a dialogue about "a different
kind of practice" that is supportive of movements for social
justice.

49

I. THE DEMOCRATIC PREMISE OF RATIONALITY REVIEW
Whenever one finds paeans to democracy in United States
Reports, there is a fair chance that the Court has just dispatched a
poor person's claim of constitutional right. 50 In such cases, the
Court might allow that the policies sustained against constitutional
attack are neither "wise," "just," nor "humane," and that they may
even threaten the physical survival of our most powerless and
vulnerable citizens. 51
But judicial noninterference with these
49 Ed Sparer, FundamentalHuman Rights, Legal Entitlements, andthe Social Struggle:
A Friendly Critique of the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 567-74
(1984) (arguing that law professors should "demonstrate concern and ways of
working-doing legal work-that at the very least are helpful to some oppressed
human beings"); see Peter B. Edelman, Mandated Minimum Income,Judge Posner, and
the Destruction of the Rule of Law, 55 ALB. L. REV. 633, 641 (1992) (stressing the need
to keep alive arguments in favor of a right to minimum income on the view that "the
Supreme Court will not always be composed as it is at the present time"); Howard
Lesnick, Being a Teacher, of Lawyers: Discerningthe Theory of My Practice,43 HASTINGS
LJ. 1095 (1992) (discussing ways in which academic lawyers might engage in
productive dialogue with practitioners for the subordinated).
50 See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 596-97 (1987) (rejecting Fifth
Amendment challenge to eligibility restrictions on Aid to Families with Dependent
Children benefits); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (rejecting equal
protection challenge to restrictions on Supplemental Security Income benefits); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (rejecting equal protection challenge to ban on
use of medicaid benefits for abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977)
(rejecting equal protection challenge to ban on use of state-funded medical assistance
for nontherapeutic abortions). Nearly 40% of all postwar cases that invoke the term
"presumption of constitutionality" to uphold legislation involve the Court's denial of
a poor person's claim. See Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 591 (1982); Schweiker
v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,238 (1981); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 175 (1978);
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 (1978); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185
(1976); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973);
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 636 (1960).
51 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
196 (1989) (rejecting substantive due process claim to government aid "even where
such aid may be necessary to secure life"); Gilliard,483 U.S. at 596-97 (upholding
welfare classification even though it would inflict "tragic" suffering on "needy
families"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (characterizing Texas system of public school financing as "chaotic and
unjust," but upholdingits constitutionality); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485
(1970) (deferring to welfare regulations that deny "the most basic economic needs of
impoverished human beings"); see also Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgt. Corp., 482
F. Supp. 673, 679-80 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affid, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding
decision to site solid waste facility near a high school attended primarily by poor
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unjust and inhumane policies is warranted, we are told, because
ours is a democratic system in which authority over such matters
properly resides with the people's representatives, not with an
unelected judiciary.5 2 For good measure, the Court may conclude
by solemnly raising the Lochner53 bogey and forswearing any
backslide toward the anti-democratic judicial adventurism of that
54
era.
This well-worn script descends from the constitutional paradigm
laid down by the New Deal Court in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish55 and United States v. Carolene Products Co. 5 6 Through
these cases, the Court installed a regime of judicial review that
generally accords a strong presumption of constitutionality to the
outcomes of democratic political processes, at least in the context
of "legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions" that are
said to implicate no preferred or personal rights. 57 The Burger
African-Americans as rational even though "illogical").
52 A recent exposition of this idea appears in a case where the Court upheld the
reduction of subsistence benefits to destitute families with young children:
The District Court was undoubtedly correct in its perception that a number
of needy families have suffered, and will suffer, as a result of the [challenged
statute]. Such suffering is frequently the tragic byproduct of a decision to

reduce or to modify benefits to a class of needy recipients. Under our
system of government, however, it is the function of Congress-not the
courts-to determine whether the savings realized... are significant enough
to justify the costs to the individuals affected by such reductions....
[I]nequities created by such decisions must be remedied by the democratic
processes.
Gilliard,483 U.S. at 596-97.
53 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating state labor legislation
on substantive due process grounds).
54 See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 484 (commenting unfavorably on earlier Court
practices of invalidating state economic and social regulation, and arguing that the
Court should not have the power to strike down legislation that it thinks "'unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought'" (quoting
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 384 U.S. 483, 488 (1955))).
55 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937) (upholding minimum wage legislation).
"6 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (upholding constitutionality of federal Filled Milk Act).
57 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4 (1938). The general principle that
legislation bears a presumption of constitutionality and is entitled to judicial
deference has been an abiding feature ofAmerican constitutionaIjurisprudence from
the start. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 143-52 (1893). James Wilson, a delegate to
the Constitutional Convention and later a Supreme Court justice, expressed one
version of this idea, commenting that under the proposed Constitution, even
"dangerous" or "destructive" laws may "yet not be so unconstitutional as tojustify the
Judges in refusing to give them effect." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1789, supra note 18, at 73.
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and Rehnquist Courts eagerly embraced this noninterventionist
principle, extending the presumption of constitutionality from
commercial regulation to matters "involv[ing] the most basic
economic needs of impoverished human beings" with an absence of
58
analysis that can only be described as breathtaking.
Needless to say, when courts broadly defer to political outcomes
involving the most basic needs of impoverished human beings, the
consequences may be tragic. Whether by design or default, our
political system routinely condemns even infants and children to
painful and desperate lives of hunger, homelessness, and disease
59
amidst the greatest wealth and abundance in human history.
These effects of the Court's poverty jurisprudence are sadly
apparent. Far less apparent, however, are the benefits of the
Court's approach. The rote insistence that any judicial interference
with distributional decisions would be undemocratic or antithetical
to our system of government 6° rings hollow in the poverty context. 61 Whatever solace the malnourished child might take if her
suffering safeguarded so great an ideal as "democracy," commitment
to democratic values can hardly be served by consigning the
economically dispossessed to a political system in which they are
62
nonplayers and "perpetual losers."
If the rationale for denying judicial protection to the poor is
deference to democratic process, 63 then some fundamental
questions demand answers: What quality of political process merits
58
59
60
61

Dandridge,397 U.S. at 485; see infra text accompanying notes 124-55.
See infra text accompanying notes 164-227.
See cases collected supra notes 50-51.
From the perspective of political or moral theory, one might accept a less

"democratic" process in return for substantively "just"outcomes, or unwise outcomes
in return for a more "democratic" process, but the Court's poverty jurisprudence
does not convincingly fit into either of these models. See Susan Rose-Ackerman,

Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 191 (1992)
(contending that a "misplaced" trust in the political process consigns "thousands or
millions" to "harm[]" caused by democratic decisions); Dworkin, supra note 16, at 4
(describing potential aspirations of democracy as "results of the right sort" and
governing processes that are fully participatory); infra text accompanying notes 124-

55; cf Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 74 (critiquing the Rehnquist Court's nearly
indiscriminate deference to majoritarian decisionmaking).
62 See Robert M. Cover, The OriginsofJudicialActivism in the ProtectionofMinorities,
91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1296 (1982) ("'Discrete and insular' minorities are not simply
losers in the political arena, they are perpetual losers.").
6s For consideration of the related issue of whether more generalized separation
of powers or institutional competence concerns justify near absolute deference to
social welfare legislation, see infra notes 135 & 235, and 332-40 and accompanying
text.
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this thoroughgoing solicitude from the Court? What are the
implications for constitutional theory and adjudication if that quality
is lacking in a particular context? And to what extent does the
functional exclusion of the poor deprive the political process of a
valid claim to broad judicial deference? If the intensity of judicial
review is fundamentally related to the democratic legitimacy of the
underlying political process, then a reorientation of the Court's
poverty jurisprudence requires no restructuring of the basic theory
of constitutional review. Rather, working within the Court's
doctrinal framework, it can be argued that a standard of review
more protective of poor people is compelled if political marginalization on account of wealth is considered a constitutionally significant
64
departure from democratic norms.
A. The Relationship Between JudicialDeference and
DemocraticallyLegitimate Politics
Over the last half century, the Court and a broad array of
commentators have acknowledged that the presumption of
constitutionality normally accorded legislative decisions presupposes
some antecedent quality of political process. 65 In this sense,
judicial deference to political outcomes is contingent-at least at the
level of doctrinal construction and justification, if not always in
practice-upon some baseline characteristic of the political process
that will here be referred to as "democratic legitimacy." Where the
political order deviates from the structural norm, the Court may
closely scrutinize governmental decisions for unconstitutionality,
and impose a higher burden of justification on the state. Deferential review, the converse would run, is inappropriate when the
democratic premise is missing.
One of the clearest statements of the democratic premise idea
appears in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,6 6 where the Court
6 But see Ackerman, supra note 47, at 723, 745-46 (arguing that constitutional
protection for politically powerless poor people must await a reorientation and
restructuring of current doctrine); infra text accompanying notes 288-330.
65 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 41. Even this basic precept has its critics. The classic
argument remains that of Justice Frankfurter that any judicial inquiry into the
integrity of political institutions requires selection "among competing theories of
political philosophy" and is outside the appropriate scope ofjudicial competence.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See generally
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 183-98 (1962) (warning

against judicial assessment of political institutions for conformity with democratic
principles).
66 395 U.S. 621 (1969). Kramerinvolved a challenge to a New York statute that
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justified "close scrutiny" 67 of a voter-qualification statute on the
theory that rationality review presupposes that state political
processes are structured fairly:
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given

"rational" classifications in other types of enactments are based
upon an assumption that the institutions of state government are
structured so as to represent fairly all the people. However, when
the challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of this basic
assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the basis for
68
presuming constitutionality.
Kramer is significant because the Court expressly linked the method
of judicial review to the integrity of the political process that
generated the challenged legislation. The Kramer Court did not
justify its use of heightened scrutiny simply on the existence of the
franchise as a preferred or fundamental right. Rather, the Court
looked more generally to the structure of government and to
69
notions of fair, democratic representation.

limited the franchise in school board elections to property owners, renters and
parents of children enrolled in the district's public schools.
67 Id. at 626.

68 Id. at 628 (footnote omitted). The Kramer dissent did not question the
soundness of the proposition that rationality review presumes democratically
legitimate politics, but disputed whether that democratic baseline had been breached
on the facts presented. Id. at 639-40 (Stewart, J.,joined by Black, J., and Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
69
Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,561 (1964) ("[S]ince the right to exercise the
franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized."). The contingency ofjudicial deference on
democratic politics is also implicit in the widely held notion thatjudicial review gives
rise to a "counter-majoritarian difficulty": namely, a tension between the fundamental
ideal of democratic, majoritarian rule and the power of nonelected, life-tenured
judges to nullify laws that have been duly enacted by the people's representatives. See
generally BICKEL, supra note 65, at 16-23; ELY, supra note 41, 73-104. Regard for this
perceived tension implies a deferential form ofjudicial review, but to the extent that
the political process does not fulfill basic democratic criteria, the central rationale for
such deference collapses. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 74-98 (critiquing
"counter-majoritarian difficulty" idea). Moreover, on a view of democracy that looks
beyond formal rights, certain enhancements of the relative power of the courts-as the
public institution to which the most disenfranchised citizens have the surest (though
still inadequate) access-might be regarded as advancing democratic values by
mitigating illegitimate disparities in political influence and power. Cf Frank I.
Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARv. L. REV. 4, 74 (1986) (constructing a conception of the Supreme Court as "the
modeling of active self-government that citizens find practically beyond reach"). But
see Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 664, 670 (1985) (noting that
federal judges are "overwhelmingly Anglo, male, well-educated and upper or upper
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The constitutional theorem articulated in Kramer springs from
deep wells. At bottom, the contingency of rationality review on the
integrity of the political process ("fair representation of all the
people") expresses the convergence of two foundational tenets:
first, that all just powers of the state derive from the consent of the
governed; 70 and second, that the judiciary's essential duty is to
function as the "intermediate body between the people and the
71
legislature" that guarantees "just," constitutional government.
A crude form of this theorem entered constitutional doctrine
through early federalism decisions beginning with McCulloch v.
Maryland.72 These cases postulated that democratic decisionmaking merits judicial trust because it provides structural security
against official abuse; but by the same token, no judicial confidence
is warranted where political outcomes disadvantage excluded or
unrepresented interests. 73 In the latter situation, a more vigorous
judicial role is warranted because the check provided by political
accountability does not operate. 74 The modern federalism cases
share this analytical framework. On the assumption that Congress
middle class," and arguing that the net effect ofjudicial review "is to systematically

exclude citizens and their representatives from some of the most fundamental
decisions of the polity").

70 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 655 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (positing as a
foundational principle that the legitimacy of government rests upon "the consent that
comes from sharing in the process of making and unmaking laws");JOHN LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 49 (J.W.
Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1976) (1690); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM 15 (1965) ("[I]f the Declaration of Independence means what it says, if we
mean what it says, then no man is called upon to obey a law unless he himself, equally
with his fellows, has shared in making it.").
71 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton), (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
72 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819) (invalidating a state law that imposed
special tax burdens on a nationally chartered bank); see Louis Lusky, FootnoteRedux:
A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1104 (1982) (tracing the
intellectual lineage of Carolenefootnote four, paragraph 3, to ChiefJustice Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch).
73 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 435-36; see also Thomas K. Auson & P. M. Schekkan,
Federalism,the Donnant Commerce Clause,and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REv. 71,
79 (1980) (setting forth a structural explanation for the Supreme Court's authority
to review state legislation).
7' For a critique of McCulloch's theory, see MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND
BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 72-83 (1988) (arguing that the
McCulloch theory is both underinclusive and overinclusive because even formally
represented groups may be politically powerless in fact, while groups without formal
representation (e.g., large corporations) may nevertheless exercise quite substantial
influence over political decisionmaking).
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adequately represents state interests, the Court accords federal
legislation a strong presumption of constitutionality against claims
that state sovereignty has been encroached. 75 Only if a state can
demonstrate a democratic failure that leaves it "politically isolated
and powerless" will the Court entertain an activist role in enforcing
the allocation of state-federal power against the national government. 76 Conversely, the Court has assumed a strongly interventionist posture in policing the allocation of governmental powers
against the states on the theory that state legislative processes are
inherently less inclusive than their federal counterparts and so are
unable to safeguard the interests of political outsiders. 77 However

75 See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988) (holding that states must
look to the national political process, not the federal courts, for protection against
federal overreaching, unless that process leaves a state "politically isolated and
powerless"). The Court has allowed Congress an exceedingly wide berth within which
to define its own affirmative powers and has generally declined to review federal
legislation for inconsistency with the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 523. But see New
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2428-29 (1992) (holding that federal law
requiring states to accept ownership of radioactive waste exceeded Congress'
affirmative constitutional authority). See generally Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a
Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 81
(arguing that the Court's Commerce Clause analysis in National League of Cities
reflected a concern that the states' "influence on the national political process [be
preserved as] a major protection for state soverignty"); Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential
Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1069-70 (1977) (criticizing the Court's
federalism jurisprudence).
76 South Carolina,485 U.S. at 513; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-52 (holding that states must look to the political process, not
the federal courts, for protection of their rights and interests); cf. Martha A. Field,
Comment, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a
Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84, 106-10 (1985) (discussing the idea that the
national political process adequately represents state interests). But see New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2408 (reviving the theory that the Court should safeguard
a core sphere of state sovereignty against national incursion, even when state interests
are fully represented and accounted for in the national political process). The
concept of democratic failure expressed in the contemporary federalism cases as
"political[] isolat[ion] and powerless[ness]," Baker, 485 U.S. at 513, reflects the
structural concerns that have been expressed in the Court's equal protection doctrine.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (stating that the
Court has a special duty to groups "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process").
77 The Court's main doctrinal tool has been the Commerce Clause in its
"negative" or "dormant" aspect. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (assigning to Congress the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States"). See generallyJulian
N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 435 (1982);
Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restrictionon State Regulation and
Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of ConstitutionalStructure 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 894
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one assesses the model of politics assumed by these federalism
cases, 78 the pertinent observation is that the Court has grounded
important areas of constitutional doctrine on the principle that the
intensity of judicial review should vary
inversely with the integrity
79
process.
political
underlying
the
of
A cognate of this democratic theorem became a fundamental
mediating principle of modern constitutional law as a result of the
Court's renowned Carolene Products decision. 80 Carolene's point of
(1985); Mark Tushnet,RethinkingtheDormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 125,
165. The earliest modern case to deploy the Commerce Clause on a theory of fair
representation is South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938). In Barnwell, the Court stated:
[u]nderlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed injudicial
opinion, that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls
principally on those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be
subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on
legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.
Id. at 184 n.2. See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761,
767 (1945). A similar theme is present in the Court's privileges and immunities
doctrine. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); see also Austin v. New
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975) ("[S]ince nonresidents are not represented in
the taxing State's legislative halls ... [the Court should not acquiesce] in taxation
schemes that burden them particularly"). See generally GaryJ. Simson, Discrimination
Against Nonresidentsand the PrivilegesandImmunities Clauseof Articl IV, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 379, 384-85 (1979) (contending that laws disadvantaging nonresidents conflict
with "the framers' deep commitment to representative government" and arguing that
"in placing constraints on states' freedom to discriminate against nonresidents
[through the Priviliges and Immunities Clause of Article IV], the framers were moved
in part by democratic ideals").
78 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 74, at 72-83 (contending that the process-based

approach taken by the Court in federalism cases rests upon simplistic and inaccurate
assumptions about the way American politics operate).
79 See TRIBE, supra note 41, at 411 (describing the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine as resting upon the twin premises that "unaccountable power is to be
carefully scrutinized and that legislators are accountable only to those who have the
power to vote them out of office.").
8o United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Seegenerally
Ackerman, supranote 47, at 713-17 (noting that Carolen'sdemocracy-centered theory
ofjudicial review occupies a key position in modern constitutional doctrine); Lea
Brilmayer, Carotene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the Insider-Outsider, 134 U. PA. L. REv.
1291, 1291-98 (1986) (same). Footnote four of the Carotene decision states:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution ....

It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exactingjudicial
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than
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departure was the nascent post-Lochner ideology ofjudicial faith in
and deference to democratic decisionmaking. 8 1 The generative
aspect of Carolene, though, was its intimation that this new judicial
faith would not be a blind faith; that judicial deference was justified
by, and so might be conditioned upon, some quality of publicregarding politics, the outlines of which the Court only began to
sketch.8 2 As a "starting point for debate,"8 3 the Carolene Court
proposed what have become two broad and familiar categories of
political failure that might negate, or at least undermine, the usual
presumption of constitutionality. First, "legislation ... restrict[ing]
political processes" 84 -broadly conceived to include the franchise,
the free communication of ideas, and concerted political activitiescould trigger heightened review. Second, and more daringly, the
functional marginalization of certain out-groups-so-called "discrete
and insular minorities" 8 5 -might warrant judicial adjustment or
negation of majoritarian outcomes, even absent any formal
8 6
restriction on political participation.
Carolene thus extended the democratic premise beyond the
federalism context and laid the groundwork for its elaboration in

are most other types of legislation ..
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious ....
or national .... or
racial minorities ... whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searchingjudicial
inquiry.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
81 See, e.g.,J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275, 283 (1989) (discussing
judicial deference to majoritarian outcomes and the Carotene footnote).
82 See, e.g., Lusky, supra note 20, at 108-09 (asserting that footnote four of
Carolene was designed to advance "two national objectives-government by the people,
and government for the whole people-and focus attention on the Court's special
ability to effectuate them"); Cover, supra note 62, at 1291-92 (reading Carolene as
accepting the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," but being consonant with it by looking
to the integrity of the political process as determining the degree ofjudicial review).
83 Lusky, supra note 72, at 1098.
84 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
85 Id. at 153 n.4.
86 See Lusky, supra note 72, at app. (letter from Justice Stone to the ChiefJustice
(April 19, 1938)). Paragraph one of the Carolene footnote suggests that the
Constitution places textually committed rights beyond the reach of political
majorities, making inappropriate the presumption of constitutionality. Paragraphs
two and three suggest, on an altogether different theory, that certain species of
democratic failure might dissolve the premise forjudicial deference andjustify more
searching review by the Court.
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other areas of constitutional doctrine. After a period of dormancy,
Carolene's intellectual framework became an influential dynamic in
judicial theory. 87 It is widely viewed as the progenitor of the
Court's political rights jurisprudence, 8 8 and it has spawned a major
branch of equal protection doctrine.8 9 The theme that unifies
these two strains of doctrine is the Court's implicit identification of
political malfunction as a warrant for rigorous judicial scrutiny. In
this sense, the Court intervenes on behalf of disempowered
majorities in legislative districting cases for the same reason that it
professes to protect politically powerless minorities in the equal
protection context. The Kramer Court neatly expressed this
synthesis of Carolene's two process-regarding branches with the
precept that deferential, rationality review presupposes an inclusive
90
and democratic politics.
B. The Court's Elaborationof the Democratic Norm
The critical question for the poor, therefore, is how the Court
determines whether the requisite quality of political process-what
this Article calls "democratic legitimacy"-is present in any particular
case. The Court has never articulated a comprehensive theory of
democratic governance. The Court has also never made explicit the
value commitments that it believes are embedded in the democratic
87 See, e.g., Lusky, supra note 20, at

108-14, 312-14 (describing the Carolene

footnote's influence on modern constitutional doctrine); John E. Nowak, Foreword:
Evaluatingthe Work of the New LibertarianSupreme Court, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
263, 272-73 (1980) (discussing the lasting influence of the Carolene framework on
constitutional theory); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., CaroleneProducts Revisited, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1087, 1087 (1982) (characterizing Carolene's footnote four as the "most
celebrated footnote in constitutional law").
88 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 41, at 582, 1452-54 (stating that Carolene's 'famous
footnote 4 would later support increased judicial intervention in non-economic
affairs," and tracing the Court's political rights cases to Carolene'spolitical process
approach to judicial review).
89
See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
474 (11th ed. 1985) (referring to the "pervasive influence" of footnote four on equal
protection doctrine); Powell, supra note 87, at 1088 (stating that the Carolenefootnote
.now is recognized as a primary source of 'strict scrutiny' judicial review").
go See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). The interrelationship
between the intensity of judicial review and the integrity of political processes
admittedly presents far more subtle and more intricate issues than the foregoing
survey allows. Moreover, any suggestion that the Court claims constitutional
authority to adjust legislative outcomes whenever the underlying process strikes it as
imperfect would be vastly overstated. The point here is simply that the Court has, in
a variety of doctrinal contexts, suggested that judicial deference presupposes some
baseline integrity or trustworthiness in the underlying political process.
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norm. Commentators elsewhere have elaborated on the "conceptions of democracy" that abound in the Court's work, although
many are only implicit and relatively unrefined. 91
Perhaps the most direct and sustained exposition of the Court's
understanding of democracy appears in the political rights cases
decided by the Warren and Burger Courts. These cases attacked a
broad range of exclusionary and inegalitarian political practices,
striking down poll taxes, 92 durational residence requirements, 93
and other franchise restrictions; 94 voiding limitations on ballot
access; 95 and invalidating congressional and state legislative
districting schemes that deviated from the Court's newly minted
96
one-person, one-vote principle.
The constitutional warrant for this judicial restructuring of
political processes was said to be the equal protection guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Article I, Section 2 command
that federal representatives be chosen "by the people." But the
absence of a purely textual anchor for the Court's holdings was
palpable. 97 Indeed, the Court candidly admitted that extratextual
91 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Conceptionsof Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989) (elaborating on the conceptions
of democracy that are "latent" in the voting rights cases).
92 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating
a state poll tax of $1.50).
93 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (invalidating a one-year
residence requirement for voting in general elections).
94 See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 213 (1970) (invalidating
a restriction of the franchise to property owners in referenda on proposed issuance
of general obligation bonds); Kramer,395 U.S. at 633 (invalidating a restriction of the
franchise in school board elections to property owners, renters, and parents of school
children); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 701 (1969) (invalidating a
restriction of the franchise to property owners in referenda on proposed issuance of
public bonds for local improvements); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965)
(invalidating a denial of the franchise to members of armed forces).
95 See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (invalidating a filing fee requirement that effectively denied ballot access to indigent candidates); Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (same).
9 See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526
(1969); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado Gen.
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes,
377 U.S. 656 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S.9 71 (1964).
The Court nominally relied on the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate
franchise restrictions, ballot access requirements, and unequal districting of state
legislative seats, see, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566-67, and on art. I, § 2 to strike
down population disparities between a state's congressional districts, see, e.g.,
Wesbeny, 376 U.S. at 7-8. Whatever the doctrinal difference between these two
strands of the political rights cases, commentators have noted that they share certain

1993]

POVERTY AND DEMOCRACY

1301

values informed its interpretation, 98 and it openly drew upon a
substantive vision of democracy that declared "[t]he conception of
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments" to be a "fundamental principle of
representative government." 99
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,1° ° for example, the

Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from
conditioning the franchise on a citizen's payment of a poll tax. The
Court seemed to apply some form of close scrutiny to invalidate the
poll tax, but even under rationality review such a tax could not
survive the Court's central conclusion: "wealth or fee paying has
...

no relation to voting qualifications." 10 1 That conclusion, of

course, is not empirical, but normative, and reflects external value
judgments about the nature and goals of democratic government.1 0 2 The Fourteenth Amendment may have provided the
analytical framework, but its bare text does not disclose whether
concentrating public authority in affluent citizens or discouraging
political participation by impecunious ones constitutes a "legitithematic approaches, namely, the fundamental principle of representative government
and equal representation for equal numbers. See generally Gerhard Casper,Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standards ofJudicialScrutiny, 1973 SUp. CT. REv. 1, 6-32
(tracing the Court's approach in apportionment cases).
98 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,669 (1966) ("Notions
of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do
change.").
9 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533, 558, 560. The Court suggested, not without basis,
that its conception of democracy paralleled the constitutional evolution toward
universal suffrage and a more inclusionary politics. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV
(extending franchise to males regardless of race); id. amend. XVII (mandating popular
election of Senate); id. amend. XIX (extending franchise to women); id.amend. XXIII
(extending franchise in presidential elections to residents of the District of Columbia);
id. amend. XXIV (prohibiting poll taxes in federal elections); id. amend. XXI
(extending franchise to 18-year-olds).
I'0 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
101Id. at 670.

102 On this basis, Justice Harlan objected in his Harperdissent that the political
rights decisions were more a product of the Court's "egalitarian notions of how a
modern democracy should be organized," than of the Constitution's text, and
suggested that equally respectable conceptions of democracy could allow for wealthbased hierarchy in the distribution of political power. Harper, 383 U.S. at 686
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 549 (1959)
(Harlan,J., dissenting). Indeed, as Frank Michelman has noted, prior to the political
rights cases of the 1960s, the Court had left states at liberty to choose "virtual
representation" over equal representation as a model of government. Michelman,
supra note 91, at 453.
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concededly proper, governmental end. Justice Frankfurter had it
right when he predicted that judicial definition and enforcement of
political rights would ultimately require the Court to choose "among
competing. . theories of political philosophy."10 3
The salient point here is that the political rights cases went
beyond mechanical enforcement of specific and disconnected
constitutional commands and elaborated a conception of democracy
grounded in principles of "political equality" and "fair representation." The Court offered little explication of these open-ended
phrases that it claimed to enforce against majoritarian preference. 104 But it consistently invoked a vocabulary of egalitarian
ideals that sought to disperse power and influence among political
actors standing on a level playing field. "To say that a vote is worth
more in one district than in another," the Court declared in
Wesberi y v. Sanders, would "run counter to our fundamental ideas of
democratic government." 10 5 And in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court
proclaimed that "each and every citizen has an inalienable right to
full and effective participation in the political processes" because
10 6
"representative government is in essence self-government."
The conception of democracy animating in these cases falls
short of a fully developed theory. But the Court's core normative
conclusion is unmistakable: democracy entails some irreducible
quantum of political equality. 10 7 While the Court never fully
articulated the content of that term, it acted on the assumption that
the political order, to be structured fairly, needed to allow "'we the
people'" 0 8 an equal chance both to participate in the processes
103 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
104 Cf. Casper, supra note 97, at 22-23 (questioning whether fair representation
means "descriptive representation ('an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at
large') or... a concept of 'acting for,' rather than 'standing for.'" (quoting HANNA
F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60 (1962)).
105 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
'or Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
107 The egalitarian conception of democracy found in the voting rights cases
resonates with the democratic governance value that has been associated with the
First Amendment and is most closely identified with the thinking of Alexander
Meiklejohn. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OFTHE PEOPLE 24 (1965) (describing the democratic order as a town meeting
in which people "meet as political equals"). But see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 151-60 (1989) (contending that the equality principle of the
First Amendment embraces broader notions of political and expressive rights than
those associated with the electoral model).
108 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80
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of self-government and to influence the political market of
109
ideas.
Significantly, the Court made clear that the political order could
not constitutionally disable or exclude citizens because of a lack of
wealth. 110 The idea that wealth ought not be an influential determinant of political power emerged in the early legislative districting
cases. In Reynolds v. Sims, for instance, the Court deemed "fundamental" the principle of "equal representation for equal numbers of
people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of
residence within a State."1 11 The view that the Court should
intervene to prevent or correct the wealth-based distributions of
public power appeared as well in other apportionment and
112
legislative districting cases.
The same normative judgment animated the Court's condemnation of poll taxes, property qualifications for the franchise, and
ballot access fees.113 In Harper,the Court reasoned that state poll
taxes violated equal protection because "[t]he principle that denies
the State the right to dilute a citizen's vote on account of his
economic status.., by analogy bars a system which excludes those
unable to pay a fee to vote." 114 Further, in Bullock v. Carter, the
Court voided statutory fee requirements for ballot access because
such statutes discriminate against candidates "lacking both personal
wealth and affluent backers," create a "disparity in voting power
based on wealth," and skew political influence in favor of the rich
(1963)).
109 See DAHL, supra note 17, at 325 ("In the democratic vision, opportunities to
exercise power over the state, or more concretely over the decisions of the
government of the state, are, or at any rate ought to be, distributed equally among
all citizens. That citizens ought to be political equals is... a crucial axiom in the
moral perspective of democracy."); see also Peter Bachrach, Interes Participation,and
Democratic Theoy, in NOMOS XVI: PARTICIPATION IN PoLrTcs 39, 41 (J. Roland
Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1975) ("Democratic participation... is a process
in which persons formulate, discuss, and decide public issues that are important to
them and directly affect their lives.").
110 On this view, wealth is irrelevant to the distribution of power because it is
outside the political order and external to concerns about self-governance. Compare
Dworkin, supra note 16, at 12-17 (discussing the role that wealth ought to play in the
distribution of power in a democracy) with HANNAH ARENDT, THE HuMAN CONDITION
31 (1958) (stating that in ancient Greece the slaves could not be members ofthepolis
because they lacked the necessities of life).
m"377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964).
112 See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368, 374-75 (1963).
113 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
114 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
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at the expense of the poor. 115 The Court stated: "[W]e would
ignore reality were we not to recognize that this system falls with
unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their
116
economic status."
The essential theme of the political rights cases is that political
inequalities attributable to disparities in wealth, like other "irrelevant" factors, are inconsistent with fundamental principles of
representative government. On this view, the fencing out of a
minority on the basis of economic status ought to be considered
democratically illegitimate and at odds with the concept of fair
representation. Indeed, the Court found such departures from its
conception of democracy sufficiently severe to warrant not only
close scrutiny, but also a vigorous and controversial judicial
reordering of state political processes, a realm previously thought
to be cloaked by legislative prerogative.
The doctrinal stage was thus set for according greater judicial
protection for the poor. The Warren Court had begun to speak
generally of poverty as a "suspect" classification, 117 one that is
"traditionally disfavored" in our democracy."l 8
Perhaps more
importantly, the basic insight that the poor suffer structural
exclusion from the political order in a way that is incompatible with
democratic self-government had appeared in a variety of contexts.1 19 And the basic empirical point that wealth is a potent

115 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1972).
116

Id. at 144.

117 See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802,

807 (1969) (dictum) ("[A] careful examination on our part is especially warranted
where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth.., which would independently render
a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial
scrutiny.").
118 Harper,383 U.S. at 668 ("Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like
those of race ... are traditionally disfavored.").
119 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (finding that the poor lack
access to 'opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the
life of the community"); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[t]he States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause from discriminating between 'rich' and 'poor' as such in the
formulation and application of their laws"); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949)
(Black, J., dissenting) (stating that the poor "do not have enough money to own or
control publishing plants, newspapers, radios, moving picture studios, or chains of
show places"); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (declaring that "[w]e should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a
man's mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify,
or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States").
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determinant of political power held widespread consensus among
12 0
social commentators.
II. RATIONALITY REVIEW AND THE COURT'S TREATMENT
OF THE POOR

By the early 1970s, then, the Court possessed the analytical tools
to fashion, without great leaps of theory, ajurisprudence that would
have offered the poor some modicum of protection from majoritarian political processes. Orthodox constitutional theory recognized the contingency of deferential judicial review on the democratic legitimacy of the political process. And the political rights
cases set forth an egalitarian conception of democracy that could
not easily be reconciled with wealth-based disparities of political
access, influence, or representation. Arranging these propositions
into a simple syllogism yields the conclusion that the "democratic
premise" of rationality review does not obtain where unresourced
citizens are politically marginalized:
(i)

Courts need not defer to political outcomes where the
"democratic legitimacy" of the underlying political process
has been called into question;

(ii)

Significant wealth-based inequalities of political access,
influence, or representation seriously undermine the
"democratic legitimacy" of a political process;

(iii) Courts need not defer to political outcomes traceable to
significant wealth-based inequalities of political access,
influence, or representation.
120 See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 17, at 114-15 (noting the "familiar fact" that political
power is a function of access to money and related resources that are unequally

distributed); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 200-01 (1957)

(observing that "voters with the highest incomes [normally] have the most political
power" and that this phenomenon creates a "counterforce" to the "natural 'Robin
Hood'" tendency of a democratic government" and encourages "rational government"
to "redistribute income from the poor to the rich"); PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at xvii
(noting that "money politics" is evolving as the political theme for the 1990s); Beitz,
supra note 16, at 138 (noting correlation between private wealth and public power in
the American political system). CompareRALPH K. WINTERJR., CAMPAIGN FINANCING
AND POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1973) (recognizing the plutocratic vices of American
politics, but asserting that a cure would be worse than the disease) with MICHAEL
HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 13-17 (1962)

(condemning the domination of wealth in the political sphere).
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As a matter of doctrine, the precondition for deferential judicial
review should have been found lacking in poverty cases because lowincome citizens are politically marginalized on account of their
economic station. The poor deserve judicial protection not because
they are "outvoted," but rather because they find themselves
"denied access to the political system" for a democratically illegitimate reason. 121 The case law reviewed in Part I strongly suggested that political outcomes do not merit the judicial trust that
rationality review encompasses when they significantly disadvantage
a group marginalized because of poverty.
The Court's actual poverty discourse, however, broke sharply
with this doctrinal trend. The Burger Court declined even to
address the idea that poor people might comprise a politically
powerless group undemocratically denied a fair share of influence
in the processes of public decisionmaking. Instead the Court
summarily consigned the constitutional claims of the poor to the
feeblest form of rationality review. Under this regime, the Court
mechanically attaches the usual presumption of constitutionality to
classifications that affect the poor, without inquiring into the
democratic legitimacy of the underlying process. Rather, and
ironically, the Court periodically warns that any judicial intrusion
into allocative decisions, expressive as they are of majoritarian
122
preference, would harm the foundations of democracy itself.

A. An Analysis of the Court's Poverty Jurisprudence
The rise and demise of poverty law have been critically reviewed
elsewhere. 123 It is useful, however, to revisit two of the landmark
cases to examine the quality of argument that the Court offered to
justify its rejection of heightened scrutiny. The key inquiry here is
whether the Court jettisoned the doctrinal framework that linked
121 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 154-55 (1971).
122 See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text; cf. W.H. AUDEN, Shorts, in
COLLECTED POEMS 231,233 (Edward Mendelson ed., 1976) ("Base words are uttered
only by the base/And can for such at once be understood,/But noble platitudes:-ah,
there's a case/Where the most careful scrutiny is needed .... ").
123 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1627-72 (analyzing the evolution of the
Supreme Court's povertyjurisprudence and the "decline ofjudicial intervention on
behalf of the poor"); Robert W. Bennett, The Burger Court and the Poor, in THE
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUIION THAT WASN'T 46-52 (Vincent Blasi ed.,
1983) (same). For an optimistic reading of the cases, see Frank I. Michelman, Welfare
Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 663 ("[A] thinly
fictionalized report" of Supreme Court cases from 1969 to 1974).
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deferential review to democratic legitimacy, or instead, determined
that deference was warranted because it regarded the political status
of the poor in America as untroubling. In fact, the Court did
neither. At no point has the Court ever considered whether the
disempowerment of the poor deprives certain political outcomes of
their basic democratic integrity. The poverty cases are thus
remarkable less for the questions the Court answers than for the
issues it declines to address.
124
Typical of the Court's approach is Dandridge v. Williams,
which announced by mere ipse dixit that laws affecting social
welfare issues would henceforth receive the extreme deference
accorded commercial classifications. Dandridgeinvolved a Maryland
public assistance regulation that capped the amount of aid that an
eligible family could receive to the benefit payment for a family of
five.12 5 The regulation responded in punitive fashion to the
abiding myth that welfare mothers bear children casually in order
to draw state support. 2 6 As a result of the regulation, families with
more than four children received assistance that by any economic
measure relegated them to less than a subsistence level. In effect,
the youngest children of large families received no assistance at all.
The state initially attempted to justify the regulation as a
"'legitimate way of allocating the State's limited resources available
124 397

U.S. 471 (1970).

125 Benefits were provided under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children

(AFDC) program, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (1988), a program of cooperative federalism
in which the federal government reimburses participating states for costs associated
with the provision of cash assistance and services to eligible applicants. The statute
mandated that aid "'shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals.'" Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 480 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1964 &
Supp.IV) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A) (1988)). In the determination
of aid levels, the AFDC program grants the states broad authority to calculate a
.standard of need" that defines basic subsistence costs, and to fix benefit levels as a
percentage of that standard. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 419 (1970)
(description of state authority to determine standard of need under the AFDC
statute). At the time Dandridge was decided, a majority of the states paid less than
their standards of need. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 481 n.13 (citing a 1967 HEW
Report). A benefit cap such as Maryland's forced payment levels for larger families
even farther below the minimum needed for subsistence.
126 But cf. COBBETT's PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 32:709-10 (Feb. 12, 1796) (quoting
William Pitt), quoted in GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY: ENGLAND IN
THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE 74 (1983) (arguing that England should "make relief in
cases where there are a number of children, a matter of right and an honour, instead
of a ground for opprobrium and contempt. This will make a large family a blessing,
and not a curse").
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for AFDC assistance.' 1 27 Precedent made clear, however, that
"'[t]he saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious
classification,' 128 and the district court rejected the state's explanation on a rationality standard. Indeed, the United States in
analogous litigation had disapproved the maximum grant practice
as "'arbitrary,' oppressive of large families, as resulting in 'patently
different treatment of individuals,' and having received, at least
inferentially, the disfavor of Congress." 12 9 In post-trial proceedings, the state shifted ground and attempted to justify the benefit
15 0
cap as an employment incentive.
Upholding the regulation against both statutory and constitutional challenge, the Court delivered a sweeping decision on the
standard to be applied in cases affecting the poor. The Court
allowed that the administration of social welfare programs raises
"dramatically real factual difference[s]" from "state regulation of
business or industry," since they involve "the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings. " 13 1 But those differences
were of no constitutional distinction: the Court could "find no basis
for applying a different constitutional standard" to the claims of the
poor than to those of optometrists who assert that an economic
classification is "imperfect." 132 The Court's reasoning was succinct:
the regulation raised no interest that warranted close
scrutiny. First, it implicated no enumerated right under the Bill of
Rights, and second, it did not involve racial discrimination. For
good measure, the DandridgeCourt invoked the specter of Lochner:
For this Court to approve the invalidation of state economic or
social regulation.., would be far too reminiscent of an era when
the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to

127 Dandridge,397 U.S. at 523 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting the State's Motion
to Dismiss).
128 Id. at 524 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)).
129 Id. at 515 n.8 (quoting various briefs submitted in analogous litigation). In
Rosado, 397 U.S. at 422-23, decided the same day as Dandridge,the Court stated that
the view of the United States should be sought in cases involving administration of
the AFDC program, but the DandridgeCourt declined to follow this procedure. See
Dandridge,397 U.S. at 515 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (stating that HEW was not invited
to submit a brief on the propriety of maximum-grant practice).
130 Id. at 524 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the majority's acceptance of the
state's arguments that the "imposition of the maximum serves as an incentive for
welfare recipients to find and maintain employment").
131 Id. at 485.
132 Id.; see Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)

(upholding law restricting the practice of optometry).
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strike down state laws "because they may be unwise, improvident,
13 3
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."
The Court did not pause to consider whether the poor are a
politically subordinated out-group that might require special judicial
protection. The Dandridge Court simply ignored this doctrinal
1 4
inquiry, assuming instead that the poor were political "insiders" 3
who could properly be bound by majoritarian preference. On this
basis, the Court applied a rationality test so extreme that deference
would be given to any conceivable relationship between any
13 5
imaginable state policy and the challenged classification.
133 Dandridge,397 U.S. at 484 (quoting Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488).
134 See Brilmayer, supra note 80, at 1293 (defining the "insider-outsider" as
someone "who is subject to the state's power and yet, at the same time, is excluded
from the community to an extent that makes discriminatory treatment suspect"). The
irony of extending the deferential approach of CaroleneProductsand West CoastHotel
to reject the constitutional claims of impoverished children, who are thoroughly
lacking in democratic voice, was nowhere apparent in the Dandridge decision. See
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (rejecting the Lochner
paradigm and upholding a minimum wage law for women, in part on the ground that
the unregulated labor market provided "a subsidy for unconscionable employers");
see also TRIBE, supra note 41, at 585 (noting that West Coast Hotel serves as a source
of liberty rights under the Due Process Clause available "to combat economic
subjugation and human domination"); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM.
L. REv. 873, 911 (1987) (discussing the possibility of using West Coast Hotel as a
"sword" against social structures that subordinate the poor).
s5Justice Marshall made this point in his dissent:
More important... is the Court's emasculation of the Equal Protection
Clause as a constitutional principle applicable to the area of social welfare
administration. The Court holds today that regardless of the arbitrariness
of a classification it must be sustained if any state goal can be imagined that
is arguably furthered by its effects. This is so even though the classification's
underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness clearly demonstrates that its actual
basis is something other than that asserted by the State, and even though
the relationship between the classification and the state interests which it
purports to serve is so tenuous that it could not seriously be maintained that
the classification tends to accomplish the ascribed goals.
Dandridge,397 U.S. at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court also declared that
"the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by
public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court," and that the
"Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged
with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the
myriad of potential recipients." Id. at 487. Most charitably, the Court's statements
might be viewed as suggesting a relative institutional competence basis for steering
clear of any substantive review in welfare cases. Yet this same logic would apply to
many other areas-state taxation, for instance-where the Court has not abdicated
responsibility for meaningful judicial review. See supra note 32 and accompanying
text. Thus, the declaration that social welfare issues "are not the business of this
Court" does less to explain the Court's position than to serve notice that it had
washed its hands of poor people's rights in the welfare context.
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The second defining poverty decision of the Burger Court,James
v. Valtierra,l1 6 raised even more acutely the problem of democratic legitimacy and its implications for judicial review.
Valtierra
involved an amendment to the California Constitution that barred
the construction of low-income housing without prior approval by
local referendum.1 3 7 No other form of housing construction was
subject to this restriction.1 38 Thus, unlike the welfare measure in
Dandridge-which might be understood as distributing a fixed
resource among the poor or drawing lines within that population139-the California law sustained in Valtierra unambiguously
classified on the basis of wealth and directly discriminated against
the poor as a group.1 40 The "special burdens" this classification

136 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
137 The California Constitution reserves for the people the referendum power to
approve or reject legislative acts of local government bodies. See CAL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 1. In 1950, the California Supreme Court determined that local decisions to seek
federal financial assistance for local public housing projects were nonlegislative and
therefore not subject to referendum. See Housing Auth. v. Superior Court, 219 P.2d
457, 460-61 (Cal. 1950) (holding that decisions by a local authority to seek federal
housing aid were executive and administrative, not legislative). California subsequently adopted an amendment to its constitution that subjected local public housing
decisions to referendum approval. See Valtierra,402 U.S. at 138-39 (setting forth the
history of the state constitutional amendment).
138 The amendment on its face singles out low-income people for different
political treatment. Low-income people in this context were defined as individuals
"who lack the amount of income which is necessary ... to enable them, without
financial assistance, to live in decent, safe and sanitary dwellings, without overcrowding." CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1 (quoted in Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 144 n.2).
139 The classification upheld in Dandridge has been characterized as one that
distinguished among categories of the poor, rather than between the poor and the
rich. See Michelman, supra note 123, at 688 (explaining that in Dandridge,assistance
was given to all families defined as "needy," but nevertheless provided fewer benefits
per capita to larger families). That characterization, however, ignores the political
context of the maximum grant regulation challenged in Dandridge. That regulation
was precipitated by the Maryland legislature's failure to appropriate sufficient funds
to meet the subsistence needs of all indigent families within the state. Fiscal
resources were not available to meet these needs because of dejure political decisions
reached by the state legislature. See generally PHILLIPS, supranote 15, at xviii (demonstrating government's pervasive role in directing and distributing societal resources
among and between classes of citizens). The state withheld support from large poor
families while extending analogous support to more affluent families through tax
exemptions, mortgage deductions, and other allowances. Viewed from this baseline,
the challenged regulation disfavored the poor as a group in order to provide greater
support through other dispensations of public money for the more affluent. See
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972
SUP. CT. REV. 41, 57 (contending thatJustices Marshall and Brennan, dissenting in
Dandridge,"were less concerned over distinctions among the poor than between the
poor and the rest of society").
140 See Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 144 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[The challenged

1993]

POVERTY AND DEMOCRACY

1311

placed on the poor 141 were known to have effectively barred
low142
income housing from communities throughout the state.
Only two years before Valtierra, the Court had invalidated a
similar referendum requirement from Akron, Ohio. 143
The
Akron provision prohibited the adoption of any fair housing
ordinance absent approval by public referendum. Treating this
restriction as a race-based classification, the Court subjected it to
"the most rigid scrutiny." 144 On the authority of that holding
alone, as one commentator has noted, Valtierrashould have been an
"open and shut case." 145 The political rights cases had equated
legislative classifications based on race and wealth as presumptive
evidence of political malfunction that warranted closer judicial
scrutiny; Valtierrapresented a classic example of a majority unfairly
manipulating the public decisionmaking process to disadvantage an
already weak and unpopular minority. Nevertheless, the Court
upheld the California referendum requirement. The Court first
denied that the state law provision discriminated against the
poor.1 46 Second, even if the provision did discriminate against
the poor, the Court believed it permissible because it did not
provision] is neither 'a law of general applicability that may affect the poor more
harshly than it does the rich,' nor an 'effort to redress economic imbalances.' It is
rather an explicit classification on the basis of poverty .... ") (quoting Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
141 Id. at 140 (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
142 See Valtierra v. Housing Auth., 313 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (citing
evidence that the referendum requirement has blocked low-income housing in other
California counties).
143 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969).
144 Id. (holding that § 137 of the Akron City Charter constituted "a real,
substantial, and invidious denial of the equal protection of the laws").
145 TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1666.
146 The Court did this in two ways. First, it asserted that the referendum
requirement disadvantaged not the poor, but rather "persons advocating low-income
housing." Valtierra,402 U.S. at 142. Next, the Court insisted that California had not
"singled out" poor people for "mandatory referendums while no other group must
face that obstacle." Id. at 142. After all, the Court stated, referendum approval was
required for all state constitutional amendments and the alienation of public parks.
The Court ignored, however, that within the relevant universe, California had
burdened only low-income housing with the referendum requirement. By the Court's
logic, California could defend a law making traffic violations by poorpeoplea capital
offense on the ground that state law also imposes the death penalty on murderers
regardless of economic status. In addition, the general nature of the other items
California subjected to mandatory referenda, none of which singled out the interests
of particular groups, further confirmed that poor people were the only discernable
group upon which the state placed "'special burdens ... within the governmental
process.'" Id. at 140 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
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implicate race. Lastly, the Court extolled the referendum requirement as evidence of the state's "devotion to democracy, not to bias,
" 14 7
discrimination, or prejudice.
Valtierra is remarkable for its apparent conclusion that even
express de jure discrimination against poor people should be
reviewed only under the most indulgent and deferential standard.
The Court never explicitly stated that poverty was no longer to be
regarded "like race, creed, or color" 148 as "a capricious or irrelevant factor" 149 warranting special judicial attention.
But it
implicitly rejected earlier doctrinal insights that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the states "from discriminating between 'rich'
and 'poor' as such," 150 a prohibition that the California measure
quite clearly breached. Valtierra has been criticized for the Court's
pretense of writing on "a clean slate," despite contrary precedent
that required reconciliation. 151 The Court never explained its
refusal to subject overt discrimination against the "'poor' as such"
to any meaningful level of review. 15 2 The Court was silent on why
wealth would no longer be considered a marker of democratic
malfunction. And the Court left unarticulated the premises and
assumptions that drove its decision.
147 Valtierra,402 U.S. at 141. The Court's glorification of the referendum process
as evidence of"devotion to democracy," elides the fact that the selective importation
of more cumbersome forms of governance can indeed reflect "bias, discrimination,
[and] prejudice," if used to hamstring disfavored minorities. Id.; cf. News in Brief,
EDUC. WK., Sept. 30, 1992, at 19 (discussing a California ballot initiative that would
cut welfare benefits, to the detriment of infant children). Indeed, the referendum in
Valtierrafacilitated the exclusion and isolation of the poor from the politically and
economically dominant segments of the polity by preventing construction of lowincome housing outside of lower class and racially segregated ghettos. The
referendum, because it stigmatized the poor by keeping them outside the favored
community's "bond of... kinship," presented not a political process representing the
whole people, but rather'one that functioned to marginalize an already disempowered
"out-group." See Lusky, supra note 72, at 1105 n.72 (citing Louis Lusky, Peace... the
Presence ofJustice, 17 HUMANIST 195, 201-02 (1957)).
148 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
149 Id.; see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) ("In criminal trials a State
can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or
color.").
150 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (HarlanJ., dissenting).
151 TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1666.
152 A notable feature of the Court's opinion was its refusal even to recognize the
poor as a discernible group. While tolerating a blatant form of "we-they" discrimination that clearly arose from social perceptions of poor people as distinct and
undesirable, the Court refused to see the poor as a disempowered group: rather, by
the Court's lights the poor were merely one of a number of "diverse and shifting
groups" without special constitutional significance. Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 142.
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The Court's subsequent poverty discourse adds nothing to the
shockingly deficient reasoning and analysis of Dandridge and
Valtierra.1 53 Indeed, later cases avoid any discussion whatsoever
of judicial method, and simply recite the standard litany that
poverty is not a suspect classification, 154 and that classifications
"in the area of economics and social welfare" will be upheld if any
conceivably rational basis to support them can be imagined. 5 5
In no case has the Court even considered whether wealth and
political power intersect in such a way as to mandate more intense
judicial review of legislation disadvantaging the poor. In sum, while
the Court has made clear its refusal to extend special judicial
protection to poor people, it has never adequately defended this
position nor addressed the constitutional implications of a political
system that functionally excludes a large segment of the nation's
citizenry on account of poverty.
B. AcademicJustificationsforthe Court'sPovertyJurisprudence
The Court's failure to articulate a credible theory for its poverty
jurisprudence invites skepticism, but it does not necessarily follow
that no plausible basis for its work can be imagined. To the
contrary, legal scholars from across the spectrum have stepped into
the breach to justify the Court's relegation of poor people's
constitutional claims to rationality review. Although the academic
apologies proceed from widely divergent premises, they all absolve
the Court's poverty jurisprudence as the faithful application of
received (though perhaps unworthy) doctrine. On examination,
however, none of these explanations fills the missing theoretical
gap.
153 See,

e.g., Lyng v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.

Implement Workers, 485 U.S. 360 (1988); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987);
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986); Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569 (1982) (per
curiam); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170
(1978); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976); Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577
(1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
154 See, e.g., Harris,448 U.S. at 323 (declaring, on the strength of Dandridge and
Valtierra, that "poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification").
155 Kras, 409 U.S. at 446 (declaring, on the strength of Dandridge,that legislation
"in the area of economics and social welfare" must be upheld upon any "rational
justification").
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Conservative Apology

A number of libertarian arguments have been developed to
justify the Court's deference to majoritarian outcomes that affect
the poor. The leading exponents are Robert Bork and Ralph K.
Winter, Jr.156 Their articles focus, for the most part, on why the
Constitution does not support the enforcement of substantive
welfare rights by the Court. That part of their argument, significant
as it is, is not relevant to the purposes of this Article. More to the
point is their insistence that poor people do not need special
protection from the Court because the results generated by
American politics and free market economics have been exceedingly
favorable to the poor. According to this view, the premise that the
poor are "underrepresented politically is quite dubious" because the
"poor ... have had access to the political process and have done
very well through it." 15 7 Bork thus invokes what he terms "an
explosion of welfare legislation" and the "massive income redistributions" of the 1960s and 1970s (neither of which he documents or
Similarly,
even describes) in support of this proposition. 158
Winter alludes to an "enormous amount" of unspecified legislation
"intended... to help the poor," and argues from this premise that
poor people require no judicial protection from majoritarian
political processes. 159 The idea that the poor are outside "the life
of the community" 160 or that they are "the most ineffective
participants in the political process" 16 1 is dismissed as mere
"liberal shibboleth." 162 Indeed, the entire history of the nation
is described as witness to the great political success "of virtually all
of its people bettering themselves economically." 163 Since the
interests of the poor are already generously accounted for in the
preferences of the majority, the Bork-Winter thesis runs, there is no
conceivable justification for the displacement of democratic
decisionmaking that a more protective poverty jurisprudence would
entail.
156

See Robert H. Bork, The Impossibilityof FindingWelfare Rightsin the Constitution,

1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695; Winter, supra note 139 passim.
157 Bork, supra note 156, at 701.
158 Id.

159 Winter, supra note 139, at 98.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
161 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
162 Bork, supra note 156, at 701.
'60

163 Winter, supra note 139, at 98.
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The statement that the poor "have done very well" 16 4 invites
the question, "in comparison to what?" Neither Bork nor Winter
identifies his reference point, though it appears that the "free
market," laissez-faire baseline common to libertarian critiques is
what each has in mind.1 6 5 Judicial activism, they contend, interferes with the natural ordering of economic arrangements and the
resulting distribution of wealth. From this perspective, the poor
have done well politically because legislation has spared them (at
least some of them) the Bleak House conditions that would prevail
under an unregulated, common-law regime.
If one chooses a different reference point, however, the
conservative argument collapses. It is hard to say that the poor have
done well when one looks at the conditions of their subsistence and
166
the increase in their absolute numbers over the last decade.
Severe cutbacks in social programs, unchecked by the Court, have
contributed to broad and unremitting deprivation on the part of
free market "losers." 167 Contrary to the conservative assumption,
"rising tides" have lifted the yachts but left the rowboats and life
1 68
rafts behind.
164 Bork, supra note 156, at 701.
165 Cf Sunstein, supra note 134, at 875 (criticizing the notion that government
neutrality means "preservation of the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements
[made] under the baseline of the common law"); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature
of ConstitutionalSpace: What Lauyers Can Learn From Modem Physics, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 15-16 & n.61, 24-25 (1989) (noting that New Deal reformers identified
common law baseline as neither "natural" nor "neutral" nor "prepolitical").
166 See Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of OurConstitution: Rethinking OurDuty
to the Poor,39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8 (1987) (citing "a visible and measurable increase in
the number of people who are so poor that they have great difficulty in obtaining
basic necessities"). The following discussion focuses on recent social statistics and
legislative developments, but it is not meant to suggest that the political and material
plights of the poor are in any sense new phenomena. See PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at
8-14 (noting the relative stability in the depressed economic position of the lower
quintile
of households over the past four decades).
167 See Bob Greenstein & Art Jaeger, Number in Poverty Hits 20-Year High as
Recession Adds 2 Million More Poor, Analysis Finds (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 8, 1992, at 8 ("A second factor pushing poverty
rates up over the past decade has been declines in government assistance programs,
especially those for the poor and the unemployed."). But see Gary Burtless, Public
Spending on the Poor: Historical Trends and Economic Limits 2 (May 28-30, 1992)
(unpublished paper prepared for the University of Wisconsin-Madison conference
entitled "Poverty and Public Policy: What Do We Know? What Should We Do?," on
file with author) (contending that a "significant liberalization of poverty programs was
underway by the early 1990s").
168 See Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, Do Rising Tides Lift All Boats? The
Impact of Secular and Cyclical Changes on Poverty, 76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
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In the few years since the conservative apologists optimistically
consigned the poor to the political arena, impoverishment has
claimed more victims than at any time since 1964, when the nation
declared war on poverty. 169 Over the last decade, the number 170
of
threshold
poverty
federal
the
below
incomes
individuals with
increased both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total
population. In 1990 alone, 2.1 million individuals joined the ranks
of the poor, increasing the total percentage of persons below the
poverty line to 13.5%. 17 1 More than one fifth of the nation's children, 21.8%, live in poverty.1 72 These children suffer severe
material deprivation: they frequently are of low birthweight and are
later hungry; 173 they are ill-housed, if at all; 174 they lack health

PROCEEDINGS) 405, 410 (1986) (arguing that improved economic conditions have
limited anti-poverty effects).

169 See e.g., 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 22, at 1274-75 (citing overall poverty

rates from 1959 through 1990); Deborah L. Cohen, Child Poverty Rose Steadily in '80s,
City-by-City Count by C.D.F.Shows, EDUC. WK., Sept. 9, 1992, at 20 (citing data); Robert
Pear, Ranks of U.S. PoorReach 35.7 Million, the Most Since '64, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1992, at Al, A14 (citing national statistics).
170 The federal poverty line is not intended as a relative measure of poverty, but
rather as an absolute measure of subsistence. See MOLLIE ORSHANSKY, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, THE MEASURE OF POVERTY: TECHNICAL PAPER
I, DOCUMENTATION OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND RATIONALE FOR CURRENT

POVERTY MATRIX 233-83 (1977) (documenting the development of federal poverty
guidelines). The measure has been criticized as failing to serve that purpose. See
JOHN E. SCHWARZ & THOMAS J. VOLGY, THE FORGOTTEN AMERICANS 61-63 (1992)

(arguing that the federal poverty guidelines greatly understate the number of
Americans who cannot afford basic necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter);
Kathryn A. Lavin & Kathryn H. Porter, Enough to Live On: Selling an Appropriate
AFDCNeed Standard(Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Oct.
1992, at ix (discussing the relation between the federal poverty level and subsistence
levels). See generally 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 22, at 1270-72 (explaining the
historical beginnings of the calculation of the poverty threshold; DANIEL H.
WEINBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., MEASURING POVERTY 4 (1984)
(arguing for an absolute rather than a relative standard).
1 See Jason DeParle, Number of People in Poverty Shows Rise in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1991, at Al, B5 (setting forth statistics). Among full-time, year-round
workers, the number of individuals who earned incomes below the poverty level
increased from 12.1% in 1979 to 18% in 1990. The number of individuals with a year
or more of college who fell into poverty rose from 6.2% in 1979 to 10.5% in 1990.
SeeJason DeParle, Repor Delayed Months, Says Lowest Income Group Grew, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 1992, at A15. Two political scientists have estimated that the number of
functionally poor Americans-those who cannot secure living necessities-exceeds
federal estimates by almost 100%. See SCHWARZ & VOLGY, supra note 170, at 61
(estimating that in 1989, 56 million Americans, about one in four, were functionally
in poverty).
172 See Pear, supra note 169, at A14. For anecdotal accounts of the lives of
children in urban poverty, see ALEX KOTLOWITz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE:
THE17STORY OF Two BoYs GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991).
3 See FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, COMMUNITY CHILDHOOD HUNGER
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IDENTIFICATION PROJECT: A SURVEY OF CHILDHOOD HUNGER IN THE UNITED STATES
16 (1991) (reporting that 5.5 million children under the age of 12, or one out of
every eight children, are hungry) [hereinafter FRAC, COMMUNITY CHILDHOOD
HUNGER IDENTIFICATION PROJECT]; FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, POOR
INFANTS/POOR CHANCES: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF PROGRESS TOWARD REDUCING
Low BIRTH WEIGHT AND INFANT MORTALITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS LARGEST
CITIES, 1979-1984, at 11 (1987) (stating that low income financial problems during
pregnancy increase the risk of delivery of a low birthweight baby by seven times);
FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, FEEDING THE OTHER HALF: MOTHERS AND
CHILDREN LEFr OUT OF WIC at iv (1989) (stating that substantial numbers of children
from poor households are "at special risk with respect to their physical and mental
health by reason of inadequate nutrition") [hereinafter FRAC, FEEDING THE OTHER
HALF]; see also Marian W. Edelman, Children and the Nation's Conscience, N.Y.S. BJ.,
May/June 1992, at 14 (noting that every 117 seconds, an infant in America is born
too small to be healthy).
174 It is estimated that as many as 500,000 children are currently homeless in
America. See 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 22, at 1184 (calculation of the National
Coalition for the Homeless). In August 1992, more than 1000 families with children
entered the homeless shelter system in New York City alone. See NEW YORK CITY
HUMAN RESOURCES ADMIN., EMERGENCY HOUSING SERVICES FOR HOMELESS FAMILIES
MONTHLY REPORT, AUGUST 1992, at 2 (1992). ShamalJackson was an eight-month-old
boy who died of the health consequences of poverty and homelessness, "complicated
by low birthweight, poor nutrition, viral infection, and sleeping in shelters, welfare
hotels, and the subway." In his entire life he had never slept in an apartment or a
house. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET: FY 1989, AN
ANALYSIS OF OUR NATION'S INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN iii, xvi-xvii (1989) [hereinafter
CDF, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET]; see also Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty and
State Constitutions,38 EMORY L.J. 577, 579 (1989) (citingJackson's story as one of the
"human tragedies" behind the statistics in this article). At the outset of the war on
poverty, New York City had 6,763 construction starts of public housing. In 1989, the
New York City Housing Authority reported only one new construction start. See
PATRICIA SIMPSON, COMMUNITY SERV. SOC'Y OF N.Y., LIVING ON POVERTY: COPING
ON THE WELFARE GRANT 13 (1990) (citing figures provided by the Office of Research
and Policy Development, New York City Housing Authority).
175 SeeJulieJohnson, Children'sHealth Seen as Declining,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1989,
at A21 ("[O]ur social and political negligence is creating generations of medically
homeless children." (quoting William H. Considine, head of the Children's Hospital
Medical Center in Akron, Ohio)); Meg Sommerfeld, Survey Charts Rise in Health
ProblemsAmong Pupils, EDUC. WK., Sept. 23, 1992, at 8 (citing survey results that show
increases in health problems among poor children). Thirty-seven million Americans,
including children, are uninsured and ineligible for Medicaid, and less than half of
all poor families are covered by Medicaid. SeeJean Bandly, Medicaid: A PoorProgram
for Poor People, in PREVENTING NEED: A LONG WAY TO Go 27, 30 (Elizabeth
Wickenden ed., n.d.). Only four out often eligible women receive benefits for their
children under the Women, Infants and Children program, and a smaller percentage
of children were fully immunized in 1987 than in 1980. See Winifred Bell, High Risk
Children: Can Their Odds Be Improved?, in PREVENTING NEED: A LONG WAY TO Go,
supra, at 17, 23; see also Elisabeth Rosenthal, Health Problems of Inner City PoorReach
CrisisPoint, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1990, at Al ("While Americans elsewhere are living
longer, healthier lives, residents of the inner cities inhabit islands of illness, epidemics
and premature death.").
I76SeegenerallyJONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
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fifty-three minutes poverty kills an American child. 177 The United
States loses more children to poverty every five years than it lost

soldiers to battle during the entire Vietnam War.178 For those
whose lives are perched at the margin of survival, the idea that the
179
poor "have done very well" would be astounding.
Government cutbacks to social programs contributed heavily to
the increased impoverishment of the poor during this period.
Because poor people lack political clout commensurate with their
numbers, the political arena, unchecked by judicial constraints, has
converted the war on poverty into a war on the poor.18 0 The
poor subsist in an underclass, dehumanized and demonized in the
public's mind.1 81

Viewing social welfare programs as the source

of all the nation's ills, 182 government has instituted a systematic
SCHOOLS 83-132 (1992) (discussing disparities between public schools in low and high
income neighborhoods across the country, including New York City); Mark Pitsch,
Income Gapin CollegeParticipationPersists,DemocraticStudy Concludes, EDUC. WK., Sept.
9, 1992, at 17 (discussing low college participation rates of children from low-income
families).
177 See CDF, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET, supra note 174, at xvii.
178 See id.
179 One tragic illustration of this point appears in a recent Boston study that
documented widespread malnourishment and disease among poor children during
the winter months due to the inability of poor families to afford both food and
heating fuel. See Study of Poor Children Shows Painful Choice: Heat Over Food, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1992, at A17.
'80 See Martha F. Davis, War on Poverty, War on Women, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1991,
at A19 (suggesting that the war on poverty has "turned into a war on poor women").
Governor Mario Cuomo of New York noted an increase in what he termed "welfare
scapegoating": "'The poor people don't have any power .... That's why welfare's
such a terrific issue. Who's going to march against you, a 15-year-old girl with a baby?
She doesn't even get to the polls.'" Kevin Sack, The New, Volatile Politics of Welfare,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, at A24 (quoting Governor Mario Cuomo). And when
Massachusetts State Senator Michael C. Creedon characterized welfare recipients as
"'people who are urinating on the floor in the bus station,'" he said he "was not
concerned how his comments would be received,.. . because welfare recipients do
not vote." Id. (quoting Senator Michael Creedon).
181 The term "underclass" was first used by Gunnar Myrdal and others in the
1940s. SeeJAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 1900-1985,
at 215 (1986). Originally a shorthand for "the chronically unemployed, underemployed, and unemployables," Herbert Gans, Deconstructingthe Underclass: The Term's
Dangers as a PlanningConcept, AM. PLANNING ASS'NJ., Summer 1990, at 271, it has
"acquired lurid connotations, suggesting something monstrous and even subhuman,"
KAUS, supra note 16, at 105.
182 Throughout the 1980s, Charles Murray was the leading spokesperson for the
view that welfare enables a culture of poverty to perpetuate itself by facilitating
dependence on government assistance programs that discourage work and promote
wanton and illegitimate births. See CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN
SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 at 154-91 (1984); see also SusanJ. Popkin, Welfare: Views
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rollback on its commitment to alleviate poverty.1 83
Punitive
84
without any evieligibility requirements have been imposed
18 5
dence of their effectiveness in dealing with the poverty crisis. 18 6
The myth has reemerged that the poor are "lazy and shiftless,"
systematic
rather than victims of an economic system that generates
187
wages.
low
at
underemployment
and
unemployment
from the Bottom, 37 SoC. PROBS. 64, 77 (1990) (stating that "long-term use of public
assistance reduces recipients' beliefs in their own abilities"); cf. HUMAN RESOURCES
Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/HRD-87-51BR, WELFARE: ISSUES TO
CONSIDER IN ASSESSING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 23 (1987), reprinted in part in Poverty

and Welfare: The GAO Report, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 227, 227 (1987) (stating that
"some work demonstration projects had encouraging results" but that research did
not "clearly support" dependence theory and long term effects remain unclear). But
see Kathryn Edin, Surviving the Welfare System: How AFDC Recipients Make Ends Meet
in Chicago, 38 SOC. PROBS. 462, 472 (1991) (arguing that welfare "actually prohibits
dependency by paying too little").
183 In 1992, the median ADFC grant in the United States was fixed at 39% of the
federal poverty line. See CENTER FOR BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES ET AL., Welfare
Rolls Rising Due to the Recession, in SELECTED BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON WELFARE
PROGRAMS 1, 3 (1992). Total spending for AFDC in constant 1990 dollars dropped
from $20.7 billion in 1973 to $16.7 billion in 1989, despite an increase in the number
of poor people. See Jason DeParle, Fed by More Than Slump, Welfare CaseloadSoars,
N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 10, 1992, at Al, A16; see also Bell, supra note 175, at 23 (stating that
social welfare programs for the poor were cut from 15% of the federal budget in 1980
to 10% in 1985, with a real loss of $10 billion);Jason DeParle, CaliforniaPlan to Cut
Welfare May Prompt Others to Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at Al, D21 (stating
that many states slashed welfare costs by as much as 9.5% in 1990). Moreover, in
1991, one-third of the AFDC caseload or 2.9 million children and parents or
guardians, suffered severe cuts in their benefits. At the same time, three-fifths of 5.2
million poor people watched their welfare benefits get "eaten up" by inflation as 33
states held 1991 rates at 1990 or earlier levels. See CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE
POLICY AND LAW, PUB. No. 165, 1991: THE POOR GOT POORER AS WELFARE
PROGRAMS WERE SLASHED at i (1992) (describing the effect of 1991 welfare cuts).
184 A number of welfare "reforms" have been put forward as purported incentives
for work and family responsibility. New Jersey, for example, proposed to deny
additional benefits to families if a single mother has additional children while on
welfare. SeeJason DeParle, Workfare, Learnfare, Wedfare: Why MarginalChangesDon't
Rescue the Welfare System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, § 4, at 3 (summarizing recent
welfare proposals).
185 See Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare
Reform Proposals, 102 YALE LJ. 719, 726-41 (1992) (critiquing the effectiveness of
behavior modification welfare restrictions and demonstrating factual inaccuracies in
their underlying assumptions).
186 Blaming the Victims in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at A18 (quoting
New York City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association position calling for increased
police pay at the expense of welfare benefits on grounds that the poor are "lazy and
shiftless").
187 Peter T. Kilborn, Lives of Unexpected Poverty in Center of a Land ofPlenty, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 1992, at Al (contending that the persistence of poverty in Marshalltown, Iowa is linked to "the nation's proliferation of low-wage jobs and two decades
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The conservative defense of the Court's hands-off approach fails
for another reason as well: the argument's focus on supposed
success stories of the poor conflates democratic legitimacy with
"favorable" political outcomes.1 8 8 But to claim that any legislative
attention to the plight of the lower classes signifies a democratically
inclusive politics is to ignore the obvious fact that social welfare
measures have abounded even in societies that formally exclude the
Indeed, history
poor from the processes of government.1 8 9
documents that superficially "favorable" treatment of the poor often
190
reflects a politics of subordination.
Finally, even if sporadic political success could serve as a
democracy surrogate that somehow cures or constitutionally
neutralizes the otherwise illegitimate exclusion of poor people from
democratic processes, the question of baseline reemerges: does the
observed outcome resemble the distribution of surplus that one
might expect a constituency the size of the poor to achieve under
of falling wages, especially for the least skilled").
188just as process-based theories may camouflage substantive value choices, so
substantive outcomes, however favorable, may merely provide protective coverage for
exclusionary or irregular political decisionmaking processes. See, e.g., RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977) (distinguishing procedural aspects
of Rawls's concept of "equal concern and respect" from the substantive outcomes that
may be understood to reflect equality of treatment).
189 See, e.g., BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND
DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 215-17
(1966) (describing Chinese Imperial Minister Tseng Kuo-fan's use of peasant relief
measures to overcome the Nien rebellion in the nineteenth century); FRANCES F.
PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC
WELFARE 3-41 (1971) (describing the early rise of poor relief in Europe and the
United States as a social control measure).
190 See FERNAND BRAUDEL, CAPITALISM AND MATERIAL LIFE, 1400-1800, at 40
(Miriam Kochan trans., Harper & Row 1973) (1967) (contending that the Elizabethan
Poor Laws were "laws against the poor"); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 189, at 17-23
(contending that social welfare programs are designed to regulate the lives of the
poor and to avoid social upheaval); cf. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 262-70
(Henry Collins ed., Penguin Books 1961) (1791-92) (describing the provision of
"practical relief" that would result in "[tihe poor, as well as the rich, . . . [being]
interested in the support of government, and the cause and apprehension of riots and
tumults ... ceas[ing]"); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Cour4 1984 Term-Foreword: The
Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 19 (1985) (referring to social welfare
"crumbs" from the "tables" of the "upper classes" that forestall the "true reform" of
society). But see HIMMELFARB, supra note 126, at 40-41 (criticizing the "social control"
theory of public welfare). See generally Jeffrey S. Lehman, To Conceptualize, to
Criticize,to Defend, to Improve: UndertandingAmerica's Welfare State, 101 YALE L.J. 685,
704 & n.74 (1991) (book review) (discussing and citing the "substantial literature in
which social scientists debate the historical motives of political actors" responsible for
welfare state expansion).
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fairly" 191 to reflect all relevant

192

interests?
Without pretending to any scientific resolution, one
might nevertheless seek rough answers by comparing our society's
material capability to relieve the privations suffered by our most
destitute citizens with the efforts actually made, and by juxtaposing
the American political response to poverty with the social welfare
measures of other "industrialized democracies." On both counts,
the comparisons suggest anything but a fully enfranchised, fairly
represented, or politically successful American lower class.
First, the widespread persistence of malnutrition, homelessness,
and other absolute privations in a nation with the surpassing wealth
and abundance of the United States is itself starkly inconsistent with
the Bork-Winter premise. 193 Consider the example of childhood
hunger.19 4 In the United States today, an estimated 5.5 million
children under the age of twelve suffer hunger and malnourishment,
but the federal government systematically fails to appropriate
sufficient funds to deal with the problem. 195 It is further estimated that the most egregious aspects of inadequate nutrition, in terms
of abject deprivation, could be eliminated through an appropriation
of less than ten billion dollars, an amount equal to a fraction of one
percent of the federal budget for fiscal year 1993 and an even
smaller fraction of the gross national product. 196 On the other
191 Supra text accompanying note 68.
192 This is not to suggest that the democratic integrity of a political process can

"be determined simply by looking to see who ended up with what." ELY, supra note
41, at 136. But the pattern of distribution can provide relevant evidence in this
regard.
193 See PHYSICIAN TASK FORCE ON HUNGER IN AMERICA, HARVARD SCHOOL OF
HEALTH, INCREASING HUNGER AND DECLINING HELP:
BARRIERS TO

PUBLIC

PARTICIPATION IN THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM 6 (1986) (finding that over 20 million

citizens "suffer from hunger at least some days each month," characterizing domestic
hunger as a "national health epidemic," and observing that "[a]s hunger has increased
federal food programs designed to feed the hungry have been weakened").
194 See generallyFRAC, COMMUNITY CHILDHOOD HUNGER IDENTIFICATION PROJECT,
supra
note 173 (describing the results of a nationwide survey of childhood hunger).
19 5 See generally FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, ANALYSIS OF THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION'S FY 1993 BUDGET PROPOSALS REGARDING NUTRITION PROGRAMS

(1992) (examining proposed funding for childhood hunger programs and concluding
that small increases are paid for by reductions in other food programs). By way of
comparison, the federal government spends nine dollars for a congressional
representative's lunch, three dollars for a prisoner's lunch, and 59 cents for a child's
school lunch. See Out to Lunch, HUNGER ACTION FORUM (The Hunger Project, Wash.,
D.C.), Feb. 1991, at 3.
196 See FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, DETAILS ON MEDFORD COST
ESTIMATES 1 (1992). The Medford Declaration to End Hunger in the United States

calls for full funding and utilization of existing food programs followed by new
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side of the ledger, sufficient food is as fundamental and imperative
an interest as a group or individual might assert.1 97 Indeed,
adequate nutrition in early years is vital to the healthy development
of a child; its absence often results in disease, stunted growth, brain
198
damage, mental retardation, and death.
In assessing whether the poor "have done well" on the legislative
score, we might engage in a simple balancing test comparing the
intensity of interest that the poor have in the elimination of
childhood hunger, for example, to the relatively modest cost that
would be required to achieve that goal. On a pluralist model, the
size of the constituency, the intensity of its interest, and the force
of countervailing factors ought to tell us a lot about the chance of
political outcomes. Here the constituency is fifteen percent of the
population, a larger proportion of the nation than many ethnic
minorities that have acquired significant voice in the political life of
the country. The intensity of the interest is keen, 199 and the
countervailing factors, in terms of social expenditures, relatively
weak. So why does childhood hunger nevertheless persist? Given
the marked imbalance between the critical, inelastic interest of the
poor in adequate food, and the puny social effort required to satisfy
that interest, it is highly unlikely that outright hunger would be as
prevalent in the United States if poor people commanded anything
approaching the political power one would expect a fairly represented constituency of such size to wield. Nor, in a pluralist model,
would one expect the government to refuse to fund even cost-saving
poverty prevention programs-like WIG200 and Head Start20 1 -

legislative
initiatives to eradicate remaining hunger and malnutrition. See id. at 2.
97
1

See generallyJEAN DRtZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION vii, 3-4

(1989) (discussing the debilitating and potentially deadly effects of inadequate
nutrition and arguing that "the persistence of chronic hunger [is] morally outrageous
and politically unacceptable" given modern society's clear capacity to "guarantee
adequate food for all").
198 See, e.g., FRAC, FEEDING THE OTHER HALF, supra note 173, at 14-17 (surveying
medical effects of inadequate nutrition; NATIONAL EDUC. ASS'N, THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN NUTRITION AND LEARNING 8 (1989) (discussing undernutrition and its

effects on the mental, social, and motor skills of children).
199 See T. Berry Brazelton, Why Is America FailingIts Children?,N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 40, 50 (contrasting lack of popular support for needed
nutrition and poverty programs with pediatrician's personal experience of individual
care and concern); U.S. Panel Warns on Children Poverty: 'StaggeringNational Tragedy'
Seen as Threatening the Future of the Young, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at A22
(describing the poverty facing American children and noting that malnutirition affects
nearly half a million children, a factor which "threatens America's future").
200 The Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children,
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that demonstrably reduce public outlays over the short to medium
term. 20 2 Only the marked absence of political access, voice and

Child Nutrition Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), commonly
known as "WIC," is a federally funded nutrition assistance program that provides
supplemental foods, nutrition education, and access to health services to pregnant
and post-partum women and their children to age five. WIC was created in response
to medical evidence of the increased health and developmental risks that accompany
low birth weight. See generally FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, WIC FACTS:
NATIONAL AND STATE PROFILES OF THE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL FOOD PROGRAM FOR
WOMEN, INFANTS, AND CHILDREN (1988) (describing the WIC program). Forty
thousand infants die each year in the United States because of complications due to
low birth weight. SeeJohn Kitzhaber, M.D., Uncompensated Care-The Threat and the
Challenge,W.J. MED.,June 1988, reprintedin 135 CONG. REC. S5082, S5083 (daily ed.
May 10, 1989).
201 The Head Start Act of 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 9831-9852 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990),
provides developmental, educational, and health services to economically disadvantaged preschoolers. See generally GARY NATRIELLO ET AL., SCHOOLING DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN:
RACING AGAINST CATASTROPHE 45-70 (1990) (reviewing
longitudinal studies on the effects of Head Start and other preschool programs on
child development).
202 Every dollar spent on WIC benefits for prenatal care saves up to three dollars
in short-term hospital costs for neonates and their mothers. See 134 CONG. REC.
S4977 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Simon). Participation in the WIC
program has been shown to produce positive outcomes in reducing low-birth weight,
reducing infant mortality, and improving health status of women and children. See
generally DAVID RUSH, FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EVALUATION OF THE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL FOOD PROGRAM FOR WOMEN, INFANTS, AND
CHILDREN (WIC) 1-3 (1986) (describing the National WIC Evaluation, a study that
assessed the health and nutritive impacts of the WIC program); FOOD RESEARCH AND
ACTION CENTER, WIC: A SUCCESS STORY: THE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL FOOD
PROGRAM FOR WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN 3-11 (1983) (describing the success
of the WIC program in improving the health status of low-income women and
children at nutritional risk). The U.S. health system saves between $14,000 and
$30,000 in hospitalization and long-term care for every case in which low birth weight
is prevented through nutritional and medical intervention at the prenatal phase. See
134 CONG. REC. E864, E865 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1988) (statement of Rep. Miller). In
1989, the General Accounting Office revealed that the federal government had
attempted to suppress the scientific data that confirmed WIC's effectiveness. See
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC DEV. Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/RCED-90-3, FOOD ASSISTANCE, THE NATIONAL WIC EVALUATION: REPORTING
AND FOLLOW-UP ISSUES 16-19 (1989).
Every dollar spent on Head Start saves $4.75 because of reduced costs for
additional education and public assistance. See CDF, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET,
supra note 174, at 8. Participation in the Head Start program has been demonstrated
to improve long-term school and employment prospects of preschoolers. See CDF,
A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET, supranote 174, at 9; Mary K. Stein et al., Instructional
Issues for Teaching Students at Risk, in EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS FOR STUDENTS AT RISK
145, 149-50 (Robert E. Slavin et al. eds., 1989).
Neither WIC nor Head Start is sufficiently funded to allow all poor children who
require benefits to participate. See CDF, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET, supra note
174, at 8 (discussing Head Start appropriations covering less than 20% of disadvantaged); Legislative Update, THE WIC NEWSLETTER (Center on Budget and Policy
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representation can reasonably explain the inability of poor people
to obtain public commitments to protect them against the most
serious privations, especially where those commitments simulta20 3
neously reduce public expenditures and tax burdens.
Recent economic analyses confirm that "America has high
2 04
poverty rates not because it must, but because it chooses to."
International comparisons indicate that the United States commits
a smaller percentage of its national income to redistributive welfare
programs and tolerates more income inequality than other advanced
industrialized nations.205 The poverty rate for every significant
age group is higher in America than in other industrialized
nations. 20 6
Among six industrialized countries studied, the

Priorities, Washington, D.C.),July 8, 1992, at 1 (discussing shortfall in WIC funding).
Many other examples of under-funded yet cost-efficient social welfare programs can
be cited. For example, the medical community has long asserted the need to fund
treatment for tuberculosis, a preventable illness that has reached epidemic
proportions among poor communities in urban centers. See Michael Specter,
Neglectedfor Years, TB is Back with Strains That Are Deadlier,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1992,
at Al, A44 ("'We have turned a disease that was completely preventable and curable
into one that is neither.'" (quoting Dr. Lee B. Reichman, President of the American
Lung
20 Association)).
3 Cf Garry Wills, The Born-Again Republicans, 34 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 24,
1992, at 9 (quoting statement by Pat Buchanan at the 1992 Republican National
Convention referring to "'the Vandals and Visigoths who are pillaging your cities by
expanding
the Head Start and food stamp programs'").
2
0Jason DeParle, In Debate on U.S. Poverty, 2 Studies Fuel an Argument on Who Is
to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1991, at A20. See 1992 GREEN BOOK, supra note 22, at
1288-1300 (citing international poverty and social spending comparisons); MariaJ.
Hanratty & Rebecca M. Blank, Down and Out in North America: Recent Trends in
Poverty Rates in the United States and Canada,107 Q.J. ECON. 233, 251-52 (1992) (citing
retrenchment in assistance levels as a possible explanation for the persistence of
poverty in the United States while Canadian poverty declined by 60%); Timothy M.
Smeeding, Why the U.S. Antipoverty System Doesn't Work Veiy Well, CHALLENGE, Jan.Feb. 1992, at 30, 33 (analyzing data from the Luxembourg Income Study and
concluding that other nations' tax and transfer systems are better suited to fighting
poverty); Rebecca M. Blank & MariaJ. Hanratty, Responding to Need: A Comparison
of Social Safety Nets in the United States and Canada 1-21 (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (explaining differences in the social welfare systems
in the United States and Canada, and estimating that adoption of the Canadian
system in the United States would reduce poverty rates for single-parent households
from 43% to between 2% and 16%).
205 See HOWARD OXLEY & JOHN P. MARTIN, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CoOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STUDIES, No. 17, CONTROLLING GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND DEFICITS: TRENDS IN THE 1980s AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 1990S

145-89 (Autumn 1991) (citing international comparisons); PETER SAUNDERS,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, No. 11, EVIDENCE
ON INCOME REDISTRIBUTION BY GOVERNMENTS (Paris, France 1984); Burtless, supra

note 167, at 28-29 (same).
206 See Burtless, supra note 167, at 29 (stating that in the United States, poverty
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United States and Australia had the highest percentage of children
living in poverty, (approximately 17%), and the highest rates among
families with children (15% and 14% respectively). 20 7 Ranked
against other industrialized nations, infant mortality in the United
States went from sixth best in 1950 to the worst rate in 1985.208
Moreover, no other industrialized nation has such extremes of
relative inequality as measured by the income gap between rich and
20 9
poor or the "distance between what CEOs and line workers earn."
is three times more prevalent among children and twice as prevalent among the
elderly
2 07 than in other industrialized nations).
See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, 101ST CONG.,
2D SESS., CHILDREN'S WELL-BEING: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 40-41 (Comm.
Print 1990) [hereinafter CHILDREN'S WELL-BEING] (comparing poverty rates among
children in the United States and six industrialized nations).
208 See Jean Bandler, Medicaid: A Poor Programfor Poor People, in PREVENTING
NEED: A LONG WAY TO Go, supra note 175, at 27, 28.
209 Bell, supra note 175, at 18; see also PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 8 (stating that
"[b]y several measurements, the United States in the late twentieth century led all
other major industrial countries in the gap dividing the upper fifth of the population
from the lower-in the disparity between top and bottom"). Relative inequality
increased precipitously in the United States as the gap in income between rich and
poor widened. Without capital gains income, the percentage of income received by
the lowest three fifths of the American population in 1985 was the smallest since
1947, the year such information collection began. See Jerry Kloby, The Growing
Divide: Class Polarizationin the 1980s, MONTHLY REV., Sept. 1987, at 1, 2-3. The
average family in the highest quintile of income had more than nine times as much
yearly income as a family in the lowest quintile. See id. The average household in the
upper one-half of one percent of the population had approximately 223.6 times more
wealth than the average household in the lower 90%. See DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, THE CONCENTRATION OF
WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1987). By the end of the Reagan years, the
disparity had grown still wider. The richest 1% percent received nearly as much
income after taxes as the bottom 40% combined. See Robert Greenstein & Scott
Barancik, DriftingApart: New Findingson GrowingIncome DisparitiesBetween the Rich,
the Poor,and the Middle Class (Center on Budget and Policy Priorites, Washington,
D.C.),July 1990, at 1; see also SCOTT BARANCIK & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CENTER ON BUDGET
AND POLICY PRIORITIES, WHERE HAVE ALL THE DOLLARS GONE? A STATE-BY-STATE
ANALYSIS OF INCOME DISPARITIES OVER THE 1980S, at ix-x (1992) (analyzing national
income on a state-by-state basis). Although the average family income of the poorest
fifth of the nation declined by 10.9% from 1976 to 1986, the average family income
of the richest fifth increased by 13.8%. See Leonard Silk, Now, to Figure Why the Poor
Get Poorer,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1988, § 4, at 1. Michael Milken's 1987 salary of $550
million equaled the yearly salary of almost 79,000 individuals working a 40-hour work
week at the minimum wage of $3.35. See Hard Times, THE NATION, Apr. 24, 1989, at
544 (citing statistics). The gap in income translates into a gap in essential services to
broad categories of Americans. For the impact on the elderly, see PROGRAM
EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY DISION, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/
PEMD-92-29, ELDERLY AMERICANS:
HEALTH, HOUSING, AND NUTRITION GAPS
BETWEEN THE POOR AND THE NONPOOR 2-7 (1992) (finding that 19% of the elderly
population were poor or near poor, with the increased likelihood of inadequate
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International comparisons further confirm the role that
government plays in fostering or eliminating poverty from the social
order. Any capitalist society will always have a bottom fifth that
enjoys less relative wealth. But the more important question is how
we regulate markets to avoid absolute privation among significant
segments of the population. Recent studies conclude that "with
comparable patterns of economic growth, other nations reduced
poverty to a far greater extent. The difference ... is that other
2 10
countries have more generous and effective social policies."
Moreover, industrialized nations that spent twice what the United
States did on social welfare programs saw their economies grow "at
2 11
least as fast as the United States or faster."
Other industrialized nations provide greater assistance than the
United States to individuals in need, 2 12 and they provide it in a
less stigmatizing, punitive fashion. 213 Poor people have not "done
well politically" in the United States when measured against the
achievements of lower classes in comparable and even less affluent
democracies. Extreme forms of deprivation that are prevalent here
are not plausible or acceptable political results in other industrialized countries. 2 14 This too supports the conclusion that poor
people in the United States do not exercise a fair, "democratic"
share of political power.
A conservative response might emphasize that the poor have a
relatively low participation rate in the political arena. 2 15 The
nutrition, housing, and health care).
210 DeParle, supra note 204, at A20. The number of households with family
income less than forty percent of the country's median income "has an almost perfect
inverse correlation with the level of social welfare spending." Burtless, supra note
167, at 29.
211 Burtless, supra note 167, at 28.
212 Ninety-nine percent of poor families in the developed countries that were

studied received government assistance, as compared to 73% in the United States.
See CHILDREN'S WELL-BEING, supra note 207, at 43 (citing data).
213 Some European countries provide annual vacations to single parents on
welfare. See Nancy Amidei, Welfare, in PREVENTING NEED: A LONG WAY To Go,
supra note 175, at 7.
214 Cf. Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice": The Distributional
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 1993)
(contending that nonenforcement of the Clean Air Act would not have been tolerated
for 13 years if toxic emissions had been of comparable concern to the white affluent
majority as to the poor black minority).
215 Cf. FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE
10-21 (1989) (discussing several causes for the correlation between income levels and
nonvoting in the United States). The Legal Services Corporation Act prohibits
federally funded attorneys for the poor from engaging in voter registration activity
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poor do not vote, this argument goes, and you cannot be a winner
if you do not play the game. The argument is ironic coming from
conservatives, who have consistently endeavored to block political
participation by poor people. 2 16 Moreover, the fact of nonparticipation cannot be dismissed as merely a bad political choice by the
poor.2 17 As one commentator notes, "[p]eople who are literally
struggling to find enough to eat are highly unlikely to participate in
the political process." 218 The failure to vote corresponds to other
indicators of political powerlessness, including poor people's
inability to amplify their voice through financial resources, the
creation of organizational structures, or the building of coalitions
with more affluent groups. 2 19 The "politically quiescent" attitude
of the poor, therefore, is less a matter of free choice, 22° than of
the mutually reinforcing effects of "low resources," weak political
as part of their employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(6)(c) (1988).
216 A recent instance of the conservative effort to minimize political participation
by the poor was a 1993 filibuster by Senate Republicans that stripped proposed voting
legislation of a provision making registration services available in welfare centers. See
139 CONG. REC. S2988-3009 (daily ed. March 17, 1993). The bill as passed by the
Senate requires states to provide voter registration forms to persons who apply for
or renew a driver's license, but not to persons who seek assistance from a state
unemployment or welfare office. See id. at S3004 (quoting the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993, § 4(a)(1)). Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell
explained:
In order to pass this bill, we have compromised with our Republican
colleagues. We had to modify a provision.., so that public assistance and
unemployment compensation offices do not have to provide voter
registration forms to those citizens they serve....
I regret that we had to make this change [because it] ... prevents the
most vulnerable, the most economically disadvantaged portion of our people
from having easier access to voter registration. I think it is sad that many

took that position.
Id. at S3007-08.
217 To say that the poor "choose" not to vote is like saying the poor "choose" to
be poor. Cf Lou Cannon, Reagan Cites "Choice" by Homeless, WASH. POST, Dec. 23,

1988, at A8 (discussing statements by President Reagan that homeless people "make
it their own choice" not to seek shelters that are available to them).
218 Edelman, supra note 166, at 34.
219 See e.g., IreneJ. Dabrowski et al., An ExchangeApproach to Community Politics:
A Case Study of White EthnicActivism in Staten Island, New York, in THE EGALITARIAN
Crry: ISSUES OF RIGHTS, DISTRIBUTION, AccEss, AND POWER 110 (Janet K. Boles ed.,
1986) (discussing a case study of organizational barriers faced by poor communities);
Scott E. Masten et al., The Costs of Organization,7J.L. EcON. & ORGANIZATION 1, 5-8
(1991) (discussing the role of internal organization costs and transaction cost
differentials).
220 Parker, supra note 33, at 242.
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incentives, and "inadequate skills" that trap the poor in what
22 1
democratic theorist Robert Dahi has termed a "cycle of defeat."
The political outcast status of the poor also reflects deep-rooted
stereotypes harbored by the more affluent; stereotypes that
contribute to a politics of irrationality and exclusion. 222 Myths
abound about the poor: they spread a "moral pestilence" 223 more
treacherous in the public mind than the diseases that more often
afflict the poor than the rich.224 Unable to quarantine the
poor,225 the rich have instead "sece[ded]" from any notion of a
shared life with the less affluent. 2 26 This secession expresses itself
221 DAHL, supra note 33, at 488. According to Dahl, social scientists have
identified "differencesin socialandeconomic status[as] the most important"causal factors
producing "differences in political participation." Id. at 450-51. Dahl notes that
"weak political incentives" and "inadequate skills" are in theory independent of "low
resources," but reports that they "tend to run together in the United States" more so
than2 22in any democracy other than India. Id. at 488.
See e.g., BARBARA LEYSER ET AL., CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND
LAW, BEYOND THE MYTHS: THE FAMILIES HELPED BY THE AFDC PROGRAM iii (2d ed.

1985) (providing facts to dispel common myths about welfare recipients).
223 Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142-43 (1837) (stating that
it is "as necessary for a state to provide precautionary measures against the moral
pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against the
physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported");
cf. Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, in ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS
METAPHORS 3-4 (1990) (discussing the phenomenon of cultures attaching stigma to
diseases and their victims).
224 See, e.g., Philip J. Hilts, Victory Over TB Seen as Thwarted by Budget Unit, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1990, at A24; Poverty Blamedfor Blacks'High CancerRate, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1991, at A16 (discussing the link between the incidence of cancer and
socioeconomic status).
225 Tight patterns of residential segregation based on race and class are a form of
social quarantine. See William W. Goldsmith, Poverty, Isolation, and UrbanPolitics, 21
REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 91, 92 (1989) (discussing the use of market forces to
insulate members of the more affluent classes from the "daily drudgery of the poor
and the working class"); Gary Orfield, Separate Societies: Have the Kerner Warnings
Come True?, in QUIET RIOTS: RACE AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 100, 110-12

(Fred R. Harris & Roger W. Wilkins eds., 1988) (discussing the consequences of
residential segregation). On the use of asylums and poorhouses to "quarantine" the
poor, see JUNE AXINN & HERMAN LEVIN, SOCIAL WELFARE: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN RESPONSE TO NEED 13 (1975); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE
POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 3-35 (1986); DAVID
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC 161-65 (1971).
226 Robert B. Reich has explained the secession of the affluent as follows:

The secession is taking several forms. In many cities and towns, the
wealthy have in effect withdrawn their dollars from the support of public
spaces and institutions shared by all and dedicated the savings to their own
private services. As public parks and playgrounds deteriorate, there is a
proliferation of private health clubs, golf clubs, tennis clubs, skating clubs
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politically as a withdrawal of support from even those social welfare

programs that would result in shared benefits to society at
2 27
large.
Finally, the conservative defense ignores the predominant role
that nonelectoral activity has played in the erstwhile success of the
poor. Historically, the threat of social disorder has dramatically

influenced progressive responses. The New Deal reforms were
enacted under the pressure of mass popular mobilization during the
Great Depression. 2 28

And the War on Poverty during the 1960s

represented, at least in part, a response to the civil rights movement
and the direct "political action" that erupted in Watts and else22 9

where.
Commentators have offered various theories for why these
reforms occurred. One school argues that mass agitation forces
23 0
political concessions in the form of social welfare legislation.
A parallel thesis holds that governing elites undertake social welfare
reforms at times of perceived danger in an effort to purchase social
peace and lower-class docility at the least possible cost. 23 1 More
specific explanations obtain for particular historical moments; some

and every other type of recreational association in which costs are shared
among members.
Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine),
at 16, 42.
227 See, e.g., Warren E. Leary, Free Flu Shots Halted, Leaving Many at Risk, N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1992, at A16.
2 28
See generallyJAMES O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973); Barton
J. Bernstein, The New Deal: ConservativeAchievements of Liberal Reform, in TOWARDS A
NEW PAST (BartonJ. Bernstein ed., 1970); Miller, supra note 20, at 496 ("'[T]he sheer
need of governments to allay working-class discontents that were dangerous to the
stability of the state' was obviously central to the New Deal ethos." (quoting C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 14 (1966))).
229 See generally FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 272-73 (1977) (tracing the Kerner
Commission's call for "'a massive and sustained commitment to action' to end poverty
and racial discrimination" to the "mass rioting throughout the nation between 1964
and 1968").
230 See, e.g., PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 189, at 45-199, 222-340.
231 See, e.g.,JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION
OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 95 (1991) (discussing cuts in New Deal
public employment programs "once the threat of social disorder subsided"). A
variant of this theory attributes progressive legislation during the New Deal period
to extraordinary social and economic circumstances that diminished the legitimacy
of established institutions and enabled an enlightened governing faction to carry out
reforms from above. See generally CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS:
THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977).
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conservatives, for example, attribute the Great Society initiatives to
"white guilt."

232

The constant across all of these explanations, however, is a lower
class disconnected from the normal channels and processes of
politics and able to influence political outcomes only through
threats of social disorder.233 The most recent example of this
phenomenon is the Los Angeles "uprising" that occurred in May
1992 and the political response that it quickly elicited from the
federal administration. 23 4 Even if one accepts, against all evidence, the poor person's success story told by the conservative
apology, the "success" results not from a democratically inclusive
politics, but rather from a convulsive mass politics of the dispossessed. 3 5
232

MURRAY, supra note 182, at 33 (stating that "[w]hite America owed black

America; it had a conscience to clear").
2
33 See generally FRED C. PAMPEL & JOHN B. WILLIAMSON, AGE, CLASS, POLITICS,
AND THE WELFARE STATE 34-44 (1989) (discussing the social democratic and interest
group politics theories of the welfare state).
2 4 Los Angeles experienced intensive rioting and arson in May, 1992 following
the jury acquittal of four policemen for the brutal beating of an African-American
motorist, Rodney King. The beating had been videotaped by a bystander and played
repeatedly on nationwide television. In the days that followed the verdict, many
people died, and the beating of a white motorist by African-American youths was
again videotaped by a bystander and broadcast repeatedly. Within days of the Los
Angeles uprising, Congress issued a lightning-fast appropriation of two billion dollars
to assist the urban area, as a committee of the House of Representatives reported that
"[t]he rioting in Los Angeles ha[d] focused attention on new solutions to inner-city
poverty." Urban Fuy Fuels Welfare Debate, HUNGER REP. (House Select Comm. on
Hunger, Wash., D.C.), Summer 1992, at 1; see also Toner, supra note 35, at A16
(commenting that after "the riots in Los Angeles, [President] Bush ha[d] changed his
tone, speaking more sympathetically about the plight of families on welfare"). Too
often it seems that the violence of the street is the only tool the poor have to contest
the "violence of institutions." See Ronald Steel, The Bobby Gap, NEW REPUBLIC, May
25, 1992, at 16, 17 ("'There is another kind of violence .... This is the violence of
institutions; indifference and inaction and slow decay. This is the violence that afflicts
the poor .... This is the slow destruction of a child by hunger, and schools without
books and homes without heat in the winter.'" (quoting Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.)).
235 In addition to the foregoing apology, Winter also advances an "institutional
competence" defense of the Court's poverty cases, Winter supra note 139, at 100, but
this argument fails for a similar reason. Winter posits that distributional questions
(a category into which he lumps all social welfare matters) are "classic issue[s] calling
for the resolution of the claims of competing groups," and that "[o]ne area in which
legislatures seem institutionally superior to other branches of government is in the
representation of interest groups." Id. But even granting that courts should not
meddle with ordinary distributional choices if the political system is functioning on
the pluralist model that Winter presumes, the proposition does not hold where a
group is undemocratically excluded or disabled from competing for government
attention and largesse. Indeed, this is a central point of Carolene's footnote four.
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2. Centrist Apology
A second theoretical justification for the Court's poverty
discourse derives from John Hart Ely's process-oriented approach
to judicial review. 23 6 This approach, also known as a "representation-reinforcing" model, has long dominated constitutional theory
and its contours are quite familiar. 23 7 Ely's theory assigns the
23 8
Court the task of "[p]olicing the [p]rocess of [r]epresentation"
in order to protect against democratic "malfunction." 23 9 The key
question is "whether the opportunity to participate either in the
political processes by which values are appropriately identified and
accommodated, or in the accommodation those processes have
reached, has been unduly constricted." 24 ' This role of dismantling roadblocks in the political process 24 1 is said to protect
against democratic breakdown.
See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. In a similar vein, Winter rationalizes
the Court's placement of welfare laws affecting "the most basic needs of impoverished
human beings" into the same constitutional category as ordinary commercial
legislation, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), by asserting that both
species of legislation "involve[] the allocation of scarce resources and the distribution
of income." Winter, supra note 139, at 101. The argument proves far too much,
since, as other adherents to the law and economics school tirelessly remind us, the
enforcement (or nonenforcement) of virtually any "law"-constitutional, legislative or
judicial-has measurable allocational impacts. See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw (1972). On Winter's theory, all laws would be constitutionally
indistinguishable.
236 See generally ELY, supra note 41, at 73-104.
237 Ely's book, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 41, has been called "the
most important effort to develop footnote four's larger implications for the practice
of judicial review." Ackerman, supra note 47, at 716 n.6. Ely does not have a
monopoly on process-oriented theories, but as the leading proponent, this section
focuses exclusively on his arguments with respect to treatment of the poor.
238 ELY, supra note 41, at 73.
239 Id. at 103. In close parallel with the second and third paragraphs of Carolene
footnote four, Ely describes two categories of "systematic malfunction" that call for
judicial intervention:
Malfunction occurs when theprocessis undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins
are choking off the channels of political change to ensure they stay in and
the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a
vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically
disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal
to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority
the protection afforded other groups by a representative system.
Id. (citations
omitted).
240
Id. at 77.
241 See id. at 136.
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Ely's argument about the poor is located in his broader
discussion of the Court's role in protecting minorities. Ely argues
that the Court's function is not limited to perfecting the processes
of public decisionmaking directly. 242 Rather, its role extends to
adjusting political outcomes for groups that are undemocratically
disabled from safeguarding their interests through normal political
channels, groups that, in Ely's words, are "barred from the pluralist's bazaar, and thus keep[] finding [themselves] on the wrong end
of [legislative] classifications, for reasons that in some sense are
discreditable."243 Ely attends to the reasons for a minority's political exclusion or ineffectiveness, on the theory that many perfectly
valid and democratic factors-such as group size or merit of claimmight fully explain a minority's perennial losses in the political
sphere. 24 4
The critical question, then, is what constitutes a
"discreditable"-and therefore, constitutionally suspect-reason for
minority powerlessness. Ely's response, harking back to Carolene, is
"prejudice," and he identifies two variants. 245 "First degree"
prejudice, the most virulent, is marked by the majority's desire to
impair a group, not for the sake of some overriding social good, but
largely to disadvantage the group's members. 246 First degree
prejudice manifests itself as a majority's irrational failure to
apprehend its common bonds and interests with a disfavored group
and its concomitant refusal to deal pluralistically with that group.
A second, more subtle form of prejudice is reflected in legislative
resort to generalizations founded upon majority "self-flattering"
stereotypes. 247 Ely enlists a variety of social-psychological principles to argue that such generalizations are especially prone to
inaccuracy and therefore "distort" the legislative process. This
242 See id. at 135.
243 Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
244 But cf Tribe, supra note 46, at

1072-77 (arguing that Ely and other process
theorists cannot distinguish democratic from undemocratic reasons for a minority's
political status without first identifying "fundamental substantive rights," and that
once one develops a theory of substantive rights, the raison d'itre of process-based
theories dissolves).
245 See ELY, supra note 41, at 153-57
246 Id. at 157.
247 Id. at 158. Ely provides several examples of such generalizations, including
.generalizations to the effect ... that whites in general are smarter or more
industrious than blacks, men more stable emotionally than women, or native-born
Americans more patriotic than Americans born elsewhere .... " Id. at 159. Such
stereotypes, Ely observes, "go down pretty easily" with the "flattered" groups, "whose
demography is that of the typical American legislature." Id.
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second variety of prejudice manifests itself in "erroneous" or
unreasoned legislative decisionmaking that denies the minority's
right to "equal concern and respect" by obliviously undervaluing its
welfare.

248

Ely's treatment of the Court's poverty discourse is short and
pointed. 249 He refers to the Warren Court's effort to expand "the
set of suspect classifications beyond the core case of race" as so
"adventurous" that it included "even poor people." 250 With the
transition to the Burger Court, "the retreat from the once glittering
crusade to extend special constitutional protection to the poor had
turned into a rout."25 1 Ely explains that the "unusual conceptual
problems with that campaign ...

were never satisfactorily worked

out," and the suggestion is that he is glad to bury the entire
252
episode.
Ely's theoretical framework allows the poor no better than
standing room in the Constitution's inner circle of special protection. Ely recognizes that the poor, despite their formal possession
of the franchise, are in fact politically marginal. 253 Any representation they command deserves little judicial trust because those who
govern can be expected to lack "empathy," that is, the ability to
discern and respect the interests of those who are different from the
ruling groups. 254 Legislators are not, for the most part, drawn
Id. at 157; see also supra note 188 and accompanying text. This category of
prejudice also includes legislation that tangibly benefits people who resemble those
in power at the expense of others.
249 Interestingly, some commentators have derived from the theory of representation-reinforcement a constitutional right to subsistence. With characteristic irony,
Frank Michelman finds in the process-oriented approach support for a welfare rights
thesis that each individual may claim from the state an income sufficient to facilitate
meaningful participation in the political process. See Michelman, supra note 123, at
248

677. Robert Dahl similarly argues that a social guarantee of "rights and goods
external to the [democratic] process, but necessary to it," including the material
wherewithal for survival and political participation, is among the essential "criteria"
for a democratic system. DAHL, supra note 17, at 167-82. This Article does not

address these implications of Ely's argument for the Court's treatment of the poor.
250 ELY, supra note 41, at 148.
251 Id. at 148. Although Ely states that the retreat began at the end of the Warren
era, the cases that he cites for that view, Dandridgeand Valtierra, see id. at 149 n.50,
were decided after Justice Rehnquist had joined the Court and Justice Burger had
become Chief Justice. But see HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE BURGER YEARS xii (1987)
(stating that "the Burger Court was discernably more conservative than the Warren
Court, even though by 1968 the latter was moving to the right along with the nation,
in reaction to riots, assassinations, and the Vietnam War").
252 Id. at 148-49.
253 See id. at 162.

254 Id. at 160-61.
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from the lower strata of society, and in any event, they may be
expected to share a broad-based "[h]ostility" that has been historically directed toward poor people. 255 Finally, Ely explains, the
"social intercourse" between majority and minorities that ordinarily
operates to mitigate "exaggerated stereotyping" of outgroups does
not exist between the haves and have-nots; 256 a sufficiently significant form of "prejudice" therefore persists to warrant judicial
257
concern about legislation that disadvantages the poor.
Oddly, however, Ely concludes that such judicial concern ought
only extend to "laws that actually classify on the basis of wealth,
drawing on some comparative generalization about the relative
characteristics of the poor on the one hand and those who more
nearly resemble the legislators on the other."258 All other forms
of political outcome injurious to the poor are of no constitutional
moment because, as Ely views it, they merely involve "failures on the
part of the government.., to alleviate.., poverty by providing one
or another good or service."259 Ely concedes that heightened
judicial review may be warranted even when a law does not
"discriminate explicitly against a disfavored group," but contends
that indirect legislative discrimination against the poor and so-called
"they-they" classifications that discriminate among the poor are not
troubling because they are not motivated by either form of
constitutionally significant prejudice. He writes:
[F]ailures to provide the poor with one or another good or service,
insensitive as they may often seem to some of us, do not generally
result from a sadistic desire to keep the miserable in their state of
misery, or a stereotypical generalization about their characteristics,
but rather from a reluctance to raise the taxes needed to support
such expenditures-and at all events they will be susceptible to
immediate translation into such constitutionally innocent
260
terms.
Under Ely's analysis, therefore, the Court erred by refusing close
scrutiny of the de jure anti-poor discrimination in Valtierra, but it
appropriately applied only a minimum rationality standard to
uphold the social welfare laws in Dandridge and its progeny.
255 Id. at 161.

256 Id. at 161-62.
257 Id. Ely makes these observations initially about "aliens" and then asserts that
"a similar analysis seems to apply to the poor."
258 Id. at 162.
259 Id.

260 id.
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Ely's analysis of poverty suffers from three decisive flaws, each
related to his single-minded focus on the subjective motivation of
the politically dominant group. 26 1 First, let us take Ely at his
word that the poor are not subject to prejudice when the majority
reaches distributional decisions that are disfavorable to the less
affluent. Why should the absence of prejudice end the inquiry into
democratic malfunction?262 If, as Ely claims, majoritarian decisions are illegitimate whenever a group lacks a meaningful opportunity to participate in the process "by which values are appropriately
identified" or in the process of the "accommodation" of those
values, then the Court ought to give classifications close scrutiny
whenever evidence suggests "blocked access" to the pluralist
bazaar.263 Prejudice is thus one indication of democratic malfunction; but it is not the only one.
Indeed, Ely acknowledges that the poor lack meaningful political
access. The source of their "blockage" is the wealth-induced
disparity of political influence that accords them less weight and
respect in the political process than a constituency of their magnitude would seem to deserve. 264 The concept that wealth is a
261 For general objections to Ely's use of motivation analysis, see Daniel R. Ortiz,
Pursuinga Perfect Politics:The Allure and Failureof Process Theoy, 77 VA. L. REv. 721,
735-41 (1991).
262 Earlier in his argument, Ely distinguishes between objectively inadequate
political access and subjective prejudice, and describes each as an independent basis
for ratcheting up judicial review. The concept of prejudice in this regard extends
Ely's theory ofjudicial intervention to groups that possess their democratic share of
voice and vote but nevertheless find themselves undemocratically excluded from their
commensurate share of power and influence:
Political access is surely important, but (so long as it falls short of majority
control) it cannot alone protect a group against the first type of prejudice
we examined, out-and-out hostility, nor will it even serve effectively to
correct the subtler self-aggrandizing biases of the majority. If voices and
votes are all we're talking about, prejudices can easily survive (and even on
occasion be exacerbated): other groups mayjust continue to refuse to deal
ELY, supra note 41, at 161 (citations omitted). This refinement enabled Ely to
encompass African-Americans-whom he regards as amply possessed of voice and
vote-in his process-oriented interpretation. See id. at 151-53. By Ely's analysis, it may
be that prejudice renders certain political outcomes constitutionally suspect even if
the disadvantaged group has voice and vote. But the absence of prejudice should not
necessarily remove all constitutional doubt concerning legislation that disadvantages
groups politically marginalized for other democratically "discreditable" reasons.
2 3 See supra text accompanying notes 239-43.
264 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 47, at 723 (discussing social science literature
that expresses "a pervasive anxiety over the way in which inequalities of wealth distort
the operation of a democratic process formally based upon egalitarian principles");
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"discreditable" basis for allocating public power is the basic insight
of the political rights cases, 265 and is consistent with the processoriented approach that no group should lack a fair chance to stake
out the values that are at the heart of the community's distributive
choices.
Moreover, Ely himself professes that even the allocation of
"benefits that are not themselves constitutionally required" should
be carefully scrutinized if "the way the distribution was arrived at"
is procedurally suspect (or, "discreditable," or reflective of a
"systematic malfunction").2 66 Ely never explains, though, why the
distributional choices that reflect the government's failure to
alleviate poverty by providing "one or another good or service"267
should be excluded from the more general category of "constitutionally gratuitous" benefits-"goods, rights, exemptions, or whatever"the dispensation of which the Court has an obligation to re26 8
view.
Ely's discussion of the poor fails for a second reason which
becomes apparent when one examines the function that prejudice
performs in his analysis. Ely focuses on prejudice not for its own
sake, but rather as evidence of distortion, defect, or lack of trustworthiness in the political process. According to Ely, first degree
prejudice perverts pluralist politics because it "distorts reality" and
"blinds" politically ascendant groups to the common and overlapping interests that they share with disfavored groups. The more
subtle form of prejudice that he describes-majority "self-flattering
generalizations"-is also dangerous because it "distorts" political
decisionmaking by displacing reasoned (or at least informed)
deliberation with stereotype, causing legislatures to act on "erroneous assumptions" and "misapprehensions."
If the functional marginalization of the poor produces the same
quality of legislative distortion that Ely describes as resulting from
"prejudice," then the judicial response ought to be the same
regardless of the ruling elite's subjective motivation. 269 And

see also Beitz, supra note 16, at 132-41 (commenting on the ability of the wealthy to
exert disproportionate political influence through campaign contributions).
265 See supra notes 100-18 and accompanying text.
266 ELY, supra note 41, at 145.
267 Id. at 162.
268 Id. at 136.
269 Cf. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Forward:Equal Citizenship

Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1,51 (1977) ("One who is stumbled
over often enough may, understandably, notice that those cumulative impacts bear
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indeed, distortion in each of the senses that Ely associates with
prejudice is caused by the political debilitation of the poor.
Politicians readily admit that programs for the poor are "easy
targets" that can be decimated without worrying too much about
getting facts straight, assessing consequences, or developing
270
coherent policy-because poor people are politically powerless.
of
Welfare, one politician explains, is "the domestic equivalent 271
attitudes."
and
prejudice
in
wrapped
....
politics,
East
Middle
Moreover, the more affluent, lacking empathy for the poor, have all
but abandoned the goal of constructing "a healthy and nourishing
community life for all citizens." 27 2 Having exercised their exit
27 4
option 278 and resorted to the privatization of public services,
they increasingly view all social welfare programs as simply handouts
to the poor. The idea that social welfare programs are a long-term
social investment for the good of all 275 is dismissed by those who
276
dispute that poverty even exists.
In addition, the usual mix of political incentives that imposes
some, however feeble, discipline on legislative decisionmaking is
absent in the case of the poor because they are unable to hold
27 7
politicians accountable through traditional political channels.
a certain functional resemblance to kicks.").
270 See supra note 180 and accompanying text; see also Kevin Sack, New York
Medicaid Strainedby Newly Poor,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1992, § 4, at 16 (quoting Michael
J. Dowling, Director of Health, Education and Human Services for New York, that it
is politically easier "to deal with issues that are just perceived as welfare").
271 Toner, supra note 35, at A16 (quoting Rep. Thomas J. Downey, and
characterizing current welfare policies as a way of "penalizing the powerless").
272 Patricia M. Wald, Becoming a Player: A Credofor Young Lawyers in the 1990s, 51
MD.27L.
REV. 422, 423 (1992).
3
See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
274
See, e.g.,JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1990) (proposing a market-based approach to provision of educational

services).
275
Se, e.g., Symposium, Investing in Our Children'sFuture: School FinanceReform
in the '90s, 28 HARV.J. ON LEGIs. 293 (1991) (discussing the need to improve public
education through school finance reform); CDF, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE BUDGET,

supra,note 174, at 7 (stating that investment in children's progrrms "are investments
in America's future"). But see Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look
at the Theoreticaland "Empirical"Practiceof the Public ChoiceMovement, 74 VA. L. REV.
199, 272 (1988) (describing passage of rent control ordinance in East Palo Alto, Cal.
that27sought to "protect large numbers of long-term citizens against... dispersion").
SeeJonathan Fuerbringer, Homeless Are Not Duty of U.S., Reagan Aide Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1986, at A18 (reporting a 1983 statement by Edwin Meese, then
Counselor to the President, contending that people go to soup kitchens not because
they are poor but "because the food is free and that's easier than paying for it").
277 Cf. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2424 (1992) (suggesting a
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This is not by any means a recent or transient phenomenon.
Twenty years ago, Justice Marshall observed that the political
powerlessness of poor people would frequently allow legislative
processes to deteriorate in precisely the manner that Ely identifies
under his "prejudice" rubric as warranting judicial intervention:
"Because the recipients of public assistance generally lack substantial political influence,"Justice Marshall noted, "state legislators may
find it expedient to accede to pressures generated by misconcep27 8
tions."
Moreover, as a structural matter, the absence of an out-group
voice reduces the likelihood of careful and informed decisionmaking with respect to the interests of the excluded group. In the
case of the poor, it has too often allowed political discourse to
degenerate into mindless scapegoating and dehumanizing stereotypes. 279
Poor children have become America's untouch280
ables,
and poor mothers are "lumped together with drug
addicts, criminals, and other socially-defined 'degenerates' in the
newly-coined category of 'underclass.'" 28 1 It seems more than
clear that the virulent and dehumanizing anti-poor rhetoric that has
become the currency of recent public discourse would not be
politically practicable if poor people were fully enfranchised. That
this lack of political access-and the correspondingly diminished
quality of public discourse on poverty issues-has "blinded" the
majority to its overlapping interests with poor people and deprived
the poor of "equal concern and respect" 282 is amply demonstrated
by governmental failure to fund preventive programs that would

model of constitutional governance centered on the principle of political accountability). 278 New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino,
413 U.S. 405, 432 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 575 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the evidence that legislatures underfund the AFDC program
because AFDC recipients are stigmatized and "frowned upon by the community,"
thereby making the program itself "politically unpopular").
279 See Amidei, supra note 213, at 9 (stating that the welfare system "reflects a view
of poor people as unwilling to work unless forced, dishonest, incompetent, and
irresponsible toward family and community alike. They're people no politician would
eagerly help, people to be screened out at almost any cost"); HerbertJ. Gans, Fighting
the Biases in Social Concepts of the Poor,POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL,
May 1992, at 1 (stating that "policy makers avoid dealing with poverty" by labeling
"some of the poor as morally deficient or undeserving").
280 SeeJonathan Kozol, Outside the Dream, SAFETY NET, Oct. 1991, at 3.
281 Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274,
283.
282 Supra note 188 and accompanying text.

1993]

POVERTY AND DEMOCRACY

1339

simultaneously reduce public expenditures and relieve some of the
privations presently endured by society's most vulnerable citizens.28 By Ely's own lights, then, it is difficult to see how democratic breakdown due to avarice is any less troubling, or less in need
2 4
of judicial correction, than breakdown due to prejudice. 8
Finally, Ely's distinction between de jure discrimination on the
basis of wealth and distributional outcomes that "incidentally" injure
poor people makes no sense in view of his statement that prejudice
against the poor pervades the political process. Much of the
function of modern government concerns the allocation and
distribution of resources. 285 If prejudice against a particular
group infects the governance process, then there is no reason to
286
suppose that it will steer clear of key distributional decisions.
Under these circumstances, to say that allocational outcomes
unfavorable to the poor are disconnected from prejudice because
they might save public money is to ignore political reality. As a
constitutional matter, it should make no difference if prejudice
manifests itself as a single statute that employs an explicit wealthbased classification, or instead as an overall legislative program that,
because of an unworthy decision-making process, denies "equal
concern and respect" by channeling resources into programs for the
more affluent at the expense of the poor.
Similarly, discrimination between categories of the poor ought
to be suspect for such classifications frequently emerge from a
283 See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text. Poverty advocates are familiar

with this phenomenon. A common argument against agency construction of a social
welfare statute, or against the constitutionality of the statute itself, is that the measure
as applied not only inflicts injury but is also cost-ineffective. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Grinker, 794 F. Supp. 1193, 1200-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd 965 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.
1992).
284 See ELY, supranote 41, at 148-53 (arguing that prejudicial animus should be the
key element in defining protected classes under the Equal Protection Clause). In a
somewhat different context, even Madison identified avarice (expressed through
conflicts between various economic interests) as the root cause of "factionalism" that
posed the most serious threat to representative government. THE FEDERALIST No. 10,
supra note 18, at 77.
285 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 733 (1964).
286 Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing
Significance of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325, 331-50 (1992) (discussing the
pervasive nature of racism in decision-making processes); Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs
of Motive-CenteredInquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1978) (contending that
"racial attitudes often operate at the margin of consciousness"). See generally Charles
R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that racism is often a subconscious
phenomenon).
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decision-making process that Ely would regard as defective: either
the process relies on majority "self-flattering generalizations" by
favoring "we-like" poor over "they-like" poor,28 7 or it is devoid of
equal concern and respect in that the lines that are drawn are less
the product of considered policy than they are of an inflammatory
politics played out at the expense of a socially isolated out-group.
3. Liberal Apology
Finally, we examine the liberal apology for the Court's poverty
discourse. The most comprehensive and insightful explanation
appears in the work of Bruce A. Ackerman. 288 Ackerman argues
that the judiciary ought to intervene when groups are undemocratically fenced out or denied their "fair share of political influence,"
and he urges that poor people are such a group. Ackerman
contends, however, that current constitutional theory recognizes
only certain varieties of undemocratic, exclusionary politics as
warranting heightened judicial concern, namely, politics that result
from "'prejudice against discrete and insular minorities'" as
described in footnote four of Carolene Products.2 89 Proceeding on
287 For example, the "we" that Ely identifies-white, male, upper-middle class
legislators-are not African-Americans, seeJefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,549-50
(1972) (upholding funding disparities that favored social programs with predominantly white participants at the expense of a similar program with predominantly minority
race participants), do not have multiple children out-of-wedlock, see Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (upholding cap on benefits payable to welfare
families, regardless of the number of eligible children), and do not participate in
labor strikes, see Lyng v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 373 (1988) (upholding provision making
households ineligible to participate in the food stamp program while any of its
members is on strike). But "we" (or "our" children) are likely to attend college, live
in nontraditional domestic arrangements, and be claimed as a tax deduction. See
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973) (invalidating a Food
Stamp Act provision that, in response to concerns about abuse by college students,
barred participation by households with a member 18 years or older who was claimed
as a tax dependent of another household); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (invalidating a Food Stamp Act provision that barred
participation by any household containing an individual unrelated to any other
household member).
288 See Ackerman, supra note 47.
289 Id. at 740 (quoting United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153
n.4 (1938)). The "discrete and insular" formulation appears in the third paragraph
of the Carolene footnote. Ackerman also observes that direct interference with
political rights, of the type described in the second paragraph of the footnote,
qualifies for heightened scrutiny under current constitutional theory. See Ackerman,
supra note 47, at 741.
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the premise that Carolene Products and modern constitutional
doctrine are coterminous in all relevant respects, Ackerman
unleashes a withering social science analysis on the terms "prejudice," "discrete," "insular," and "minority," and concludes that the
structure of modern constitutional doctrine fails to protect some of
the most frequent and systematic victims of undemocratic politics. 290
Of particular import, Ackerman criticizes Carolene's
"discrete and insular minorities" formulation as neglecting the poor,
despite widespread recognition that their political marginalization
is one of the most pervasive and troubling anti-democratic features
of modern American government.2 91 On Ackerman's view of it,
the Court's poverty cases are normatively wrong and the product of
"bad political science," but they fit squarely within the confines of
292
received doctrine.
There is no doubt that Ackerman's critique is apt at the
descriptive level. The Court has indeed failed to correct, or even
seriously acknowledge, many of the most exclusionary defects of
American politics, defects that are often generated by wealth-based
inequalities of access and influence. But by blaming the Carolene
decision for this state of affairs, Ackerman conflates the question of
framework with that of application. The question of framework asks
whether current doctrine encompasses the general principle that the
intensity of judicial review rests upon the premise of democratic
legitimacy. The question of application asks whether the Court has
disregarded the general principle in particular instances or adopted
290 Ackerman asserts that racial and religious minorities have been sufficiently

incorporated into the normal political process so that discreetness and insularity are
no longer political impediments at all, but to the contrary, tend to enhance a group's
prospects and effectiveness in the pluralist bazaar. See id. at 723-24, 744-45. The
modern danger of unfair disadvantage in the political process, says Ackerman, falls
upon "anonymous and diffuse groups," which by their nature face a variety of
obstacles to effective organization and participation in interest-group politics. See id.
at 724. Of course, Ackerman's "anonymous and diffuse" formulation facially
comprehends single-issue groups and factions-gun control opponents, for examplewhose performance in politics is not likely to implicate any sympathetic constitutional
concern. Ackerman does not suggest a theory for determining which anonymous or
diffuse groups should receive special constitutional protection, but urges the
development of "paradigms that detail the systematic disadvantages that undermine
our system's legitimacy in dealing with the grievances of these diffuse or anonymous
groups." Id. at 742.
291 See id. at 723.
292 See id. at 743.
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a concept of "democratic legitimacy"293 so cramped as to improp294
erly confine the principle's reach.
The distinction is in no way trivial; it determines the nature of
the argument for a more protective poverty jurisprudence and
speaks to the integrity vel non of the Court's existing discourse. If
the premise forjudicial deference to political outcomes is democratic politics-if accepted constitutional theory recognizes a fundamental linkage between the intensity of judicial review and the democratic legitimacy of the political process-then a critique of the
Court's poverty cases might profitably focus on the Court's
conception of democracy and empirical view of politics in the
United States. On this theory, a jurisprudence more protective of
the poor requires no restructuring of the basic theory of constitutional review. Rather, the existing framework would compel a
kinder, gentler jurisprudence if the social and political marginalization of poor people were regarded as a constitutionally significant
departure from democratic norms. Ackerman, however, sees no
such linkage outside the Carolene footnote in current constitutional
doctrine.
The focus of Ackerman's analysis is the language of Carolene's
renowned footnote four. The last paragraph of that footnote asks
"whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry." 295 According to Ackerman, the core project of
judicial review under Carolene (beyond enforcement of specific
constitutional prohibitions), is to "accord special protection to those
who ha[ve] been deprived of their fair share of political influence." 296 The Carolene Court, Ackerman observes, "sketched
[this] new mission in exceptionally broad strokes" that suggested "an
293 See introductory discussion supra following note 38.
294 For example, in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973), the Court recognized the general principle that groups "relegated to... a
position of political powerlessness" should receive "extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process," but declined to extend such protection to the residents
of property-poor school districts who sought equalization of public school financing
under the Equal Protection Clause.
295 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
296 Ackerman, supra note 47, at 715. CaroleneProducts' theory ofjudicial review,
says Ackerman, "promises relief" from the counter-majoritarian difficultyby "seiz[ing]
the high ground of democratic theory and establish[ing] that the challenged
legislation was produced by a profoundly defective process." Id.
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enduring role for the judiciary" as the guardian of democratic
97
government.
One phenomenon that profoundly frustrates this democraticpluralist goal, Ackerman states, is the disproportionate influence of
wealth on politics.2 98 The appropriate judicial response under the
Carolene framework, it would seem, would be to extend heightened
protection to groups that are marginalized from politics because of
the distorting effects of maldistributed wealth. The Court, of
course, has accorded no such protection, and one waits from
Ackerman for an explanation of the Court's failure.
Ackerman, however, pursues a different analytical path altogether, one that implicitly validates the Court's current poverty
jurisprudence as the faithful application of precedent. Ackerman
concludes that since Carolene "does not assert that prejudice against
'impoverished and uneducated minorities' may call for a more
searching judicial inquiry," a poverty jurisprudence more protective
of the poor can be achieved only through construction of a new,
2 99
reoriented or adapted theory of judicial review.
Ackerman's conclusion rests on at least two unarticulated
assumptions. The first is that Carolene defines a closed universe of
constitutionally significant democratic breakdowns and restricts that
universe to breakdowns caused by "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities." 0 0° But the Carolene foftnote does no such
thing. Although Ackerman and others critique the three-sentence
footnote as though it were a fully articulated theory of constitutional adjudication,"'1 the footnote more modestly sets forth a bare
framework upon which a new constitutional regime might progressively be built. As Professor Louis Lusky has emphasized, Carolene's
footnote "did not even pretend to cover the entire field" or
"'purport to decide anything; it merely made some suggestions for
future consideration.'5302
297 Id. at 715 & n.4.
298 Other commentators have reached this same conclusion on an explicit
substantive-oriented theory that identifies an anti-subjugation principle in the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1514-21.
299 Ackerman, supra note 47, at 723, 745-46.
300 CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
301 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 81; Brilmayer, supra note 80.
302 Lusky, supra note 72, at 1098 (quoting Louis Lusky, Public Trial and Public
Right: The Missing Bottom Line, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 305 (1980)); see also Powell,
supra note 87, at 1090 (stating that footnote four "is not a developed theory in itself,"
but rather "a fertile starting place for constitutional theory"). Professor Lusky was
Justice Stone's law clerk during the term in which Carolenewas decided. See Lusky,
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Even if one were to regard the Carolene footnote as positing a
fully developed theory of judicial review, Ackerman's reading of it
is far too narrow. The footnote expresses concern over "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities" not principally for its
inherent malevolence or as an evil in itself, but rather for its
propensity to derail democratic politics.30 3 Prejudice of this kind
is constitutionally troubling, the footnote observes, because it may
be a "special condition" that subverts the "political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." 30 4 Reflecting
on this notion of political breakdown as the more fundamental
justification for judicial intervention, the Court in later years has
explained that "where legislation affects discrete and insular
minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because
traditional political processes may have broken down."3 0 5 This
effect of prejudice, the broader category of democratic failure, is
the framework-defining element that Carolene placed on the table
30 6
and left for progressive elaboration.
supra note 72, at 1093.
303 On various occasions, Ackerman seems to embrace this point, but, for reasons
unexplained, proceeds to analyze Carolene as though it had forbidden judicial
intervention outside of the discrete and insular category. See Ackerman, supra note
47, at 718-31.
304 CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. This language is consistent with Professor
Lusky's broad understanding of the footnote's theory that judicial review is not
limited to "procedural and structural interventions," but rather extends to ensuring
"government by the people and government for the whole people." Lusky, supra note
72, at 1096; see also ELY, supra note 41, at 77 (contending that the Carolene theory
focuses upon "whether the opportunity to participate... in the political processes
... has been unduly restricted"); Sunstein, supra note 19, at 34 & n.22 (stating that
Carolene responds to the pluralist problem of faction by protecting "certain groups
[that] are effectively 'fenced out' of the pluralist process").
305 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,375 n.14 (1974) (emphasis added) (quoting
Robison v.Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 848, 855 (D. Mass. 1973)).
" For the same reason, the problem is not-as Professor Balkin suggests-the
failure of the Carolene footnote to list economic domination as another "special
condition" that might undermine the democratic process and warrant heightened
scrutiny. See Balkin,supra note 81, at 309-11 (contending that Carolene'sfailure to list
wealth-based disparities of political power as a cause of democratic breakdown was
purposive and is the "source" of the modern Court's refusal to accord heightened
judicial protection to the poor); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 TermForward: The Forms ofjustice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7 (1979) (contending that Carolene's
footnote four does not recognize poverty "as a category of legislative failure," and
that to do so "would undermine the premise of majoritarianism itself"). As Lusky and
Ackerman point out, the CaroleneCourt conceptualized thejudiciary's new mission
in expansive terms, and gave no reason to suggest that its theory of constitutional
review was any less concerned with economically-based distortions of the political
process than with prejudice-driven ones, especially if the result is equally destructive
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Leaving aside this difficulty, Ackerman's rationalization of the
poverty cases fails for a more important reason. Even if one were
to accept the closed reading of Carolene that Ackerman proposes,
the Court has never espoused such an interpretation nor justified
a denial of heightened protection on that basis.3 0 7 Indeed, and this
appears decisive on the point, while the Court has denied poor
people heightened protection in at least two dozen cases since 1970,
on no occasion did it even refer to Carolene's "discrete and insular"
formulation, much less rely upon that concept as the basis for its
decision.3 0 8 Of course, the Court frequently neglects to articulate
the doctrinal origins of a ruling, but if the Caroleneformula were the
theoretical basis on which the poverty cases stand, the Court has
certainly passed up a lot of opportunities to say so.
Nor has the Carolene formula functioned as a restriction on the
Court's general theory ofjudicial review, as Ackerman suggests. To
be sure, the Court sporadically recites the "discrete and insular"
terminology, but in no case has it ever suggested that special judicial
protection would be limited to the categories of "out-groups"
encompassed by that phrase.3 0 9 Rather, the Court has repeatedly

of fair democratic processes and outcomes.
The Carolene Court's selection of the discrete and insular formulation has been
traced historically to the Court's revulsion toward the political use of racial and
religious scapegoating to displace European democracies with dictatorships. See
Cover, supra note 62, at 1293-94 & n.17. At the same time, the contemporary
domestic situation during the New Deal was characterized by a low ebb of the
economic elite's influence over government, a governing coalition whose main
constituencies were drawn from the relatively impecunious and perhaps the most
popular-regarding politics in American history. The Court was therefore left with
little reason to be immediately concerned about wealth-based disempowerment. See
generallyJOHN K. GALBRArTH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1984); LINDBLOM, supra, note

231. The present day poor, however, have not only become a numerical minority;
they are also now associated with racial minorities and women, and subjected to the

kind ofscapegoating that initially inspired the Carolenefootnote. Seesupra notes 18081,186-87.
307 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
308 See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970); supra note 153 (collected cases).
30 AsJustice Marshall has noted, "[n]o single talisman can define those groups
likely to be the target of classifications offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore warranting heightened or strict scrutiny." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
made a similar observation several years earlier, remarking that the Court had never
"held that discreetness and insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding
that a particular classification is invidious. These characteristics may be relevant in
deciding whether or not to add new types of classifications to the list of 'suspect'
categories or whether a particular classification survives close examination." Regents
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described its duty to intervene in broader functional terms that ask
whether the group has been undemocratically disabled from
effective political participation:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment also reaches "a political structure
that treats all individuals as equals," yet more subtly distorts
governmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens
on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation ....
...[T]his implicates the judiciary's special role in safeguarding the interests of those groups that are "relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command 31extraordinary
0
protection from the majoritarian political process."
On this view, the terms prejudice, discrete, and insular are neither
necessary nor sufficient to accord heightened judicial review, but
are merely evidence of democratic malfunction. 1 1 One could
make a convincing case that the Court has not consistently applied
(nor fully elaborated) the general principle of extending heightened
protection to certain "politically powerless" out-groups. But the
persistence of this more expansive, democracy-focused theory
refutes Ackerman's assumption that current doctrine extends only
as far as his cabined reading of footnote four's text.
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (citations omitted).
310 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457, 467, 486 (1982) (citation
omitted) (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 84 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment), and San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973)); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 n.14 (1982) (including in the
category of suspect classes entitled to special judicial protection those groups
"relegated to... a position of political powerlessness"); New York City Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 609 n.15 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
court reviewing a challenged rule should consider the political powerlessness of the
group whose interests are adversely affected by the rule); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 506 n. 13 (1976) (same); Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974)
(same); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (considering political powerlessness as one factor in determining suspect classes). See generally Thomas W. Simon,
Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107 (1990) (noting that
the Court has described suspect classes to include politically powerless minorities, and
not simply discrete and insular minorities).
l Majority decisions have used the phrase "discrete and insular" on 14 occasions
since the Carolene decision. See Search of LEXIS Genfed library, US file (March 19,
1993) (on file with author). The closest the Court came to relying on the language
of the footnote itself to deny heightened scrutiny was in Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (applying rationality review to a
mandatory retirement statute on the ground that the elderly do not comprise a
"suspect class," defined by the Court both in terms of "political powerlessness" and
"discrete and insular" groups).
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Ackerman's second unspoken premise is that the poor are
"anonymous and diffuse" and so fall outside Caroene's"discrete and
insular" paradigm. Ackerman considers a group "discrete" if "its
members are marked out in ways that make it relatively easy for
others to identify them." 3 12 He places gender and race in this
category, but excludes sexual orientation and poverty. "Insular,"
according to Ackerman, refers both to spatial proximity and
"sociological bonds."3 13 He views gays, lesbians and minority
racial and religious groups as insular, but women and poor people
as "diffuse."3 14 Hence, as Ackerman sees it, poor people sit at the
bottom of Carolene's constitutional priority list, being neither
31 5
discrete nor insular.
All of this may seem very neat and plausible, but it misinterprets
the Carolene footnote and severely misapprehends the status of poor
people in America today. To begin with, Ackerman's method of
interpretation-the vivisection of Caroene's discrete and insular
minority concept, followed by a rigid definitional analysis of the
parts-seems ill-applied to a text that, by Ackerman's own reckoning,
attempted to "sketch" in "exceptionally broad strokes" a grand
democratic mission for the judiciary.3 16 Lost in Ackerman's
definition-bound translation is the CaroleneCourt's own understanding that the discrete and insular formulation broadly encompassed
"any socially isolated minority group"317 or a group that is "not
embraced within the bond of community kinship, but ... held at
312 Ackerman, supra note 47, at 729.
3s Id. at 727 n.4.
314 Id. at 724. In addition to this definitional argument, Ackerman also reasons
that the poor are not a discrete and insular minority because "although modern

courts regularly express concern about the bargaining position of discrete and insular
minorities, they often react skeptically to the very idea that legislatures may
constitutionally attempt to curb the influence of wealth over formally democratic
processes." Id. at 723. But this argument misses the point that it may be perfectly
consistent for a court to prohibit, on First Amendment grounds, restrictions on the
private use of wealth for political expression, yet view the impact of such wealth as
sufficiently undemocratic or distorting to warrant heightened scrutiny. See infra text
accompanying notes 432-81. Thus, to take an example from a related context, few
would contend that government may, practically or constitutionally, legislate an end
to private, social prejudices against religious minorities; yet it is undisputed that
courts may nevertheless regard the political impact of such prejudices as constitutionally significant and in need ofjudicial amelioration.
315 See Ackerman, supra note 47, at 722-31.
316 Id. at 715.
317 LUSKY, supra note 20, at 364.
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arm's length by the group or groups that possess dominant political
3 18
and economic power."
Not surprisingly, Ackerman's interpretation of discrete and
insular minority diverges significantly from the general understanding of that concept.3 19 Although uniqueness itself might not be
grounds to reject that interpretation, even on its own merits,
Ackerman's definitional approach seems too idiosyncratic. Recall
that to be "discrete" within Ackerman's understanding, one must be
"marked out" in ways that make for easy identification. Thus, gays
are an "anonymous" rather than a "discrete" minority, not because
they are not distinct, but, according to Ackerman, because one
cannot always identify the sexual orientation of men one passes on
the street. Why Ackerman believes that a member of a group must
be visually distinct under Carolene is not clear. Beyond the logical
and linguistic difficulties with this definition, lies the further
complication that the Carolene Court could not have intended it.
Carolene indisputably embraced religious minorities in its concept
of discrete and insular groups, and while certain religious groups
are "marked out"-the Amish, for example, or Hasidic Jews-by and
large it is no easier to discern the religious beliefs of passersby than
their sexual orientation or economic status.
Moreover, Ackerman ignores the extent to which today's poor
fit well within the Carolene Court's understanding of a discrete and
insular minority as "any socially isolated minority group."320 The
poor share many characteristics of groups, such as aliens, that the
32 1
modern Court has placed within the protection of the footnote.
Indeed, it was precisely because the phrase "discrete and insular" is
so broad that Justice Rehnquist railed against its use as a constitutional standard, warning that lawyers would have little difficulty
3 22
finding discrete and insular minorities "at every turn in the road."
Lusky, supra note 72, at 1105 n.72.
See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1545 (stating that Carolene embraces the
"politically underrepresent[ed]"); Brilmayer, supra note 80, at 1292 (claiming that
Carolene's "logic" is expansive and not restrictive).
320 LUSKY, supra note 20, at 364.
321 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discreet and insular minority.'"). As the vast majority of
poor people are formal members of the polity (unlike aliens), it is even more
appropriate to consider the poor as within the Carolene paradigm. Cf ELY, supra
note 41, at 161-62 (noting that a similar constitutional analysis applies to both aliens
and the poor); Brilmayer, supra note 80, at 1293 (discussing the "insider-outsider"
who "is inside the scope of state power but outside the process of political
participation" as the core Carolene concern).
s2 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
318

319
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Finally, even if one accepted Ackerman's definitions, his
assertion that poor people are diffuse and anonymous is contrary to
the facts. Social reality amply documents that the poor are not
spatially proximate to other groups; rather, commentators note that
the poor are subject to "spatial stigma," often consigned to "innercity areas with extremely high concentrations of poverty." 323
Economic segregation is as American as apple pie; the wrong side
of the tracks has long been a pervasive feature of American

society.3 24 Over the last twenty years, sociologists and others have
documented "the growing concentration and isolation of the poor"
and the creation of an underclass that is geographically separated
from mainstream America.3 25 Government policies have heightJustice Rehnquist ultimately succeeded in sealing off the universe of suspect classes,
but this was accomplished through fiat and not by tightening the definitions of
"discrete and insular." See TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1610 (discussing the lack of
"cand[or]" in the Court's development of equal protection doctrine). For Justice
Rehnquist, "discrete and insular" connotes some characteristic that is "immutable" in

the sense of being out of the individual's control to alter immediately or in relatively
short order. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 20 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

Thus, as Rehnquist viewed it, permanent resident aliens who had yet to satisfy the five
year requirement to be eligible for citizenship suffer an "immutable" characteristic:
they do not have the means immediately to alter their status, although they will be able
to escape the disfavored class after some period of time. Id. at 17-20.

For the

overwhelming majority of the poor, poverty is at least as "immutable," if not more so,
in this sense. See FRED BLOCK ET AL., THE MEAN SEASON: THE ATTACK ON THE
WELFARE STATE 62-84 (1987) (noting that "exogenous economic forces," including the
national occupational structure and sub-poverty minimum wage rates, pose
insuperable barriers to many individuals attempting to escape impoverishment);JOHN
KEANE, PUBLIC LIFE AND LATE CAPITALISM 3 (1984) (discussing structural economic
and political defects that fail to take account of the disadvantaged); Marta Elliott &
Lauren J. Krivo, StructuralDeterminants of Homelessness in the United States, 38 Soc.
PROBS. 113, 114 (1991) (contending that homelessness is not the result of personal
fault but rather of economic factors);John E. Schwarz & ThomasJ. Volgy, Above the
Poverty Line-But Poor: One Fourthof a Nation,THE NATION, Feb. 15, 1993, at 191,19192 (observing that one in every six full-time jobs in the United States in 1989 "paid
less than it took to lift even a family of three ... out of poverty").
323 Helen Hershkoff& Adam S. Cohen, Beggingto Differ. The FirstAmendment and
the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 911 & nn.108 & 109 (1991).
324 See, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE
TRACKS 30 (1986) (discussing the ways in which Southern towns relegated AfricanAmericans to the "wrong side of the tracks" and denied them basic municipal
services); INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. &
Michael G.H. McGeary eds., 1990) (noting that "federal policies and programs have
had the effect of concentrating poverty in certain areas"); Gar Smith, Freeways,
Community and Environmental Racism, RACE, POVERTY & THE ENv'T, Apr. 1990, at 7
(describing the use of freeways to segregate rich from poor, white from black, and
environmental safety from harm).
325 See, e.g., WILLIAMJ. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 8 (1987) (noting the
emergence of an underclass that has "become increasingly isolated socially from
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ened the physical isolation of the poor through tax abatements,
exclusionary zoning policies, and subsidies that confine the poor
326
within an "invisible wall."
Moreover, the poor are disconnected from the more affluent
and suffer the social isolation that Ackerman points to as a defining
characteristic of a discrete and insular minority. The absence of
kinship between the haves and have-nots is manifest in the exit of
the upper and middle classes from a shared community life3 27 and
in ongoing assault on the notion of social welfare programs and
recipients.3 28 The New Deal conception of poor people as the
hapless economic casualties of market forces beyond their control
has given way to a mean season in which the poor are seen not as
"victims entitled to protection," but rather as people "who could be
self-reliant but are exploiting society."329
Ackerman's benign
assessment of the social status of the poor is simply insupportable.
Here as well, the supposed connection between Carolene and the
Court's poverty jurisprudence falls flat. At bottom, then, one can
readily agree that the Court's application of the Carolene framework
has been disappointing, underinclusive, and not entirely rational or
consistent, but these shortcomings have little or nothing to do with
the Carolene footnote's dicta nor indeed with any general principle
33 0
of constitutional law.

mainstream patterns" after the "exodus of the more stable working- and middle-class
segments"); Loic J.D. Wacquant & William J. Wilson, The Cost of Racial and Class
Exclusion in the Inner City, 501 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 8, 9 (1989)
(describing the poor as "[s]evered from ... society").
326 See, e.g., EricJ. Branfman et al., Measuringthe Invisible WalL Land Use Control
and ResidentialPatternsof the Poor, 82 YALE. LJ. 483, 484-85 (1973) (stating that the
"invisible wall" occurs as a result ot public controls, private restrictive covenants, and
market forces); Gerald D. Lloyd, American Middle Class Values and Land Use: The
Exportation of Prejudice,8 URB. L. & POL'Y 357 (1987) ("Zoning became the guarantor
of the exclusive suburb."); Uptown Eco Blues, CrrY SUN (NEW YoRK), June 5-11, 1992,
at A2, A4 (noting the difference in mortality rates between Harlem and the rest of
the United States).
327 See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
328 See, e.g., Jason DeParle, The Sorrows, and Surprises,After a Welfare Plan Ends,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992, at Al (noting an "increasingly strident attack on the very
idea of welfare").
329 Kevin Sack, The New, Volatile Politics of Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, at
24 (National ed.) (quoting Professor Lawrence M. Mead on social perceptions of the
poor).
330 A more thoroughgoing liberal apology for the Court's povertyjurisprudence
is offered by Owen Fiss, who contends that the poor should not be accorded special
constitutional protection because "absence of wealth is so pervasive a handicap, it is
experienced ...

even by the majority itself[;] ...

to recognize it as a category of

legislative failure would stand the CaroleneProducts footnote on its head-it would
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C. Alternative Explanationsfor the Court's
Poverty Jurisprudence
The foregoing review of academic justifications for the Court's
poverty jurisprudence indicates that while the Court has refused to
regard poverty as a suspect classification, or to intervene on behalf
of the poor, no coherent or defensible analysis has been articulated
to justify its approach. Nor has any convincing response been made
to the argument that poor people have been undemocratically
marginalized from the processes of representative self-government
and should therefore receive some heightened form of judicial
protection. But one need not justify the Court's treatment of
poverty in order to account for it, and several animating factors, not
all of them principled, appear plausible. This section looks to three
possible explanations for the Court's treatment of the poor.
1. Radical Consequences
One explanation for the Court's poverty jurisprudence is a fear
that "radical," "far reaching" consequences would ensue if the Court
were to recognize the poor as an unfairly disempowered outgroup.3 3 1 Given the extent to which wealth-related inequalities
pervade American politics, the recognition of poverty as a suspect
undermine the premise of majoritarianism itself." Fiss, supra note 306, at 7. Fiss
does not say what he means by "absence of wealth," but since "poverty," as that term
is generally understood, is not "experienced by the majority" in the United States, see,
e.g., GALBRArrH, supra note 306, at 245, his reference must be to some broader

category of ordinary folks. It is unclear, though, how the fact that a majority is not
"wealthy" leads to the conclusion that courts should not shield the most impoverished
and marginalized citizens from at least some especially untoward political outcomes.
Fiss seems to argue that the political powerlessness of the poor raises no constitutional difficulty because most people ("the majority") similarly lack the economic
wherewithal to exert significant influence on politics. One problem, of course, is that
such an argument ignores the real differences between the political circumstances of
the middle classes and the rather less attractive political situation of the abjectly poor.
More importantly, even if one regarded the nonwealthy as a single, undifferentiated
mass denied its fair share of political power, affording that group Caotene protection
only "undermines the premise of majoritarianism" as an empirical proposition (by
acting on objective proof that "majority rule" does not accurately describe American
politics), not as a normative one. This does not "stand Caroleneon its head," but, to
the contrary, seeks to vindicate the democratic aspirations of Carolene against
erroneous preconceptions about the workings ofAmerican politics. See Parker, supra
note 33, at 242.

"' See Wheeler, supra note 41, at 14 (stating that courts are reluctant to call
wealth a suspect classification because "to do so would open up monstrous problems
that would not be readily limited and solved").
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category might well jeopardize the judicial assumption that our
political processes ordinarily work well. The risk presents itself that
the general rule of deference to majoritarian outcomes could be
swallowed up by the exception of heightened scrutiny to correct for
3 32
political malfunction.
Institutional concerns, embedded in the separation-of-powers
doctrine, no doubt form a part of this fear. It has been the easiest
anxiety for the Court to articulate. In Valtierra, for example, the
Court was plainly concerned that striking down California's
referendum provision on the theory advanced by plaintiffs would
install the judiciary as a democratic ombudsman, with no readily
discernible limits to its oversight of political structures.3 33 But
something else is going on as well, and for a clue we might turn to
the Court's Fourteenth Amendmentjurisprudence where apprehension about "far reaching" consequences has led to the Court to
restrict the reach of the Equal Protection Clause to state action
motivated by discriminatory intent:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and
33 4
to the average black than to the more affluent white.

This passage yields several relevant insights into the nature of
the Court's fear. To begin, the Court displays a keen awareness that
legislation across a variety of subjects frequently disadvantages the
poor, and that the disadvantage is systemic and structural, facilitating to a profound degree the projection of economic inequalities
into most, if not all, spheres of social life. Moving from the
empirical to the normative, the Court accepts as self-evident that a
constitutional rule mandating judicial modification of these political
332 See Fiss, supra note 306, at 7 (stating that recognition of poverty as a category
of democratic failure would "undermine the premise of majoritarianism itself"); cf
Dworkin, supra note 16, at 15 (arguing that "accepting equality of influence as an
ideal" could conflict with other important democratic goals).
SeeJames v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971) (stating that interference with
California's referendum requirement would require the Court in the next case "to
analyze governmental structures to determine whether a gubernatorial veto provision
or a filibuster rule is likely to 'disadvantage' any of the diverse and shifting groups
that make up the American people").
334 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
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outcomes is to be avoided at all costs. The implication seems to be
that the sheer magnitude of the enterprise is reason enough to
devise new and different legal rules.
But the prospect of displacing legislation on a grand scale has
not always deterred the Court from embarking on-or hewing to-a
particular constitutional path.3 3 5 The Court's reluctance in the
poverty context produces considerable irony: the justification for
scaling back constitutional protection is that affording broader
rights might entail the extensive revamping of legislation that favors
"more affluent white[s]."3 3 6 But the reason so many laws would
bejeopardized is that the preferred group has thoroughly succeeded
in securing political advantages (or in politically safeguarding
privately acquired privilege) at the expense of "the poor and ...
the average black." 33 7 Either way, the prospect of radical consequences is itself the function of untoward political marginalization.
It exists by virtue of the prodigious body of purportedly neutral laws
that invariably disadvantage lower class and minority citizens. On
a principled approach, the expectation of far reaching consequences
should militate in favor of heightened judicial intervention, not
against it.
Finally, institutional concerns cannot possibly explain the
comatose form of rationality review that currently operates. Movement to a more invigorated form of review would result in the
invalidation of some statutes currently upheld, but would certainly
not threaten anything approaching the kind ofjudicial overreaching
that is said to engender separation of powers difficulties or
institutional competence concerns.3 38 The specter of real judicial
review might, however, have a salutary effect on public discussion
and the quality of legislative deliberation that affects the poor.
The Court's poverty discourse suggests that its fear of far
reaching consequences has at least as much to do with the substance
of the consequences that would result as with any institutional
issues. Since the same institutional concerns are implicated any
time that the Court tackles the counter-majoritarian problem,
something more must underlie the Court's choice of when to take
M A recent example is INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), in which the Court's
invalidation of the "legislative veto" immediately placed several hundred federal
statutes at constitutional risk.
336 Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.

337 Id.
338 See supra note 41.
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the plunge and when to demur. In the poverty context, one may
glimpse that "something more" in the Court's use of the term
"neutral" to describe a body of "tax, welfare, public service and
regulatory statutes" that is consistently "more burdensome" to the
poor than to the affluent.3 39 The Court's characterization of
legislation that is systematically skewed in favor of more affluent
whites as "neutral" is intelligible only as the creature of an assumption that economic and social inequalities are a pre-political and
substantively desirable feature of American life. 340 On this view,
legislative programs that leave private economic inequalities
undisturbed or even amplify their import (for instance through
price systems and user fees) do not raise the specter of a politically
subordinated lower class unable to secure a fairer distributive share,
but merely represent constitutionally benign measures of general
applicability.
2. Formal-Functional Dichotomy
A second explanation for the Court's poverty cases might draw
on the familiar dichotomy between formal and functional rights.
The thesis is that the Court distinguishes between wealth-based
distribution of formal political rights-which it condemns-and
wealth-based distribution of actual political power-which it ignores
or tolerates. The Court nowhere expressly articulates such a
theory, 34 1 but as explained below, it appears to be the only rea-

s9 The Court has expressed the same idea of neutrality in the abortion-funding
context, viewing as untroubling laws that place constitutionally protected medical
choices and information beyond the reach of poor women. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan,
111 S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1992) (upholding federal regulations that prohibit abortion
counselling in publicly funded health clinics for low income women).
340 See Sunstein, supra, note 134, at 874; supra notes 164-65 and accompanying
text. Professor Tribe has suggested that the Court's poverty cases can be understood
as a substantive commitment to protection of existing distributions of wealth by
safeguarding the "category of desirable goods which wealth can purchase." TRIBE,
supra note 41, at 1669-71. On this view, Valtierra guaranteed that money could
continue to buy a residence in a neighborhood that excludes the poor, and Rodriguez
ensured that wealth could continue to purchase a higher quality "public" school
education. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973);James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). These cases illustrate "passive"judicial endorsement
of political determinations that favor the economically privileged.
341 Some commentators view the formal-functional dichotomy in terms of
institutional competence, contending that the Court lacks the expertise to assess the
interrelationship between wealth and politics, and therefore should not venture a
constitutional response to wealth-skewed misallocations of power. See, e.g., Einer R.
Elhauge, Does Interest Group TheoiyJustfy More IntrusiveJudicialReview, 101 YALE LJ.
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sonable basis for reconciling political rights cases such as Harperv.
Virginia Board of Elections3 42 and Bullock v. Carter343 , with later
campaign finance cases such as Buckley v. Valeo. 3 44 On this
theory, the functional disempowerment of poor people does not
trigger heightened scrutiny because formal rights of access to the
ballot and franchise are not officially restricted.
The evidence that the Court's poverty jurisprudence follows a
formal-functional divide is straightforward. It centers on the
apparent conflict between the Court's broad egalitarian pronouncements in the political rights cases of the 1960s and 1970s, and its
blunt refutation of political equality as a constitutional value in
subsequent campaign finance decisions, where the Court voided
legislative efforts to contain the influence of wealth over the
electoral process. Recall that the Court's political rights decisions
restructured the processes of representative government by
invalidating poll taxes, voiding property qualifications, striking
ballot access requirements, and reshaping malapportioned legislative
districts. 45 In the process, the Court, at least rhetorically, elevated political equality to a core constitutional ideal, one that promised
all citizens, regardless of economic status, a roughly equal opportunity to influence political decisions. Wealth was one of a very few
factors that these cases singled out as a democratically illegitimate
determinant of political outcomes. The conception of democracy
advanced by the political rights cases forcefully rejects not only
political arrangements that exclude the poor from the ballot box,
but also those that debase their influence in the political order.
This egalitarian conception of democracy was eclipsed several
346
years later by a competing vision advanced in Buckley v. Valeo.
The Buckley Court confronted a First Amendment challenge to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). Congress adopted
FECA to mitigate what it found to be the corrosive impact of
concentrated wealth on elections and, by extension, on the
31, 66-68 (1991) (arguing that courts may lack competence to address the issue of
wealth and politics, and that the political process is a better forum for its resolution).
The problem with that justification, however, is that it does not explain the Court's

rejection of legislative judgments about the impact of wealth on the democratic
process. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 257 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
342 383 U.S. 663 (1966).

343 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
344 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); see infra text accompanying notes 347-61.
345 See supra text accompanying notes 92-120.
346 424 U.S. at 1.
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processes of government generally. Among the regulations were
provisions that restricted individual and group expenditures
"relative to a clearly identified candidate" to $1000, 3 17 restricted
a candidate's expenditures "from his personal funds" to between
$25,000 and $50,000,348 and set various overall ceilings on campaign spending.349 The aim of these provisions was two-fold: to
counteract both the fact and the perception that "the outcome of
elections is primarily a function of money," and to promote "equal[]
access to the political arena, encouraging the less wealthy, unable to
50
bankroll their own campaigns, to run for political office."
These governmental interests strongly recalled and resonated with
the constitutional principles that the Court had itself established in
the poll tax and ballot access cases: principles that proscribed the
"dilut[ion of] a citizen's vote on account of his economic status,"3 5 1 denounced any "disparity in voting power based on
wealth,"3 52 and proclaimed equalization of political access across
3 53
economic classes as a constitutional value.
Despite this congeniality of legislative purpose and constitutional principle, the Buckley Court struck down FECA's spending
restriction as violative of the First Amendment. The major premise
of the Court's holding was its controversial assertion that the
deployment of wealth to influence political outcomes-short of
outright bribery-is "political expression 'at the core of... the First
Amendment freedoms.'" 35 4
Many commentators criticized
Buckley's facile equation of spending and speech as elevating the
aphorism "money talks" to a constitutional principle. 355 But
neither this premise, nor indeed the Court's ultimate ruling,
definitively set Buckley in opposition to the political rights cases. To
the contrary, the Court could reasonably have reaffirmed its
commitment to political equality and the corresponding interest in
curtailing the political sway of wealth, and yet, on balance, conclud347 Id. at 39.
348 Id. at 51.
349 See id. at 54-55.
350 Id. at 266 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
351 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
352 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
353 See id.; see also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (striking down a state
candidate filing fee requirement where an alternative means of access to indigent
candidates was not provided).
354 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
355 See Tushnet, supranote 21, at 259;J. Skelly Wright, Politicsand the Constitution:
Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976).
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ed that the particular First Amendment interests at stake weighed
more heavily in the scales.
In fact, however, the Court selected a more extreme path.
Rather than acknowledging a need to balance the private interest in
unlimited political expenditures against a competing interest in
political equality, the Court summarily rejected as illegitimate any
"governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of [rich and
poor] individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections."3 56 This is where the conflict with the political rights cases
resides: Buckley's categorical approach broke decisively with the
egalitarian conception of democracy that guided the Court's earlier
decisions. In this regard, Buckley transformed the constitutional
landscape from one where reducing wealth-based disparities of
political power was required to one where interference with the
disproportionate political power of the affluent had been all but
prohibited. 5 7
The Buckley Court claimed not to be in conflict with the earlier
political rights cases and casually dismissed that doctrinal line as
irrelevant to the issues before it:
Cases invalidating governmentally imposed wealth restrictions on
the right to vote or file as a candidate for public office rest on the
conclusion that wealth "is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process" and is therefore an
insufficient basis on which to restrict a citizen's fundamental right
to vote. These voting cases and the reapportionment decisions
serve to assure that citizens are accorded an equal right to vote for
their representatives regardless of factors of wealth or geography.
But the principles that underlie invalidation of governmentally
imposed restrictions on the franchise do notjustify governmentally
imposed restrictions on political expression3 58
The Court did not explicitly acknowledge that its account of the
political rights cases seriously constricted the conception of
democracy elaborated in those decisions. Nevertheless, Buckley
356 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48. But cf. Wright, supra note 355, at 1005 ("Nothing bars
us from chosing... to move closer to... a process wherein ideas and candidates

prevail because of their inherent worth, not because prestigious or wealthy people
line up in favor .... [N]othing in the First Amendment commits us to the dogma

that money is speech.").
357 Cf Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distributionin the ConstitutionalIdea of
Property, 72 IowA L. REV. 1319, 1349 (1987) (offering explanations for the Court's
categorical stance against legislative efforts to redress the "plain inequality of political
voice [that] stem[s] from inequality of resources among individuals").
358 Bucklky, 424 U.S. at 49 n.55 (citations omitted).
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effectively reduced Harper and its progeny from potentially
expansive charters of political equality to narrow decisions concerning only the technical right to cast a vote or to place one's name on
the ballot 59 The more broadly conceived right to "full and
effective participation in the political processes"3 60 was diluted to
a decontextualized "equal right to vote for ... representatives" in
361
Buckley's revisionist order.
Thus sanitized, the political rights cases fit comfortably with
Buckley into a unified constitutional theory: equality of formal
rights are to be scrupulously maintained-even to the point of
rejecting legislative districting plans with less than one percent
deviation from perfect equality362 -but

the immeasurably greater

political inequalities that flow from private wealth through less

359 This is not to suggest that Buckley's interpretation of the political rights cases
is completely baseless. A respectable argument can be made that the theory
underlying the political rights cases, at least as it relates to judicially enforceable
constitutional norms, speaks only to formal political equality or departures from
political equality directly attributable to state action. Cf. CHARLES R. BErrz, POLITICAL
EQUALITY 14 (1989) (noting the continued dispute between the view that "the scope
of political equality is limited to the distribution of political liberties themselves-that
is, to institutionally defined (or procedural) opportunities to influence outcomes"
(e.g., the right to vote), and the view that permitting external inequalities to penetrate
the political arena violates the principle of political equality). But see DAHL, supra
note 17, at 175 (arguing that "the right to democratic process is not 'merely formal,'
because in order to exercise this right all the resources and institutions necessary to
it must exist," and that inequalities in material resources can defeat democratic
government); WALZER, supra note 11, at 79. After all, this argument goes, the
political rights cases almost uniformly concern state-imposed restrictions on the
franchise or ballot. Even the one-person, one-vote cases, although closer to the
functional line with their emphasis on "an equally effective voice," stayed within the
sphere of state-created political processes. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565
(1964). On this view, the political rights cases tell us nothing about how the Court
viewed the relation between democracy and the projection of economic inequalities
into the political sphere. The difficulty with this interpretation is that it ignores the
Court's fundamental justification for safeguarding the franchise and ballot. These
interests receive special constitutional solicitude not principally because they are
formal symbols or a means of self-expression, but rather because they are the citizen's
practical instrument for exerting political influence and securing fair representation.
See Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2067 (1992) (rejecting the notion that the
franchise serves any more generalized expressive function beyond the selection of
candidates). The Court has repeatedly explained that "the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society" and commands vigorousjudicial
protection because it is "preservative of other basic civil and political rights." Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 561-62 (relying on Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
36o Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
36' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 n.55.
362 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983).
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visible and more ad hoc processes may not be disturbed.3 6 3
Corporations and wealthy individuals may wield disproportionate
power at the expense of the less affluent, but so long as the richest
CEO and the most destitute homeless woman each cast only a single
ballot,3 64 this version of democratic equality is satisfied.
It is easy to see how the formal-functional dichotomy neatly
accommodates the Court's refusal to intervene on behalf of poor
people. Most of the classifications that the poor challenge do not
implicate formal political rights, but rather the allocation of societal
resources by a political process from which they are functionally
excluded. One must question, however, whether a theory that
relegates the most crucial and troubling dynamic in American
politics to constitutional insignificance actually operates as a basis
for adjudication or merely describes results that the Court has
arrived at on other, submerged, grounds.
One cause for suspicion is that the Court does not typically
subscribe to the formal-functional dichotomy in cases dealing with
nonwealth-based disparities of political power. To the contrary, the
Court has generally refused to limit the Constitution's concern with

political equality to purely formal rights, and has been attentive, at
least rhetorically, to the practical disempowerment of outgroups.3 65 Hence, a major part of the Carolene framework calls
for judicial intervention where social factors combine to deny a
formally enfranchised minority its "fair share of political influence"
because of prejudice. 366 The reapportionment cases also take a
363 A similar dichotomy seems to operate with respect to a number of substantive
constitutional rights. The abortion funding cases amply illustrate this point. See, e.g.,
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In Rust, for example, the Court reaffirmed that the Fifth
Amendment guarantees a woman's right to reproductive choice, but it upheld federal
regulations prohibiting federally subsidized health clinics from even discussing
abortion with patients or referring them elsewhere for counselling. Since, as a
practical matter, publicly-funded clinics provide the only health care available to many
poor women, the regulations effectively abridged the formal constitutional guarantee.
The Court rejected arguments that this functional deprivation of Fifth Amendment
rights violated the Constitution, asserting that the barriers to "an indigent woman's
ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are not
the product of governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but rather of her
indigency." Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778 (quoting Harris,448 U.S. at 316).
A 4 But see EdwardJ. Smith, Disenfranchisementof Homeless Persons,31 WASH. U.J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 225, 226 (1987) (estimating that "[t]he requirement of a
traditional home ... effectively disenfranchises an estimated three million American
citizens who are homeless").
365 See supra text accompanying notes 309-10.
366 Ackerman, supra note 47, at 715.
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functional approach by recognizing and protecting "a right to full
and effective participation in the political process." 67 And the
Court has recently opened gerrymandered districts to substantive
judicial review on the theory, in part, that the Court's protection of
political participation extends beyond the formal casting of a ballot
to the actual capacity of individuals and groups to exert "influence
on the political process as a whole."3 68 Finally, in a series of cases
involving political processes said to be skewed against the interests
of African- Americans, the Court declared as a general proposition
that the Constitution "reaches 'a political structure that treats all
individuals as equals,' yet more subtly distorts governmental
processes in such a way as to place special burdens on the ability of
minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation."3 69 The Court
recognized that "if a class cannot participate effectively in the
process by which those rights and remedies that order society are
created, that class necessarily will be 'relegated, by state fiat, in a
most basic way to second-class status." 3 70
Why this general
concern for "effective" political participation and functional equality
should end where the interests of the poor begin is nowhere made
3 71
clear.
367 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964); see, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (striking down apportionment that favored voters in thinly
populated districts because it effectively gave "some voters a greater voice in choosing
a Congressman than others"); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (rejecting a
county-unit system for tabulating votes in a primary because it effectively weighted
the votes of some individuals more heavily than others). See generally Casper, supra
note 97, at 24-29 (discussing apportionment decisions of the Burger Court).
M08Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1986) (holding that the issue raised
by gerrymandered election districts is "whether a particular group has been
unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process").
See generally Dean Alfange, Jr., Gernymanderingand the Constitution: Into the Thorns of
the Thicket At Last, 7 SuP. CT. REV. 175, 256-57 (1986) (suggesting that Bandemer's
opening of gerrymandered districts tojudicial review has revived "the identity of 'fair
and effective representation' as the constitutional goal in this area"). Justice
O'Connor disagreed with the Bandemer majority regarding thejusticiability of political
gerrymandering claims, on the explicit ground that political rights are limited to the
individual right to a nondiluted vote in the sense of a vote within an equally
apportioned district. Her theory was that this formal token of equal citizenship is a
political good in itself, and not an instrument to exercise political power. See
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 149-50 (O'Connor,J., concurring in the judgment).
369 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982) (citation
omitted).
370 Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 546 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
371 Even within the category of political arrangements that disempower racial
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The Court's position might be assisted if we were to recast the
formal-functional dichotomy as a distinction between political
inequalities for which the state is directly responsible and those that
are said to arise from purely private activities. The Buckley Court
surely had this distinction in mind when it stressed that the political
rights cases attacked "governmentally imposed" political inequalities, whereas the wealth-based disparities of political power attacked
by FECA were said to implicate no state action at all.3 72 This
public-private distinction, well known to legal theory,37 3 may
account more clearly for the Court's approach, but others have
explained why the wealth-based distribution of public power does
indeed implicate state action.3 74 Although the excuse of state
action might reconcile Buckley and the political rights cases, it does
not account for the Court's failure to regard poor people as a
politically powerless minority for purposes of calibrating judicial
review. From the inception of the suspect classification doctrine, it
has been understood that unofficial, social, or privately initiated
marginalization of out-groups might call for enhanced judicial
Thus, while the Court may deny that the
intervention. s 75
minorities, the prospect of confronting the interrelationship of wealth and political
power, or acknowledging social stratification along economic lines, causes the Court
to retreat from a functional view of equality to a more rigid formalist approach.
Thus, in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), the Court upheld a multimember
districting scheme that resulted in poor, inner-city African-Americans having virtually
no influence in the State legislature, on the narrow formalist view that it had
"discovered nothing in the record or in the court's findings indicating that poor
Negroes were not allowed to register or vote, to choose the political party they
desired to support, to participate in its affairs or to be equally represented on those
occasions when legislative candidates were chosen." Id. at 149. The constitutional
concern with "political structures that.., subtly distort[]" the ability of minorities to
exert political influence and reduce their political effectiveness dissolved once the
issue of wealth arose. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 467.
372 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976).
373 See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (1982) (critically reviewing the history of
the waxing and waning of the public/private distinction in liberal thought).
374 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503,
510-11 (1985) (contending that concentrations of wealth and power have resulted in
certain "private" actions becoming functionally indistinguishable from governmental
conduct); see also infra notes 460-65.
375 See, e.g., LUSKY, supra note 72, at 1105, n.72 (describing the special judicial
protection envisioned by Carolene as extending to "groups that are not embraced
within the bond of community kinship but are held at arm's length by the group or
groups that possess dominant political and economic power"); see also Akhil R. Amar
& Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to
DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1379 & n.85 (stating that the concern of the
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government has any valid interest in equalizing the actual distribution of political power at the expense of countervailing First
Amendment rights, it hardly follows that privately initiated political
inequalities do not distort democratic processes in ways that are
constitutionally significant for determining the degree of judicial
protection an out-group deserves.
3. Elite Conception of Democracy
A third and final explanation 76 of the Court's poverty jurisprudence traces it to an unarticulated ideology of democratic elitism
that accommodates or even favors the distancing of less affluent
citizens from political power.377 By this account, the Court might
accept that undemocratic "defects" in the political process warrant
enhanced judicial intervention, and that the lower classes are
functionally marginalized from politics, yet deny special constitutional protection to poor people because their political out-status
strikes the Justices as a natural and appropriate feature of American
government, rather than an undemocratic aberration or malfunc37 8

tion.

This would not be the first era in which a class-based conception
of self-government held sway on the Court. To the contrary, elite
perspectives have long claimed judicial adherents, beginning with
the first Chief Justice, whose view it was that "those who own the

Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments is with the "de facto abuse of power"); cf.
Cover, supra note 62, at 1297-1300 (arguing that the source for defining "minorities"
in regard to the Carolene footnote is not the particular experience of the group in
question, but rather the factors shared by all "minorities").
376 The three explanations offered are of course not mutually exclusive. At the
descriptive level, the Court's attachment to an egalitarian conception of democracy
moves along a continuum in which the attachment is most intense at the juncture of
formal political rights, and steadily less intense as one moves to functional
participation and to privately initiated political inequalities the Court attributes to
private
activities.
77
3

See generally PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM:

A

CRITIQUE 9, 32 (1967) (critiquing theories of democratic elitism under which "the
common man, not the elite.., is chiefly suspected of endangering freedom and...
the elite, not the common man ... is looked upon as the chief guardian of the
system");Jack L. Walker, A Critiqueof the Elitist Theoy of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 285, 286 (1966) (describing and critiquing "elitist" theories of democracy that
would concentrate political authority in the hands of elites at the expense of broad

political participation by the "lower classes").
378 Cf. H.L. MENCKEN, THE AMERICAN SCENE: A READER 533 (Huntington Cairnes
ed., 1965) ("Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want,
and deserve to get it good and hard.").
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country ought to govern it."379 John Jay's sentiments simply
conveyed the ascendant federalist notion that while the franchise
perhaps ought be distributed without much regard for wealth,3 8 0
the nonpropertied masses had to be viewed as a threat and denied
meaningful access to state power.3 8 1 One would like to believe
that the social, cultural, and legal upheavals of the past two
centuries, including the sustained crusade across six constitutional
amendments to achieve universal suffrage and an open political
process, have cleansed this elite perspective from the judicial
mentality. But it appears that this perspective may simply have been
driven underground. 8 2 To be sure, one rarely hears express
appeals to class status as an appropriate determinant of public
power. A generation has passed since Justice Harlan endorsed the
idea that propertied classes are "more worthy of confidence than
those without means, and that the community and [n]ation would
be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such citizens."38 3 But the disappearance of these sentiments from modern
judicial discourse teaches little: the Court's silence might simply
reflect the legal system's aura of neutrality, which would be sorely
tested if the Court confessed to a "democratic" theory that openly
favored the affluent.

38 4

379 RUSSELL GALLOWAY, THE RICH AND THE POOR IN SUPREME COURT HISTORY 26

(1982).
380 See THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 351 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more
than the poor .... "). Qualifications were nevertheless left to the States, many of
which restricted the franchise to property holders. See KIRK H. PORTER, A HISTORY
OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 7-14 (1971).
381 See supranote 18. Indeed, it is not quite apt to speak of Madison's conception
of democracy, since the federalist drafters of the Constitution intended to establish a
"republican" form of government that deliberately isolated public power from the
people. Democracy, understood as equal power for equal numbers or direct
government by the people, was an idea that the federalists tended to equate with
"mob rule," and sought to avoid at all costs. See HACKER, supra note 18, at 7-8.
382 Cf 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 49 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
1969) ("The surface of American society is covered with a layer of democratic paint,
but from time to time one can see the old aristocratic colors breaking through.").
383 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 685 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); cf. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990) (refusing to extend First Amendment protection to
begging on the ground, in part, that begging is unlike "'"Keats' poems or Dunne's
sermons"'") (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (quoting Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
384 Cf. GORE VIDAL, Robert Graves and the Twelve Caesars,in THE OXFORD BOOK OF
ESSAYS 634, 635-36 (John Gross ed., 1991) (referring to remark of Alfred Whitehead
that "one got the essence of a culture not by those things which were said at the time
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Moreover, once one turns to the Court's actual treatment of
political participation over the past three decades, an asymmetric
pattern strongly suggestive of class emerges.3 8 5 On the one hand,
the Court has displayed exceptional sensitivity toward elite communicative modes3 8 6 such as corporate campaign financing,3 8 7 corporate speech,3 8 8 large scale political expenditures,38 9 and, to
a lesser extent, prerogatives of the mass media.3 90 These the
Court has preferred even against countervailing interests as weighty
as the integrity of the democratic process.3 9 1 By contrast, the
Court has been markedly inhospitable toward distinctively plebeian
modes of political expression and participation, like the public
display of posters,3 92 picketing, 3 93 residential distribution of

but by those things which were not said, the underlying assumptions of the society,

too obvious to be stated") (alteration in original). Influential voices on the right
continue to advocate elite control of American society. See e.g., SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, The United States, in THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 59, 59-62, 113-15
(Michael Crozier et al. eds., 1975) (warning that the "excess of democracy" associated
with the "highly educated, mobilized, participant society" in the United States poses
a threat to "governability," and advocating centralized governing authority and limits
on popular political participation); see also Philip Green, A Few Kind Words for
Liberalism, THE NATION, Sept. 28, 1992, at 309, 324 (arguing that "conservatism...
is actively hostile to democracy" and that "conservatives have had to make peace with
democratic values, but that has rarely been from conviction, only from opportunism").
385 Commentators have identified a similar tilt in favor of elite interests in the
Court's elaboration of fundamental rights. See, e.g., John H. Ely, Foreword: On
Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5, 37-38 (1978) (noting that "the
valuesjudges are likely to single out as fundamental... [are] the values of'first rate
lawyers'"); Karst, supranote 269, at 59 (stating that the reproductive rights cases "stop
at the boundary of [the judges'] own social class"); Tushnet, supra note 20, at 180
(asserting that the 1972 Supreme Court's decisions "[made] the equal protection
clause meaningful for the well-off and meaningless for the poor").
3 But see infra text accompanying notes 410-23 (discussing Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
387 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
388 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
389 See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (per curiam) (invalidating a Colorado
statute that barred the use of paid personnel to circulate petitions for referenda);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
390 See generally C. Edwin Baker, PressRights and Government Power to Structure the
Press,34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819 (1980) (exploring the argument for special press rights
beyond those advocated by a liberal theory of free speech).
391 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1; Bellotti v. First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. 765, 788-95
(1978) (holding that a statute forbidding certain expenditures by banks and business
corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals
abridges freedom of speech, and violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
39 2 See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,807 (1984) (upholding
a ban on the posting of signs on public property).
393 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,488 (1988) (upholding a ban on residential
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handbills,3 94 and demonstrations in public parks.3 9 5 These the
Court has subordinated to less impressive (though better pedigreed)
96
interests like "esthetics" and avoidance of "visual blight."
Although this pattern may not be perfect,3 97 and plausible doctrinal accounts of the cases could undoubtedly be constructed, still
398
the evidence of an underlying elitism is too strong to ignore.
A full-fledged analysis of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article. But the cases across a
broad range of expressive activities reflect a bias in favor of the
privileged and against even the relatively disadvantaged.3 99 Thus,
as the Court would have it, the government may condition public
funding for poor women's doctors on the surrender of their First
picketing).
394 See United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 133
(1981) (upholding a ban on distribution of unstamped "mailable matter" through
mailboxes).
395 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984)
(upholding a national park regulation that forbade sleeping in the park as applied to
homeless persons seeking to use sleep-expression as protest against poverty); see also
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 720 (1990) (upholding criminal sanctions for
political solicitation on a sidewalk adjoining a post office).
396 Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808-10 (upholding a proscription against
posting signs on public property as supporting "esthetic" interest in avoiding "visual
blight"); see also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (upholding a ban on targeted residential
picketing as supporting government interest in maintaining the "tranquil" atmosphere
of residential neighborhoods); Clark, 468 U.S. at 296-98 (upholding a ban on tent city
demonstration in a national park as supporting government interest in maintaining
the "attractive[ness]" of public parks).
397 See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2710
(1992) (invalidating a ban on distribution of literature at airport terminal); U.S. v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2406 (1990) (invalidating a statute that criminalized flag
burning).
398 Cf. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1387 (1984)
(arguing that "[t]he first amendment has replaced the due process clause as the
primary guarantor of the privileged").
399 See TRIBE, supra note 41, at 979 (noting that the Court has abandoned an
earlier sensitivity to the expressive rights of the lower classes). See generally Robert
C. Hunter, The Value of the Little People-A Lost Value in Commercial Speech Analysis, 16
VT. L. REV. 901 (1992) (criticizing the Court's First Amendment doctrine for
"ignoring the lack of money and power as a factor" and thereby narrowing available
speech alternatives for the "little people"); Michelman, supra note 357, at 1343-50
(examining the Court's resistance to any interference with individuals' prerogatives
to transfer wealth into political power). In a related vein, the Court has recently
restricted access to its own process by poor persons-but not by others-deemed to
have raised "frivolous" claims. See In re Amendment to Rule 39, 111 S. Ct. 1572,
1572 (1991) (holding that the court may deny leave to proceed informa pauperis if
petition is deemed frivolous); In re Demos, 111 S. Ct. 1569, 1569 (1991) (barring
future informa pauperis filings by Demos).
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Amendment right to discuss reproductive choices, 40 0 but it may
not condition state conferral of the corporate form on the corporation's forbearance from expending funds to influence public
referenda. 40 1 The government may prohibit citizens from displaying political posters on public telephone polls, even though the
prohibition leaves the impecunious with little effective means for
public communication, 40 2 but the state may not prohibit a utility
monopoly from using publicly-subsidized billing envelopes to
expound political views to a captive audience, even where the
company has ample resources and opportunity to express its ideas
by other means. 40 3 The government may restrict the volume of
a political sound truck,4 °4 but may not set limits on the volume of
money that the wealthy may spend in the political process. 40 5 As
Justice Marshall aptly put it:
[J]udicial administration of the First Amendment, in conjunction
with a social order marked by large disparities in wealth and other
sources of power, tends systematically to discriminate against

400 See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991).

401 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).
402 See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984).
403 CompareConsolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
with Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
404 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) (holding that ordinances
forbidding sound trucks on public streets does not infringe right of free speech).
405 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57-59 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding federal
regulation of direct contributions to candidates but invalidating limitations on
"independent" political expenditures). The Buckley Court sought to distinguish Kovacs
on the basis that "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Id. at 18-19 & n.17 (footnote
omitted). But surely a regulation that limits the decibel level and operating hours of
a sound truck "reduces the quantity of expression" at least as much as a cap on
campaign expenditures for the affected speaker. Ironically, the Court drew on this
very analogy in a subsequent case that voided expenditure caps for certain
presidential election contributions. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 491, 493 (1985) (stating that
"allowing the presentation of views [on a presidential election] while forbidding the
expenditure of more than $1000 to present them is much like allowing a speaker in
a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying
system."). But see Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First
Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1045, 1059 n. 7 2 (1985)
(distinguishing Buckley and Kovacs on the ground that "the evil created by too much
sound is noise in a strictly physical sense, whereas that thought to be created by too
many dollars is noise only in a normative sense-namely that, in the view of the
person drawing the analogy, too many dollars permit certain messages to be heard").
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efforts by the relatively disadvantaged to convey their political
40 6
ideas.
An unarticulated ideology of elitism may not be the principal
engine driving these decisions,but it explains the Court's differential
enforcement of values through the First Amendment. A myriad of
substantive judgments must be made in order to perform the
standard First Amendment analysis. At minimum, the court must
classify the expressive activity and the governmental regulation,
determine whether a content-neutral regulation preserves adequate,
alternative means of expression, and assess the state interest. None
of these judgments can be made without resort to external values.
The pattern of choices that emerges from the Court's work reveals
a sensibility that prefers elite political participation, and accepts, if
not welcomes, the political isolation of the poor. The Court's
poverty discourse appears to rest upon a similar world view.

III. AUSTIN AND THE POVERTY OF RATIONALITY REVIEW
The previous Parts have shown that the Court's poverty
jurisprudence fails to deal seriously with the political marginalization of poor people. No coherent theory yet exists to justify the
Court's indiscriminate application of the rationality standard in this
context. What appears to be certain, however, is that the Court's
treatment of the poor rests upon a benign or at least neutral view
of a political system in which inequalities of wealth play an
influential if not determinative role. For if the converse were trueif it were constitutionally suspect to distribute public power and
influence on the basis of private wealth-then poor people would
comprise precisely the type of politically powerless minority that the
Court has deemed worthy of "extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." 40 7 And in that circumstance, the
current regime of extreme deference to legislative outcomes
affecting the poor would be internally indefensible.
That is why Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce408 holds
such potent significance for the poor. By acknowledging that a
wealth-driven politics (even in the context of formal political
406 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 314 n.14 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).

Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982) (quoting San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)); see also supra text
407

accompanying notes 310, 407.
408 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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equality) "distorts" and "corrupts" the democratic process, Austin
4 9
shatters a core premise of the Court's poverty jurisprudence. 0
This Part contends that the Court's assumption of democratic
legitimacy in the poverty cases cannot be squared with Austin's
insight into the structural role that wealth plays in the American
political order. This structural role works to the systematic
disadvantage of the lower classes and warrants heightened constitutional protection on their behalf.
A. The Austin Decision
Austin represents the high-water mark in a line of recent
campaign finance decisions that have increasingly acknowledged the
tension between the democratic aspirations of American constitutional governance and the disparities of private power that prevail
in the economic sphere. 410 At issue in Austin was a provision of
the Michigan Campaign Finance Act that prohibits corporations
from using general funds to make independent expenUnder the Act, corporations
ditures in state elections. 4 11
may make such expenditures only out of "segregated funds"
409 Cf TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1136 (noting that before Austin was decided, the

Court had never "accepted as legitimate any asserted interest in preventing actual or
perceived corruption of the electoral system itself caused by large disparities [of
wealth]").
410 The starting point of this doctrinal evolution was Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam), where the Court dismissed the idea that concentrated
wealth might pose any measurable danger to the democratic process beyond the
threat of individual corruption. Six years later, the Court moved modestly, although
perceptibly, to a recognition that "substantial aggregations of wealth" could threaten
the "integrity of our electoral process" through the creation of "political debts."
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-08
(1982). Four years after that, the Court appeared to break qualitatively from Buckley
in Federal Elections Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257
(1986), where the Court acknowledged that "resources amassed in the economic
marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace,"
but refused to uphold campaign finance restrictions as applied to a not-for-profit
corporation. Finally, in Austin, the Court accepted the idea that aggregated wealth
does exert "corrosive and distorting effects" on the political process itself and held
that states have a legitimate and compelling interest in combating such effects.
Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60, 668-69.
411 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 654-55. The Michigan Campaign Finance Act also
prohibits corporations from using general funds to make campaign contributions, but
that aspect of the statute was not challenged in Austin. Buckley had earlier recognized
that regulation of campaign contributions served the compelling state interest of
avoiding corruption or the appearance of corruption. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28.
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accumulated from individual contributions. 412 Violation of this
restriction is punishable as a felony. The Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, a nonprofit corporation, initiated a constitutional
challenge, asserting that it wished to expend general funds to
purchase a local newspaper advertisement in support of a candidate
for the Michigan legislature. 413 Relying on earlier campaignfinance cases that were highly solicitous of corporate political
expenditures, 4 14 the Chamber of Commerce attacked Michigan's
restriction as violative of the First Amendment.
The Court, with three justices dissenting, sustained the Michigan
law. Structurally, the Court's approach to the First Amendment
issue was unremarkable. The analysis began with a reaffirmance of
Bellotti's holding that corporate political speech is entitled to
constitutional protection and of Buckley's principle that independent
campaign expenditures constitute "political expression 'at the core
of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms. ' "4 15 From these accepted propositions, the Court reasoned
that Michigan's statute imposed a significant burden on political
expression and had to serve a compelling state interest to survive.
At this point the analysis got interesting. Until Austin, the Court
had identified only one governmental interest sufficiently compelling to justify legislative restrictions on campaign expenditures:
"avoid[ing] corruption or the appearance of corruption." 4 16
"Corruption" in this context was understood narrowly, as the
"'financial quid pro quo' corruption" of particular officials. 417 In
Austin, however, the Court transcended this narrow framework and
recognized that projection of concentrated economic power into the
political sphere corrupts the democratic process itself in ways that are
constitutionally significant.4 18
Michigan's campaign-finance
4 12

Austin, 494 U.S. at 654-55.
413 See id. at 656.
414 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28; First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768,

792 (1978).
415 Austin, 494 U.S. at 657 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968))).
416 Austin, 494 U.S. at 658 (citing Federal Elections Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)).
417 Austin, 494 U.S. at 659, 702 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
418 Earlier cases, including Buckley, distinguished independent campaign
expenditures from direct contributions to candidates on the theory that only the
latter posed any appreciable threat of "financial quid pro quo corruption." Austin's
holding that the state has a compelling interest in restricting even independent
contributions in order to prevent wealth-based allocation of power (at least in the
context of state-created corporations) leaves little force to Buckley's contribution/
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restriction, the Court held, served the compelling state interest of
counteracting this "different type of corruption in the political
arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form
and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
419
corporation's political ideas."
Austin's logic rests on the essential polarity between political
influence that reflects "public support" and political influence that
reflects nothing more than control over aggregated wealth. As the
Court viewed it, popular support forms the legitimate basis for the
process of generating public choices in a democratic majoritarian
regime. Interference with the political process that "corrupt[s]" or
"distort[s]" it from this popular support paradigm undermines
democratic integrity. Concentrated wealth threatens just this type
of corrosive interference because it facilitates exercises of political
power that are grossly disproportionate to the quantity and intensity
of individual beliefs and preferences. 420 On this analysis, any

substantial disparity of economic power-whether or not mediated
through the corporate form-threatens "corrosi[on] and distorti[on]"
of the political process because it tends to deflect public decisionmaking from a popular support mode.
Interpreting the Austin decision in just this sense, the three
dissenters bitterly objected that the Court had discarded Buckley's
signal principle: that "the government has [no] legitimate interest
in equalizing the relative influence of speakers." 421 The majority's
response was curt and, at least at first glance, somewhat enigmatic.
The Michigan act did not seek to equalize political influence, the
Court explained, but merely sought to ensure that corporate

expenditure distinction. See generally David Cole, FirstAmendment Antitrust: The End
of Laissez-Fairein Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 236, 237 (1991) (stating
that Austin's departure from Buckley indicates that the Court has "potentially begun
a new era ofcampaign finance jurisprudence, for the Court's recognition of systemic
corruption collapses all the distinctions that guided its prior jurisprudence in this
area").
419 Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. The Court alternatively described thejustification for
Michigan's statute as "the compelling state interest of eliminating from the political
process the corrosive effect of political 'war chests' amassed with the aid of the legal
advantages given to corporations." Id. at 666.
420 This analysis assumes that "public" or "popular" support as used in Austin
refers in some way to the aggregation of individual preferences. There has not been
universal agreement on this point. See infra notes 436-49 and accompanying text.
421 Id. at 704 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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political expenditures reflected "actual public support." 422 Moreover, the Court emphasized, not all wealth was implicated, but only
wealth secured through "the unique state-conferred corporate
423
structure that facilitates the amassing of large treasuries."
Though far from transparent, Austin is exceptionally rich and
potentially far reaching. Implicit in its condensed reasoning are
empirical judgments about the operation of unequal wealth on the
political process, normativejudgments about the nature of democracy, and doctrinal judgments about the constitutional significance of
wealth-driven politics. Each holds importance for the Court's
continued use of rationality review in cases affecting the poor.
B. Austin's EmpiricalAspect: Wealth and Politics
At the empirical level, Austin is a landmark for its recognition
that private wealth readily translates into public political power, far
424
beyond the prospect of financial quid pro quo corruption.
Inherent in the Court's assertion that unequal wealth affords an
"unfair" political advantage that tends to "distort[]" the democratic
425
process is the premise that money exerts a structural effect.
Money does not merely increase the amount of political speech.
And it does not merely threaten the occasional corruption of
particular officials. Rather, it draws political power systematically
426
toward itself at the expense of "the (less affluent) public."
422 Id. at 660.
42 Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 450-69.
424 That wealth exerts such influence in American politics is so apparent and
widely accepted as to be beyond reasonable dispute. See, e.g., Ray Forrester, The New
ConstitutionalRightto Buy Elections, 69 A.B.A.J. 1078, 1078 (1983) (stating that money
has always been a major factor in American politics); Christine Gorman, The Priceof
Power, TIME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 44, 45 (noting the escalating cost of congressional
election campaigns, the "heav[y] dependen[cy]" of candidates on business donations,
and the political access and influence that such donations purchase); Robert Sherrill,
The Looting Decade: S & Ls, Big Banks and Other Triumphs of Capitalism,THE NATION,
Nov. 19,1990, at 589 (arguing that "uncontrolled money" rules the "world of politics"
in the United States); Calling Speaker Foley, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1991, at A16
(advocating campaign finance reform to stop the "distortion of democracy caused by
the unchecked flow of favor-seeking money to the nation's top lawmakers"); supra
notes 14-16. But see infra note 426 (discussingJustice Scalia's view).
425 The Court's incorporation of this fact into its campaign finance analysis
evolved from earlier cases in which the Court more narrowly acknowledged that
corporate wealth is "not an indication of popular support for the corporation's
political ideas." Federal Elections Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479
U.S. 238, 258 (1986).
426 Paul G. Chevigny, Review E&say: The Paradox of CampaignFinance,56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 206,220-21 (1981) (reviewing GARY C.JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL
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Austin's assertion that concentrated wealth can distort political
processes from a "popular support" norm necessarily embraces an
empirical conclusion that the control of material resources strongly
determines the distribution of public power.

ELECTIONS (1980)). The view that wealth distorts the democratic process by
overbearing the popular will is claimed by some to be in tension with the traditional
notion that ideas are best discussed and developed in an unregulated "marketplace"
of speech. Justice Scalia, for example, believes that infusions of wealth in the political
process (bribery and illegal influence peddling aside) simply increase the information
and viewpoints that are available to an engaged and deliberative electorate that
ultimately exercises its sovereign authority free from undue or unfair influence. No
matter how packaged, warped or one-sided the information that reaches the people,
all is purified in the end, Scalia believes, because governance issues are ultimately up
to the people to decide at the ballot box. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 694-95 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). This somewhat romanticized vision of the political marketplace also
appears in Bellotti, where the Court proclaimed that "the people in our democracy are
entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of
conflicting arguments." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791. Such an assessment of American
politics recalls the old adage, "let the people know the facts and the country will be
safe." That may have been sound wisdom in Abraham Lincoln's time, but the
American political system certainly does not operate on that model today. Instead,
an industry of Pavlovian engineers has arisen, which, at the direction of the highest
bidder, employs sophisticated polling techniques, focus-group models, psychological
studies, and media campaigns not to "let the people know the facts," but to market
candidates and issues in ways calculated to produce reflexive and unconscious
responses from the electorate. See, e.g., ARTHUR S. MILLER, POLITICS, DEMOCRACY
AND THE SUPREME COURT 290-93 (1985) (stating that Huxley's revolution of mind
manipulation has begun, and that "[man] is increasingly seen as... manipulable as
such") (quoting Aldous Huxley in ALAN W. SCHEFLIN & EDWARD M. OPTON, THE
MIND MANIPULATORS 10 (1978)); Forrester, supra note 424; Daniel Goleman, Voters
Assailed By Unfair Persuasion,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1992, at C1 (surveying persuasion
techniques used upon voters). A recent report on politicians' use of focus groups
concluded that this technology has "very little to do with democracy.... [It] grow[s]
out of the assumption that Americans ... don't completely understand their own
political interests and that their opinions are easier to manipulate than to enlighten."
Elizabeth Kolbert, Test-Marketing a President: How Focus Groups Pervade Campaign
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 18, 72. Said one prominent
political poll taker at the conclusion of a focus session: "You have that sense of
innocence lost. You have that twinge of knowledge that they're the guinea pigs
allowing us to exploit the electorate." Id.
MoreoverJustice Scalia's notion that campaign expenditures have only a speech
effect, and not a power distributive effect ignores the influence that such expenditures exert long after the elections have ended. This is a particularly glaring omission
in an age in which many contributors fund both major party candidates for a
particular office and-in Senate minority leader Robert Dole's words-"expect
something in return other than good government." Robert Sherrill, Deep Pockets, THE
NATION, Aug. 2 7 /Sept. 3, 1988, at 170, 170 (reviewing PHILIP M. STERN, THE BEST
CONGRESS MONEY CAN Buy (1988)); see Richard L. Berke, PragmatismGuides Political
Gifts, a Study Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1990, § 1, at 26 (noting a study showing that
PAC contributions are not based on ideological or geographical factors, but on
whether "the recipient sits on a Congressional committee that can help them").
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The observation that private economic inequalities reproduce
themselves as political inequalities that warp the processes of selfgovernment may seem mundane. For years, democratic theorists,
a majority of Congress, and most ordinary citizens have acknowledged this dynamic and criticized it as perhaps the most potent
internal threat to democratic government. 427 Nevertheless, the
Court for years managed to "shut [its] mind" to this prominent
aspect of American political economy that "[a]ll others can see and
understand." 428 The significance of Austin, then, is that it breaks
the long judicial silence and introduces the fact of wealth-determined politics into constitutional jurisprudence. Since political
power is a zero-sum game, 429 the obvious corollary to the proposition that wealth purchases political power is that unresourced
citizens are denied their fair share of political influence.
In
430
American politics, one must pay to play;
but as Senator Dole
candidly put it, "[t]here aren't any Poor PACs or Food Stamp PACs
or Nutrition PACs or Medicare PACs." 43 1 Implicit in Austin is the
recognition that as money has become the currency of political
427 Seesupra notes 14-16 and accompanying text; supra note 424; see also Dworkin,
supra note 16, at 13 (noting the popular view that "it is unfair that some private
citizens have much more influence in politics than othersjust because they are much
richer").
428 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20,37 (1922) (finding that the federal
child labor tax had a "palpable" effect on child employment, and stating: "All others
can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?"); see also
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 348-49 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]here
truly is 'another world "out there," the existence of which the Court, I suspect, either
chooses to ignore or fears to recognize. . . .'" (quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463
(1977) (Blackmun, J. dissenting))).
429 See cases collected at supra note 96.
430 See supra notes 14-16 (collecting authorities documenting the pervasive
influence of wealth on American politics). The data make clear that the poor have
insufficient resources to make campaign donations or expenditures. Indeed, those
who fall below the poverty line (welfare recipients on average receive assistance at
rates between 20% and 50% below the federal poverty guidelines) by definition have
insufficient income for brutal necessities, let alone for playing politics. See 1992
GREEN BOOK, supra note 22, at 1301-14; see also supranote 170 (authorities criticizing
federal poverty guidelines as an unrealistically low estimate of income required to
afford even the most basic necessities).
431 ETZIONI, supra note 14, at 39 (quoting Senator Robert Dole). Senator Dole
earned the title of "undisputed champion" in the U.S. Senate at raising PAC money
by collecting nearly $3.4 million between 1968 and 1986. Sherrill, supra note 426, at
170; see also Dennis Pfaff, Pollution and the Poor, DET. NEWS, Nov. 26, 1989, at Al
(quoting Alex Sagady, an environmental specialist with the Michigan American Lung
Association, that the "[p]oor don't have a PAC" to deal with poverty-related issues of
pollution).
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power-the measure of a citizen's share in self-government-the
system, unless regulated, can effectively strip those without
economic resources of their political resources as well.
C. Austin's Normative Aspect: Conception of Democracy
The Austin decision is also vital at the normative level. Austin
advances a conception of democratic governance grounded on the
principle of "popular support," and so regards wealth-based
allocations of political power as fundamentally illegitimate. As
ideology or political theory, this proposition is unexceptional; it
merely ratifies the popular vision of democracy that has been
expressed from "'the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments. " 3 2 As jurisprudence, though, Austin's democratic
vision holds remarkable generative potential. Given the extent to
which economic inequalities pervade the political process, Austin
could draw into question myriad aspects of the current democratic
order. It may be argued, however, that Austin's reach is subject to
at least two significant limitations. The first would confine Austin's
theory to aggregations of wealth that result from the "state-conferred" corporate form; inequitable distributions of political
influence attributable to inequalities of individual wealth would
continue to be constitutionally irrelevant. The second would treat
corporate expenditures as a special case for purposes of First
Amendment analysis either on the assumption that states have an
especially strong interest in protecting nonconsenting shareholders
against corporations' use of their money for speech, or on the
theory that corporate political speech merits substantially less
constitutional protection than large campaign expenditures by
wealthy individuals.
Each of these limiting principles has potential importance for
First Amendment theory. But neither detracts from Austin's
fundamental insight that wealth, regardless of source, can displace
democratic politics-and it is precisely this kind of political breakdown that should call forth a more searching judicial review of
political outcomes. For if, as Austin posits, the essence of democracy is government by the people according to a principle of "popular
support," and if, as Austin further supposes, democratic processes
432

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.

368, 381 (1963)).
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are debased and political outcomes tainted by large injections of
wealth that bear no relationship to "public support," then the source
of the money is beside the point, as is the "consent" of the owner,
or indeed, the role of the state in permitting the aggregation of the
wealth. It hardly matters, for purposes of the Court's formulation of
democratic legitimacy, whether the process is captured by corporate
managers using other people's money, the owners of closely-held
corporations using general treasury funds, or by a few multimillionaires drawing on their personal fortunes. Under any of these
scenarios, politics faces the threat of being driven not by the
strength of ideas or the desires of the people, but rather by a raw
economic force that can be expected to promote its own reproduction and continued dominance over the common good.
1. Austin's Core Democratic Principle
At the heart of Austin is the proposition that certain forms of
concentrated wealth tend to distort the processes of democratic selfgovernment. This charge of distortion, like all such charges,
necessarily carries a notion of an ideal or norm that has been
denatured. 3 3 In Austin, the normative baseline against which
distortion is detected is a conception of democracy under which the
public, and not the purse, rules. As the Austin Court viewed it,
unrestrained corporate expenditures afford "'an unfair advantage in
the political marketplace'" because "'[t]he resources in the treasury
of a business corporation'" do not indicate commensurate popular
support. 43 4 And "immense aggregations" of corporate wealth
have "distorting effects" on the political process because the power
they exert bears "little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas." 435 The core normative principle of Austin, then, designates "public" or "popular" support as the
presumptive, democratically legitimate determinant of political
outcomes and, with potential exceptions discussed below, rejects
deviations from that principle that would distribute political power
on other bases.
433 See BeVier, supra note 405, at 1073-74 (implying that the idea of a constitutional distortion presupposes some concept of constitutional norms).
434 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (quoting
Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257, 258
(1986)).
435 Id. at 660.
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This raises the question of what Austin meant by "popular
support." Neither the majority opinion nor the concurrences
expressly define the term, and several interpretations seem at least
superficially plausible. By one account, "popular support" simply
refers to any aggregation of impacts upon the political process by
natural persons (as opposed to corporations), even if wealthy people
wield influence vastly disproportionate to their numbers while
masses of less affluent people are left with virtually no political
influence at all.43 6 Conversely, Austin's "popular support" concept might be understood as an inflexible principle of majoritarian
governance that guarantees each individual a mathematically equal
quantum of influence on every political issue. This is the interpretation implied by Justice Scalia's charge that the Austin majority had
437
constructed an "illiberal ... 'one man one minute'" regime.
On the former interpretation, Austin implicitly overruled First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti;438 on the latter, it implicitly
4 39
overruled Buckley v. Valeo.
A third interpretation of Austin's "popular support" concept
avoids any irreconcilable conflict with Buckley or Bellotti,440 and,
more importantly, seems to be most consistent with the sense and
reasoning of the Austin decision itself. This third interpretation
assumes that when the Court uses ordinary words, and places no
special definition upon them, it intends their ordinary meanings.
Reasonable people may differ on the precise "ordinary meaning" of
"popular support," but the term plainly does not encompass a
system of governance by which those with the most money command the greatest political power and influence.
Rather, as
commonly understood, the phrase "public" or "popular" support
4S6 At least one prominent constitutional scholar has advanced this view. See
Letter from C. Edwin Baker to Stephen Loffredo 1 (Nov. 11, 1992) (on file with
author) (suggesting that Austin's "public support" concept merely "refers to who
counts as part of the public for political purposes-individuals, people, do count,
corporations do not").
437 Austin, 494 U.S. at 684.
438 435 U.S. 765 (1978). An all-or-nothing distinction between corporate political
speech and individual political speech contradicts Bellotti's holding that corporate
political speech is entitled to full First Amendment protections.
439 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). A "one man, one minute" concept of"popular
support" enforceable by government, Austin, 494 U.S. at 684, patently violates
Buckley's categorical ban on campaign finance restrictions designed to equalize
citizens' political influence..
440 Austin professed adherence to Buckley and Bellotti, 494 U.S. at 657-60, a fact
that may not be dispositive but is at least relevant to the interpretation of the Court's
decision.
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refers to the relative quantity, and perhaps intensity, of individual
beliefs and preferences. 441 Viewed in this light, the distinction
the Court draws between "'equalizing the relative ability of2
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections"4
(which it did not endorse) and "ensur[ing] that [political] expenditures 'reflect actual public support'" 443 (which it did endorse),
becomes intelligible. This distinction, though derided as artificial, 444 describes a theory of popular democratic governance that
441 Webster's Dictionary defines "popular" as "ofor relating to the general public;
suited to the financial means ofthe majority; INEXPENSIVE... commonly liked...
approved." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1766 (1981).
"Public," as an adjective is defined as "of relating to, or affecting the people as an
organized community;" and as a noun, "public" is defined as "the people as a whole."
Id. at 1836. The Court's various contextual uses of the phrase "popular" or "public"
support all point to this common understanding. For instance, in Massachusetts
Citizens For Life, the Court asserted that the "relative availability of funds is ... a
...

rough barometer of public support." FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 258 (1986). If "public support" simply referred to the existence of any
noncorporate human backing, the statement would make no sense. It becomes
coherent only if "public support" refers to the number of people and intensity of
interest favoring or opposing a particular issue or candidate. In Austin, as elsewhere,
the Court associates "public support" with the "power... of ideas" and perceives a
natural correlation between the two. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60. All would agree that
an idea is "powerful" if it attracts many people to its cause. But few would accept
that an idea is "powerful" in this sense merely because a wealthy individual advances
it. Here as well, the Court's usage makes sense only if "public support" refers to
relative numbers and intensity of individual views. The Court has also spoken in
terms of the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of [corporate]
wealth.., that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (emphasis added). It is a strained
interpretation indeed that would equate "the public" in this context with a few billionaires-or even a few thousand millionaires. Finally, the immediate doctrinal forbear
of Austin and FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life implicitly rejected the idea that
democracy is safe so long as wealth that captures political processes is directed by its
natural-person owners. "Regulation of corporate political activity," the Court
declared, "reflect[s] concern not about use of the corporate form perse, but about the
potentialfor unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes." Id. at 259 (emphasis
added).
442 Austin, 494 U.S. at 684-85 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S 1,48 (1976)).
443 Id. at 685 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 660).
444 The criticism is a curious one coming from Justice Scalia, who joined the
majority in Massachusetts Citizens for Lifre, a case which relied on precisely this
distinction:
Political "free trade" does not necessarily require that all who participate in
the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources. Relative
availability of funds is after all a rough barometer of public support. The
resources in the treasury of a business corporation, however, are not an
indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas.
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allows for certain benign departures from equal or proportionate
political influence but singles out wealth-based departures as
Austin's conception of democracy tolerates
illegitimate. 445
inequalities of influence based on numerical strength of an active
coalition, or the intensity of its supporters, but not such inequalities
that attach to the perquisites of affluence. Since "equalizing voices"
is not required on any given question, Austin allows members of a
minority to pool individual resources, financial or personal, in order
to project a political voice that is disproportionate to simple
numerical strength. 446 The minority could participate in an issue
of special concern with more than an equal voice, but its influence
would reflect the aggregation of intense, individual support, not the
unfair advantage conferred by unequal wealth. The intensity of a
minority's interest in a particular matter might occasionally prevail
over the superior numbers of a relatively apathetic majority. But
any number of democratic, pluralist, and interest group theories
accept such results as consistent with popular governance and
447
democratic principle.

Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 257-58 (citations omitted).
445 Cf. Dworkin, supra note 16 (discussing the relation between unequal wealth and
the possibility of equality of political influence).
446 Understood in this way, Austin does not "calibrat[e] political speech to the
degree of public opinion that supports it," asJustice Scalia charged in Austin. Austin,
494 U.S. at 693 (Scalia,J., dissenting). Scalia is correct that if one reads Austin in the
manner he proposes and if campaign expenditures are "political speech," then
Austin's principle that such expenditures ought to reflect popular support ignores a
core value of the First Amendment: that speech promotes political enlightenment by
allowing new and unpopular ideas to be introduced into public debate. As Judge
Learned Hand put it, the public is more likely to reach the right conclusions "out of
a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection." United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). A rule limiting
political speech to those ideas that already claim public support could foreclose
debate and disadvantage unpopular or minority positions. The interpretation put
forward in the text, however, does not require strict proportionality of speech to
numerical support on any given issue, but would tend to open the political process
to the unpopular views of indigent minorities, whose interests are otherwise likely to
be submerged in a political process driven by unregulated wealth. At the same time,
corporations and wealthy individuals remain at liberty to popularize their ideas
through private institutions and the media.
44 Political theorists and others have long suggested that democratic values are
not fully served by a pure and unbending principle of majority rule. Rather, it is said,
an inclusive democratic politics requires that the intensity of a minority's interest in
an issue should at least occasionally prevail over the superior numbers of a relatively
apathetic majority. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 48-50,
90-119 (1956); BEITZ, supra note 359, at 66-67.
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Finally, Austin's conception of democracy does not require that
all political viewpoints be advanced with exactly equal resources.
Rather, so long as inequalities appear to be "a rough barometer of
public support" 448 and not simply a reflection of the political
preferences of those who control vast wealth, they are consistent
with the baseline of democratic legitimacy. The "equality" demanded by Austin's democratic vision, at bottom, is an equality that seeks
to mitigate the political impact of maldistributed wealth and level
the field for rich and poor.
Austin's designation of "popular support" as the guiding
principle of democratic governance and its identification of
economic status as an illegitimate determinant of political influence
tracks the theory laid down in the political rights cases of the
1960s. 449 Austin's innovation is that it explicitly extends this idea
from formal voting parity to functional political effectiveness, and
from political inequalities imposed directly by the state to those that
result from the domination of private economic power. On this
view, the political marginalization of poor people ought to be
recognized as a fundamentally undemocratic phenomenon that
demands judicial attention.
2. Putative Limiting Principle: State Facilitation
of Corporate Capital Accumulation
Perhaps the easiest way to confine Austin's significance would be
to regard the decision as concerned only with the political inequalities that result from the accumulation of corporate(but not individual) capital. The Austin Court did "emphasize" that the compelling
interest supporting Michigan's campaign restriction arose not from
"the mere fact that corporations may accumulate large amounts of
wealth," but rather, from the fact that government "facilitates the
amassing of large treasuries" by attaching special advantages, both
legal and economic, to the corporate form. 450 Although the
Court did not elaborate on the precise significance of state
responsibility, several explanations are possible.
First, the state may have a compelling interest in regulating the
political power of corporate wealth on the theory that the corporation is a creature of the state, and therefore, subject to state
448 Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, 479

U.S. at 258.

449 See supra notes 92-115 and accompanying text.
450 Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
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definition of its powers and duties. 45 1 This view, a variant on the
logical argument that the greater power includes the lesser, would
permit any state-created, nonconstitutional benefit to be conditioned on the restrictions and limitations that the state chooses to
impose. 452 It has long been held, however, that the state may not
directly condition the receipt of a government benefit on the
forfeiture of a fundamental right, 455 and Justice Marshall, author
of the Austin decision, was a leading proponent of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 454 Moreover, this explanation would
effectively overrule Bellotti, which the Austin Court declined to
do.

45 5

451 Courts and commentators have long debated the status of the corporation as
a private actor. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819) (holding that a corporation established for purposes of general charity is

not per se a public corporation).

See generally ARTHUR MILLER, THE MODERN
CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 4-5
(1976) (acknowledging the existence of the corporate state in America and detailing
how that state developed without formal amendment to the Constitution).
452 See McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.)
("The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.").
453 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that
a teacher may not be dismissed for criticizing the school board in a letter published
by a local newspaper). For an informative discussion of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, see Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of
Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984).
454 See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (adopting
impact analysis in unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972) (holding that a classification which serves to penalize a fundamental right
triggers the compelling state interest requirement); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574
(supporting the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by holding that a teacher's
exercise of his First Amendment right to speak about public issues, without proof of
knowingly or recklessly made false statements, will not result in his dismissal from
public employment). See generally Kreimer, supra note 453, at 1345 (discussing
Marshall's role in unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence). Justice Scalia sharply
criticized the Austin majority for allowing states to condition corporate status on the
relinquishment of First Amendment rights. Austin, 424 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In other cases, however, Scalia has heartily endorsed state action that
conditions important governmental benefits upon individuals' forfeiture of First
Amendment rights. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding a
federal regulation that conditions federal medical benefits on the forfeiture of
reproductive choice and free expression); Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding a state law that effectively
conditions unemployment benefits on the forfeiture of free exercise rights).
455 In Bellotti, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that since states are
under no constitutional obligation to make any corporate structure available, they
may create a corporate form with limited powers that exclude the right to make
political expenditures. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14; id. at 823-24 (Rehnquist,J.,
dissenting).
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The second explanation is related to the first. Government
regulation designed to prevent corporate,but not other, wealth from
distorting the political process might be justified on the theory that
the state, having created the corporate form, is also responsible for
the adverse consequences that the corporate form might produce.
Corporate consequences thus fall on the side of the ledger attributable to governmentally imposed harms, as distinguished from those
ills that are privately initiated. This explanation, however, ignores
the powerful role that the state plays in facilitating individual,
noncorporate wealth, through the law of property, contract,
taxation, and other forms of economic regulation. 456 Indeed,
Justice Scalia's Austin dissent recognizes that the economic power
of individuals and noncorporate associations is largely attributable
to "all sorts of special advantages that the State need not confer."457 Management salaries, dividends, and capital gains are all
varieties of wealth that owe their accumulative properties to state
conferred benefits, no different in kind from the "state-conferred
advantages of the corporate structure" 45 8 singled out in the Austin
decision. Hence, once one concludes that the state is responsible
for regulating the untoward political consequences of corporate
capital accumulation, the same reasoning ought to apply to
resources gathered through other government-sponsored market
mechanisms and legal arrangements.4 5 9
Both of the explanations offered so far follow the fault-line of
the familiar public-private distinction. 460 But there is no reason
that the state's duty to ensure democratic legitimacy ought to be
456 See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 946 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the position that government
bears no responsibility for the unequal distribution of private wealth and noting that
"[t]he state defines and enforces property rights, creates the economic climate in
which private enterprise operates, and in myriads of ways effects the economy of the
state and the wealth or poverty of its citizens"); Sunstein, supra note 134, at 885
(contending that common law distributions cannot meaningfully be distinguished
from positive law distributions); cf. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 615 (1856) (Curtis,
J., dissenting) (asserting that "[w]ithout government and social order, there can be no

property; for without law, its ownership, its use, and the power of disposing of it,
cease to exist").
457 Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
458

Id. at 665.

459 See Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein'sMonster Hits the Campaign Traib An Approach to
Regulation of CorporatePoliticalFxpenditures,32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 632 (1991)
(contending that the corporate form does not confer significantly greater economic

advantages than many other legal constructs and arrangements).
460 See supra text accompanying notes 373-75.
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limited to situations in which it is directly responsible for democratic illegitimacy, and such has never been the law. For in an ultimate
sense, the state is responsible for any deviation from democratic
norms; it alone has established and maintains the monopoly of state
power that is exercised, coercively if necessary, over all citizens in
the political order. This is the quintessence of state action, and it
carries a correlative duty to guarantee the democratic dispensation
of government authority against all threats, whether public or
private. 46 1 Thus, the one-person, one-vote cases allude to a
citizen's right to have his or her vote counted free from private
ballot fraud.4 62 And the "white primary cases," although formally
decided at the outer boundaries of state action theory, involve the
protection of the political process against privately initiated distortions. 463 Indeed, the political distortion attacked in Baker v. Carr
resulted from private behavior-population shifts that incidentally
placed public power in a minority's hands-for which the state did
not bear direct responsibility. 464 The lesson is that it should
make no constitutional difference whether the processes that
allocate political power are corrupted by private actions or by
government policies.

465

461 Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("It is of great importance in a republic not only to giard the society against
the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice
of the other part.").
462 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (citing, among others, United
States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (ballot stuffing)). See generally Chemerinsky,
supra note 374 (arguing that courts ought to protect constitutional values against
private encroachment); Alexander H. Perkelis, Private Governments and the Federal
Constitution, in LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 91, 113-14 (Milton R. Konvitz ed., 1970)
(proposing a theory of state action in which private economic influence over the
political system could be unconstitutional if it were found to "control in fact the
political processes of a given society").
463 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (finding a political party's actions in
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(same); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (finding a political party's actions in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Nixon v. Herdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)
(same).
464 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The principle that private conduct
acquires the status of state action when it is expressed through or significantly alters
the processes of government is also reflected in a recent line of cases holding that
private litigants' race-based use of peremptory challenges constitutes state action for
purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112
S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (criminal case); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 2077 (1991) (civil case).
465 Nor does the public-private distinction in this context have the virtue of
greater enforceability. To the contrary, it is far from clear that any coherent line can
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Moreover, even if the putative distinction between statefacilitated corporate wealth and privately acquired individual wealth
holds force in the First Amendment context, it is wholly irrelevant
to the issue of democratic legitimacy. 66 Austin's conception of
democracy is reflected in its judgment, both normative and
empirical, that vast concentrations of corporate wealth distort
democratic processes because those "resources ...

are not an

indication of popular support for the corporation's political
ideas." 467 From the democratic perspective, what matters is
neither the source of wealth nor the state's enabling role in its
accumulation. The troubling phenomenon is the discontinuity
between wealth and popular support and the threat that concentrated economic power will negate any possibility of self government by
politically equal citizens. 468 In this sense, a billionaire's personal
fortune carries no greater "indication of popular support" than the
swollen treasury of a large corporation. To the extent that either
variety of economic power translates into political power, it has the
capacity to deform the democratic process away from a public
support norm. 469 In sum, the distinction between "state-facilitatbe drawn between privately and governmentally caused distortions of the political
process. For example, one might argue that the barriers to political participation
invalidated in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 135-36 (1972) (ballot-access fee that
could reach several thousand dollars), and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 664 n.1 (1966) ($1.50 poll tax), had a class-based impact only because of
disparities in private wealth for which the state bore no responsibility. Cf Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,34 (1956) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution
imposes no "affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in
economic circumstances").
466 As Judge Skelly Wright explained in an analogous context:
When barriers to equality are imposed not by state action, but by circumstances or economic resources or private persons, the equal protection
clause might no longer provide protection. Nevertheless, the bounds
imposed by the state action requirement do not limit the fundamental ideal
of political equality that underpins our democratic system of government.
J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the FirstAmendment an Obstacle
to PoliticalEquality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 629 (1982).
467 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (quoting
Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258
(1986)).
46 See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text (discussing the tensions between
economic inequality and political democracy).
469 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 685 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that, by the
majority's reasoning, concentrated wealth may distort the political process whether
the wealth is held by a corporation or by an individual). At least one commentator
has argued that the Austin Court regards individual wealth as incapable of exerting
"undue influence" over the democratic process, citing as evidence the fact that the
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ed" corporate wealth and other wealth fails to cabin Austin's core
conception of democracy.
3. Putative Limiting Principle: Other People's Money
One might also attempt to limit Austin by confining it to the
special situation in which corporate resources are injected into
politics without the consent of the shareholders. 47 0 One way of
interpreting Austin's attention to this factor is that the Court viewed

owner consent as a means of anchoring corporate political expenditures to "popular support." The aggregation of many individuals'
financial resources under a corporate umbrella might thus be
"democratically" deployed for political purposes so long as the
resources were a "rough barometer of public support" for the
favored candidate, program, or idea.471 This approach distinguishes between the "concentrated wealth" of a billionaire's
personal fortune, which bears no more relation to public support
than does a business corporation's treasury, and the concentrated
wealth of a consumer PAG funded by millions of ten-dollar
472
contributions, which does.

Court did not accept "equalization of voices" as a compelling state interest for
campaign finance restrictions. Prescott M. Lassman, Breaching the Fortress Walls:
CorporatePoliticalSpeech and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 78 VA. L.
REv. 759, 790 & n.210 (1992). As discussed above, however, the Court's rejection of
pure egalitarianism in favor of a popular-support model in fact reinforces the notion
that disparate influence flowing from any source of wealth threatens to displace
democratic politics. See supra notes 433-49 and accompanying text. Moreover,
limitingAustin to corporate wealth on this basis would require the Court to reject its
prior insight that "[riegulation of corporate political activity... reflect[s] concern not
about use of the corporate form perse, but about the potential for unfair deployment
of wealth for political purposes." Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 259
(footnote omitted). Nothing in Austin even hints at such a change in fundamental
thinking.
470 SeeAustin, 494 U.S. at 660-66. Justice Brennan, whojoined the Austin majority,
issued a special concurrence that emphasized the state's interest in protecting
shareholders against the unauthorized "political" use of their money. See id. at 66978. See generally Victor Brudney, Business Corporationsand Stockholders' Rights Under
the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 235-95 (1981) (tracing the history of state
interest in protecting shareholders against use of corporate resources for unauthorized political purposes).
471 See Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 257-58.
472 For this reason, the Austin Court could view corporate political expenditures
from segregated funds accumulated through individual contributions as benign:
contributors "understand that their money will be used solely for political purposes,"
and therefore "the speech generated accurately reflects contributors' support for the
corporation's political views." Austin, 494 U.S. at 660-61. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that in some instances PACs serve as "mechanisms by which large
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An alternative, narrowing reading of Austin is that the Court
regards corporate political expenditures as troublesome not because
they lack public support, but only because they represent the
political use of financial assets without the permission of the
owners. On this view, it is not the inequality of private economic
power that gives rise to political distortion, but only the deployment
of wealth without proprietary consent. This reading of Austin does
not command much support from the language of the decision
itself,4 73 nor does it square with the conception of democracy that
animates the Court's reasoning. If the political process is distorted
whenever large sums of money are marshalled into politics in ways
that "have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
[spender's] political ideas," 474 then the circumstance that the
money is used with the consent of the owner (or by the owner
herself) is quite irrelevant to preservation of democratic norms.
The baseline is popular support, not proprietary support, and not
shareholder support. The basic unit of democratic currency for the
Austin Court is the person, not the dollar.
For this reason, capture of the political process by corporate
managers is no more or less troubling than capture by a billionaire
cowboy who speaks only for himself. The evil identified by Austin
is that control over unequally distributed resources enables some
individuals to exert influence over the political process vastly out of
proportion to their numbers or to the "popular support" for the
outcomes they seek. Requiring nothing beyond owner consent for
the political use of money simply does not address the "distortion"
Austin identifies. Such a restriction could only protect against the
skewing of the process away from a public-regarding, popularnumbers of individuals of modest means can join together in organizations" to pool
their resources and "amplify their voices." Federal Elections Comm'n v. National

Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 494, 495 (1985). In Federal
Elections Comm'n, the Court noted that over 100,000 individuals had contributed an
average of $25 each to the Fund for a Conservative Majority, see id. at 494, and
concluded that to forbid this type of joint political activity "would subordinate...
those of modest means as opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy
expensive media ads with their own resources," id. at 495.
473 The Austin Court describes democratic distortion not as a discontinuity
between corporate political ideas and shareholdersupport, but rather as a lack of
correlation between corporate wealth and popular support for the corporation's
political ideas. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60. That Austin upheld the Michigan
restriction as applied to closely-held corporations further evidences that the Court's
central concern is unequal economic power, and not the nonconsensual use of other
people's money.
474 Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
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support model if wealth were distributed in a roughly equal manner.
Then, "voting with dollars" might work as a model and the amount
of cash flowing into the political system might correlate significantly
with the breadth and intensity of citizen support. But the distribution of wealth in the United States is more unequal than in any
other industrialized nation. 475 The problem of other people's
476
money is no doubt important for First Amendment reasons,
but it does not provide a principled basis upon which to narrow
Austin's core teaching on democratic legitimacy.
A final argument that seeks to limit Austin's significance rests on
another supposed distinction between wealth directed into politics
by individuals and wealth directed into politics by corporations.
The contention is that Austin regards corporate wealth as uniquely
capable of distorting democracy because corporate speech is "not
generated or characterized by individual participation." 477 Political expenditures of unequal individual wealth, by contrast, do not
suffer this deficiency and therefore pose no threat of "undue
influence" over democratic processes. 478 This argument mimics
almost perfectly a theory advanced by C. Edwin Baker. Professor
Baker posits liberty, self-determination, and self-realization as the
First Amendment's central values, and therefore regards corporate
speech as unworthy of protection because it is market-dictated, not
motivated by individual choice or free-will. 479
However one
evaluates Professor Baker's theory on its own merits, though, it does
not describe Austin. The Austin decision, far from accepting a First
Amendment distinction between corporate and individual speech,
expressly reaffirmed Bellotti's holdings that corporate political
speech deserves constitutional protection on a listener value
475 See, e.g., PHILIPS, supra note 15, at 8 (noting that the distribution of wealth in
the United States is more unequal than in any other major industrial country); see also
PHILLIP MATERA, PROSPERITY LOST 23 (1991) (citing Federal Reserve financial asset
surveys and concluding that American "financial assets [are] overwhelmingly concentrated among a tiny minority of families"); supra text accompanying notes 205-08.
476 Professor Brudney, for example, argues that the First Amendment does not
protect compelled, nonconsensual use of shareholder funds. See Brudney, supranote
470, at 294. Brudney's argument would require the Court to overrule Bellotti, a step
that the Austin Court declined to take. Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 232-37 (1977) (holding that a state law permitting a public employees' union to
require dues payments for political speech violated the First Amendment).
477 Lassman, supra note 469, at 790.
478 Id.

479 See BAKER, supra note 107, at 194-224; C. Edwin Baker, Realizing SelfRealization: CorporatePoliticalExpendituresandRedish 'sThe Value of Free Speech, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 646, 652-55 (1982).
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"political expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the
First Amendment freedoms. ' " 481 Austin upheld Michigan's campaign law not because the Court loved corporate speech less, as
Baker would prefer, but because it distrusted wealth-driven politics
more.
A more important reason for concluding that Austin does not
track Professor Baker's theory relates to the Court's assessment of
the "other peoples' money" problem. The Court has consistently
noted that shareholders consent to their investments being
employed for economic ends (Baker's "market-dictated" speech), but
not for political purposes. 482 To the extent that Austin regarded
the political use of shareholder money as a special evil, it was
precisely because the Court viewed that type of "corporate speech"
as beyond the economically motivated, market-driven decisions
authorized by stockholders. 48 3 At least in this context, then, the
absence of "market-dictated" activity, which for Baker is a reason to
afford First Amendment protection, was for the Court a reason to
allow greater state regulation. On this count as well, Austin's
holding and Baker's thesis collide. What remains at Austin's center,
480 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 657 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
(1978) ("The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union or individual.")
481Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968))).
482 See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238,
260 (1986) (stating that stockholders "contribute investment funds or union dues for
economic gain, and do not necessarily authorize the use of their money for political
ends"); Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414 (1972)
(noting the importance of segregating political and general funds in order to protect
the politically "dissenting stockholder or union member"); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at
670 (Brennan,J., concurring) (stating that corporate finances "are not an indication
of popular support for the corporation's political ideas," but rather "reflect the
economically motivated decisions of investors and customers") (quotingMassachusetts
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 258).
483 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 670-71 (BrennanJ., concurring). If the Court's concern
about shareholder consent extended even to "market-dictated" political expendituresexpenditures calculated to maximize the return on shareholders' investments-it
would logically apply to other business decisions with which a shareholder might
harbor a "political" disagreement, and would constitutionalize much of the general
law of corporate governance. But cf. Brudney, supra note 470, at 274 (stating that "it

is far from self-evident that the First Amendment requires the same consensual
arrangements among stockholders for corporate commercial speech that it permits,
and indeed supports, for corporate political speech").
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then, is a conception of democracy that rules out the wealth-based
allocation of political power.
D. Poverty JurisprudenceRevisited
Austin's implications for the Court's treatment of poverty should

by now be obvious. Austin recognizes that states have a compelling
interest in mitigating the effects of concentrated wealth in the
political sphere. The existence of this compelling state interest does
not necessarily imply a correlative constitutional duty,484 but it
does point to a democratic defect that is of utmost importance to
the Court in its acceptance-or rejection-of political decisionmaking. The Court's poverty discourse ignores the power that money
wields in the political sphere and mistakenly ascribes to the poor a
political potency that those without economic resources simply lack.
Austin makes clear that the Court's poverty cases rest on a misguided assessment of how well the democratic system works for the
poor. Austin's structural understanding of the role of money in
American politics pierces the myth of democratic legitimacy that
stands at the core of the poverty cases and their use of rationality
review.
This myth of democratic legitimacy is harmful in at least two
interconnected respects. First, the Court's use of rationality review,
despite the political marginalization of the poor, facilitates a politics
of scapegoating and sensationalism in which stereotype masquerades
as fact and stigma displaces deliberation. 48 5 This lack of reasoned
decisionmaking is an extreme example of a broader democratic
defect 48 6 that the courts must correct through heightened review.
But the damage wrought by the democratic myth in the Court's
poverty discourse is more personal and more tragic. When the poor

4' See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests and Constitutional
Discourse, 55 ALB. L. REV. 549, 554 (1992) (contending that "whatever arguments
support compelling public purposes will also support fundamental rights," but noting
that under current doctrine, such compelling interests do not ordinarily give rise to
constitutional duties).
485 See, e.g., Kevin Sack, New York Medicaid Strainedby Newly Poor,N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 1992, § 4, at 16 (quoting MichaelJ. Dowling, Director of health, education and
human services in New York, that "[i]t is often much easier from a political point of

view to deal with issues that are just perceived as welfare" because regulators need
not deal meaningfully with the affected client population).
486 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica Through Law, 25 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 949,949 (1991) (noting that "the contemporary American system of public law"
is characterized by a lack of "[d]emocratic deliberation").
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and homeless bring their constitutional claims to court, the stakes
are very high if concern and empathy are denied. 7 For someone
in Mr. A.'s condition, the court's deliberative indifference may mean
the difference between life and death itself. Austin should make
clear that the Court's broad deference to majoritarian outcomes that
condemn poor people to starvation or worse cannot be justified
where the political order is "distorted and corroded" by economic
inequalities.
The Court abdicates its fundamental responsibility to dispense
justice when it stands passively in the face of democratic failure
caused by disparities of wealth in the political sphere. Twenty years
ago, the Court was unable to find any distinction between laws that
affect the most basic of human wants and mere commercial
restrictions. It found nothing troubling about having "the starving
man or woman accept the majority's vote on whether he or she shall
live or not."48 8 Austin's important insight into the relation between democracy and wealth compels the Court to reassess its
treatment of a politically powerless minority and to offer protection
against a polity that claims to possess a government of and for the
community, and yet would allow its members to perish when there
are resources available to provide for them. 48 9 Extending some
kind of heightened protection to the poor may not seem like much
where hardship is so great. 490 But the modest hope is that it will
reorient social policies in a more humane and caring direction.

487 See Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homesfor the Mentally
Retarded,EqualProtectionandLegal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.

111, 132 (1987) (discussing the need for "proximity, empathy and imagination" in
determining how a class burdened by a governmental classification experiences such
treatment).
488 Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT
THEY
ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 65, 83 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971).
489

See WALZER, supra note 11, at 79 ("No community can allow its members to
starve to death when there is food available to feed them... not if it claims to be a
government of or by or for the community.").
490 Cf W.H. AUDEN & Louis KRONENBERGER, THE VIKING BOOK OF APHORISMS:

A PERSONAL SELECTION 368 (Dorset Press 1981) (1962) ("Grub, first, then ethics."
(quoting Bertolt Brecht's THE THREE PENNY OPERA (Act II, Finale))).

